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Terrorism has a predilection with nations and nationalism and it plays on the 
symbiotic relationship between nationalism and violence. But “forgetting” this 
violence and bloodshed was crucial to the perpetuation of the myth of civilized 
nations. While Postcolonial Studies has offered incisive justifications for anti-
imperialist movements and the creation of new nations within the colonizer/colonized 
paradigm, there is now a need to critically examine terrorism with its demands for 
new nations with its narratives of violence.  
This dissertation, Mapping Terrorism: Amorphous Nations, Transient 
Loyalties is a comparative study of the narratives of terrorism in specific texts that 
invoke the re-imagining of the narratives of the nation and the re-configuration of 
  
national subjectivities. Furthermore, since globalization has extended the national 
imaginary beyond borders, it has forced us to engage with the implications of 
diasporic populations that have sometimes attributed to the formation of transnational 
communities of violence (both real and imagined). Through my analysis of fictional 
representations of terrorists, terrorism and terrorist acts in cinema and fiction and 
using the rubric of Postcolonial Studies, I locate these narratives within a discursive 
space framed by the interstices of dominant discourses, where nation and state do not 
collide. For my larger overarching argument in theorizing terrorism, I introduce a new 
category of (anti)nationalisms that includes all forms of variant nationalisms like 
sub-nationalisms, ethnonationalisms, counter-nationalisms, fundamentalisms, 
extremism, secessionism etc., each of which is uniquely different but all of which 
define themselves using the discourse of Nationalism as its oppositional ‘Other’. 
Using this overarching category of (anti)nationalisms offers us a new space – an in-
between space, to talk about variant nationalisms that are not necessarily congruent 
with terrorism.  Doing so, offers us the opportunity to address each of these variant 
nationalisms in depth without having to engage with issues of ethical implications of 
these imaginings. It is my assertion that (anti)nationalisms are the geneses of all 
terrorist activities and conversely, terrorism can be argued as constituting the 
performative aspect of the political agenda of (anti)nationalisms. My dissertation thus 
addresses a broader need for theorizing terrorism through cultural representations 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Terrorism has a predilection with nations and nationalism and it plays on the 
symbiotic relationship between nationalism and violence. Violence has always been 
inherent in the birth of new nations. In 1882, Ernst Renan, in his seminal essay, 
“What is a Nation?” declared, “Historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence 
which took place at the origins of all political formations, even those whose 
consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always affected by means of 
brutality…”(11).  But “forgetting” this violence and bloodshed was crucial to the 
perpetuation of the myth of civilized nations. Similarly, even as this symbiotic 
relationship between nationalism and violence was echoed in the anti-colonial 
resistance against imperialism and the birth of new nations in the postcolonial era, it 
was the collective forgetting of violence in the exuberance of the immediate 
postcolonial moment that was crucial to the myth of nation building. Although this 
violence and trauma was initially suppressed in collective public memory, its 
displacement into the discursive public sphere came when it eventually emerged in 
fictional narratives, biographical accounts or stories transcribed from oral lore to be 
subsequently examined with academic rigor. 
But several decades later, newer narratives of violence in the form of 
terrorism have emerged and their intersections with the discourses of nationalism 






imaginings. While Postcolonial Studies has offered incisive and powerful 
justifications for anti-imperialist movements and the creation of new nations within 
the colonizer/colonized paradigm, how do we begin to critically examine terrorism 
with its demands for new nations and its narratives of violence within the framework 
of Postcolonial Studies? When Nationalism is invoked through fictional 
representation of terrorist narratives in fiction and popular film, how do these texts 
negotiate the thin line between legitimate desires for nationhood and those that hijack 
nationalism as a discourse to feed the fanatic frenzies of a community based on 
violence?  
Let me use a much misused analogy of color – black, white and shades of grey 
to illustrate what it is that I endeavor to achieve through my dissertation. Nationalism, 
as we shall show in the following chapter, is a well developed discourse, albeit it is 
still being interrogated and reworked. It can be represented in my analogy as being 
painted white, sanitized by the ‘forgetting’ of violence inherent in the creation of the 
nation and the annual ritualistic celebration that marks this moment. Terrorism, as we 
know it today, is a reality we all have to contend with but despite its significant 
spread, it remains an undefined entity. In the minds of the public and the media blitz 
that surrounds it and which terrorism feeds on, as well as, in the corridors of the 
governments of all nation-states, terrorism has taken on a life of its own. But 
terrorism as a construct has no clearly defined discursive space because of the ethical 






and because in today’s world, the role of the nation-state has again come under 
scholarly scrutiny. Since terrorism has been associated with death, destruction and the 
forces of evil, let us paint it black. The problem I am trying to articulate, here, is what 
language do we need to talk about all those shades of grey in between? Who speaks 
for those transitional movements that lurk somewhere in that space of in-
betweenness, not yet recognized as legitimate nationalisms and yet not marked by the 
macabre violence of terrorism?  If the role of the nation-state itself is being re-
examined, what identity can we ascribe to these movements? My category of 
(anti)nationalisms is an umbrella term that incorporates all these variant forms of 
nationalism, that use nationalism as their oppositional ‘other’ and have arisen out of 
the fissures and disjunctures in the nation, where the nation and the nation-state do 
not overlap. My analogy of color takes on far more symbolism than I initially 
intended, loaded with the signification attributed to these color codes but I must 
confess, inspired by the color coding that the Homeland Security uses to earmark 
stages of preparedness in the face of terror attacks in the US.  But to reiterate, this 
identification of a key term - (anti)nationalisms is my critical intervention in debates 
surrounding nationalism and terrorism.  
My dissertation, Mapping Terrorism: Amorphous Nations, Transient Loyalties 
is a comparative study of the narratives of terrorism in specific texts (film and fiction 
from the Indian subcontinent in Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi and English as well as from the 






of the nation, and the re-configuration of national subjectivities. Furthermore, I argue, 
that the effects of globalization in the recent past extend these narratives of the nation 
beyond borders, forcing us to engage with the implications of diasporic populations 
that have sometimes attributed to the formation of trans-national communities of 
violence (both real and imagined). Through my analysis of fictional representations of 
terrorists, terrorism and terrorist acts in Cinema and Fiction, I use the rubric of 
postcolonial studies to locate these narratives within a discursive space framed by the 
interstices of dominant discourses, where nation and state do not collide, and what 
Gayatri Spivak appropriately calls the “loosened hyphen between the nation and 
state” (364).  
For my larger overarching argument in theorizing terrorism through this use 
of counter-narratives of nationalism, I use my category of (anti)nationalisms that 
includes all forms of variant nationalisms like sub-nationalisms, ethnonationalisms, 
counter-nationalisms, fundamentalisms, extremism, secessionism etc., each of which 
is uniquely different but all of which define themselves using the discourse of 
Nationalism as its oppositional ‘Other’. Using this category of (anti)nationalisms, I 
argue enables my analysis of these films to show the perpetuation and projection of a 
national imaginary through narratives of terror in popular cinema.  
My choice of texts locate this analysis, in the convergence and divergence of 
the forces of nationalism with terrorism(s) mediated through the (anti)nationalisms 






specifically the Indian border states of Punjab, Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Assam. In 
my analysis, these texts, serve to interrogate the genesis of terrorism in the 
secessionist movements like the demand for Khalistan and Bodoland (Maachis and 
Dil Se); counter-nationalisms like the long festering Kashmir issue (Roja, Mission 
Kashmir); ethnonationalism like the LTTE’s demand for a Tamil homeland (The 
Terrorist); and religious fundamentalisms like those invoked in the Partition of the 
subcontinent in 1947 (Tamas) and the recent resurgent Hindu fundamentalism that 
seeks to promote a new national identity rooted in militant Hindutva (Riot, Bombay). 
The rise of religious fundamentalisms (Hindu, Sikh and Islamic) in these states can be 
attributed to a wide range of causes that resonate within these texts - from economic 
disparities to divisive issues of class and gender. The ethnonationalism in these texts 
derives from linguistic chauvinism to well-established ethnic identities. The 
introduction of material and ethical valences further complicates the formulation of 
national identity through the underlining regional and cultural differences, essential to 
this study of terrorism as a trope in fiction and film.  
In my dissertation, my chapter on fiction anchors my argument in the history 
of nationalism in the Indian subcontinent. It covers a temporal span of several 
decades, from the 1930s colonial India to contemporary India. The incipient 
nationalism in Tamas is inflected by the colonizing mission, the echoes of which we 
see in the postcolonial nationalism of Riot which contribute to my reading of 






The relationship between cinema and nation is a vexed one. For my 
dissertation in my analysis of both Bollywood and Hollywood popular cinema, I 
move away from using the category of national cinema, which to me is not only 
problematic but also inadequate in many ways. It brings to mind government 
controlled cinema, limited in its scope and that does not allow for the several kinds of 
cinema that emerge from within the same nation-state. For example, can American 
national cinema be seen as synonymous with Hollywood cinema? The answer is 
obvious. For the purposes of my dissertation, I steer clear of the category of national 
cinema, using more popular categories like Hollywood and the derivative 
“Bollywood cinema” to classify the films in this study.  
  Bollywood cinema is distinctly different from Hollywood cinema despite the 
derivative name which I see as merely a tongue in cheek reference to Hollywood. 
One of the problems with working with Bollywood Cinema has been the limited body 
of scholarly work that surrounds it.  The distinct differences in film making styles vis-
à-vis Hollywood makes it impossible to directly import film theory about classical 
Hollywood towards the reading of Bollywood films. Theorizing Bollywood is still a 
process in the initial stages although several critics have attempted to compile a 
narrative style that is unique to Bollywood and defines Bollywood films. Lalitha 
Gopalan, in a nod towards this reality, suggests, “Instead of putting forward a 
separate theoretical paradigm for reading Indian cinema, I suggest calibrating film 






provincialism surrounding film theory, and in the process, rejuvenating it” (24).  A 
reading of interruptions would thus include the foregrounding of differences and 
highlighting of the points of contact between the two different styles of filmmaking. 
Though I draw attention to the lack of a single comprehensive indigenous film theory 
about the style of Bollywood filmmaking, I do draw on the work of several Indian 
film scholars in my readings of Bollywood cinema. Using a similar structure of 
borrowing and adapting Western film theory, I incorporate terms from Western film 
theory like genre classifications (melodrama, trauma films) even as I talk about the 
disruption in linear continuity through the use of stills, song and dance sequence, 
flashbacks etc. as cinematic conventions that I attribute and develop as a Bollywood 
genre of trauma films.  
Independent and documentary films used in this dissertation are clearly 
indicated as being separate from the above not just in terms of their funding and 
production but also in terms of their limited distribution and reception. I will clarify 
this is more detail in Chapter 4. 
The latter part of my dissertation moves beyond the borders of the 
Subcontinent, wherein the influences of globalization link these local and regional 
terrorism(s) to other communities of violence. Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie in 
their “Introduction” to Cinema and Nation point out that there is a need to re-think 
the link between cinema and nation even as the notion of nations is being primarily 






globalization and nationalism in many cases are two sides of the same coin, to 
suggest that “film scholars should be intent not so much on avoiding concepts of 
nationhood and nationality, but on refining them and clearly identifying their 
continued, although changing pertinence for film studies” (2).  Their assertion that 
any such study currently draws on a rather limited existing corpus of theoretical texts 
is undeniable. It underlines the need for new studies that link cinema and nation and 
not just in the sense of nation-building clearly associated with the birthing of nascent 
nations in the 20th century. My dissertation takes a fresh look at the symbiotic link 
between nations and cinema by primarily focusing on communities of violence that 
shape and re-shape nations through the cultural prism of cinema and tangentially, 
fiction and the global media.  The sudden spurt in the number of Hollywood films 
that tackle the subject of terrorism is an obvious indication that the fear of fragmented 
nations is no longer exclusively the preoccupation of the developing world but has 
firmly taken root in the western world as well.  There are several examples to draw 
from and this would only be a cursory list of films that deal with the subject: 
Passenger 57 (1992), Under Seige (1992), Executive Decision (1996, The Seige 
(1998) The Devil’s Own (1997) Arlington Road (1999). 
With Globalization as a prominent and imperative reality of the latter half of 
the twentieth century and the global subsuming the local, terrorism has also 
metamorphosed into a global phenomenon. We are now forced to think globally, to 






borders that further evokes a crucial debate of the politics of citizenship in re-defined 
nations with large and shifting diasporic communities. The support of these 
(anti)nationalisms discussed in the earlier part of my dissertation thus extends beyond 
financing (an integral part of the financing for the Khalistani movement came from 
diasporic Sikh populations in Canada, UK and USA) to a more involved and active 
collusion that connects the Kashmir issue with Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harakat-Al-
Mujahadeen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, terror organizations based in Pakistan to the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, to the Hamas group in Palestine. I use two 
Hollywood films, The Siege, The Three Kings, both released in the late 1990s to 
bridge the transition from the local to global. These two films bring it all full circle by 
linking the Gulf War to the terrorism in the United States. Finally, I use these films as 
a point of entry into the larger discourse of global terrorism to explore and accentuate 
the incumbent economic and capitalism oriented goals of terrorist organizations 
which are tied together by an agenda of religious fundamentalism and function either 
as loosely put together ‘coalitions of convenience’ or are backed by a structured and 
systematic form of state-sponsored terrorism.  
A crucial consequence of transnational terrorism is the problems associated 
with combating terrorism. If Osama Bin Laden declared war in a fatwa1 on the United 
States in and September 11th, 2001 was a consequence of this, it obfuscates all 
previously held distinctions of nation-state and enemy states, it undercuts the 






the actions of states and it makes a mockery of established political alliances. To 
explain, Saudi Arabia is an ally of the United States and yet Osama Bin Laden, a 
Saudi citizen has declared war on the US and it was 17 Saudi men who flew the 
planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that fateful day in September. Is 
terrorism then a problem of law and order (a popular strategy used by the colonists to 
contain any violence as well as discredit any burgeoning forms of nationalism)? Or 
has the declaration of war on terror by the United States on a global network of 
loosely organized sympathizers of a religious cause, in response to September 11th, in 
direct contradiction of the International laws the world has lived with since 1945, just  
shifted the parameters of terrorism as legitimate warfare? I deal with this problem at 
length both in the context of the Indian subcontinent and then later in the context of 
Hollywood films. 
Dissertation Organization 
Chapter I:  Nationalisms and (Anti)nationalisms 
As a key discourse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Nationalism was 
instrumental in informing and shaping our collective political subjectivities as it 
helped establish civil society in fledgling democracies. The last decade, however, has 
seen several prominent postcolonial scholars take issue with its androcentric biases, 
its exclusive and elitist constituencies and the derivative nature of such national 






introduced another dynamic into this equation, challenging this current state-centric 
political system of governance. Terrorism, another monolithic category nurtured in 
these fragmentations of nation-states is seemingly a consequence of failed 
nationalistic politics. I introduce my category of (anti)nationalisms as an umbrella 
term to cover all the variant nationalisms that use nationalism as their oppositional 
‘other’. These (anti)nationalisms and there are many, need to be analyzed individually 
for their differences in orientation, politics and constituency. I then go on to build on 
my category of (anti)nationalisms to frame the paradigms to contend with terrorism as 
a discourse as I negotiate the discursive space I identify in this chapter by engaging 
individually with each of the existing discourses of Nationalism, Postcolonialism, 
Trans-nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, Multiculturalism and Globalization.   
Chapter II: Religious Fundamentalisms 
This chapter examines the religious underpinnings of Hindu and Islamic 
fundamentalisms in India in two novels: Bhisham Sahani’s Hindi novel Tamas (1974) 
set in the Partition of 1947, Shashi Tharoor’s novel Riot (2001) set in the Ayodhya 
aftermath by examining local narratives of resistance and their impact on the larger 
collective memory that shapes a national consciousness. I define the first kind of 
(anti)nationalisms in this chapter as deriving from Islamic and Hindu religious 
fundamentalisms and their manifestation as collective violence or rioting. Spatiality, I 
reckon plays a very important role in understanding this collective violence and I 






temporal space, social space, symbolic space and sacred space. Modernity, I argue 
has refashioned nationalism in the Indian subcontinent, setting up a hierarchical 
structure in society through the discourse on secularism. The modernizing mission 
that guided the secular nationalism of postcolonial India, I argue has been 
appropriated by various groups for the promotion of their own political ends.  This 
manipulation of “modernity” in the context of terror is also analyzed in this chapter. 
Chapter III: Re-affirming the Nation 
The relationship between cinema and nationhood in India is a complex one. So even 
as Hindi national cinema with its pan-Indian aesthetic contributed to the nation-
building enterprise albeit a homogenizing one that erased regional, cultural and 
linguistic differences, regional films in languages other than Hindi contributed to a 
different aesthetic, one that privileged the regional or the local over the national, that 
gave voice to oppositional discourses and that directly or indirectly challenged the 
homogenous national discourse. This chapter examines Ratnam’s Tamil film Roja 
(1992) and Bombay (1995), Chopra’s Mission Kashmir (2000) and Mohammed’s 
Fiza (2000) and how these films use terrorism as a narrative strategy to inflect and 
reflect the larger unifying and legitimizing narrative of the nation. I examine 
terrorism as a trope in these films and the (anti)nationalisms that give birth to these 
terror networks. I also analyze the fragility of the Indian nation threatened from 
within by a variety of (anti)nationalisms despite the aggressive economic and political 






Chapter IV: The Theater of Terrorism  
Drawing on the shift in Bollywood Cinema that signals a clear transition to a more 
global perspective on terrorism, the last chapter will focus on how the face of 
terrorism has changed unequivocally in the last decade by analyzing two films 
Zwick’s The Siege (1998) and Russell’s Three Kings (1999). This chapter focuses on 
a formalist analysis of the performative aspect of terrorism in film. Since terrorism 
lends itself to performance - a horrific spectacle that demands spectators to induce 
fear, this chapter examines the strategies that filmmakers employ in transferring this 
visual and graphic event onto the cinematic screen. Spatiality plays a critical role in 
my analysis of (anti)nationalisms or the asymmetrically developed ‘other’ 
nationalisms in these films. I argue that the spaces occupied by the ‘others’ on screen 
have serious ramifications off-screen in terms of containment at the political level as 
well. Hence the representation of these (anti)nationalisms plays into the larger 
discourse on terrorism as fashioned by the notions of a global empire. 
Conclusion 
My dissertation re-examines the formation of national subjectivities for nations in 
crisis through a close study of (anti)nationalisms, which are several unique kinds of 
variant nationalisms that despite their subjective differences share an affinity for 
Nationalism as their oppositional ‘other’.  My research based on the comparative 
analysis of specific Indian and American texts, fiction and film, posits that terrorism 






and is crucial to the formation of national subjectivities and ideologies today. 
Terrorism has introduced a challenging vector into national imaginings within the last 
decade and my dissertation establishes a broader need for newer ways of theorizing 
terrorism within the framework of Postcolonial studies.   
Given the vastness of the scope of terrorism, I felt the need to draw on 
theoretical premises from various other disciplines like Sociology, History, Political 
Science and Anthropology to corroborate my conclusions. My dissertation being a 
comparative study uses texts in languages other than English, including Hindi, Urdu 
and Punjabi. I have tried to retain quotations in the original language in my analysis 
which I italicize in the body text and if I could not embed the translation in my 
analysis, I used translations in parentheses where required so as to not disrupt the 
flow of the argument. I have deliberately chosen to use commonly accepted spellings 
for Hindi and Urdu words and refrain from the use of diacritical marks which I find 
cumbersome and confusing to the reader. 
This inter-disciplinary study derives and benefits from my training in 
Postcolonial theory, Cinema Studies, South Asian Fiction and Comparative Literature 
even as current events provide exigency for my doctoral research. The contemporary 
nature of my research has been very rewarding but a little intimidating in terms of the 
endless new material that came my way. My conclusion deals with a Bollywood film, 
Rang De Basanti that was released on DVD only on March 26, 2006 but that I chose 






Chapter 2: (Anti)Nationalisms And Terrorism 
Nationalism as a discourse has been on center stage for a long time. It has been 
celebrated, interrogated, dissected and even deconstructed by several critics who have 
engaged with its parameters of framing, its origins and its androcentric biases. Some 
scholars have argued that nationalism has been through several phases of existence 
and that the world is now perhaps seeing a third phase of nationalism, where the first 
phase emanated from Western Europe, the second from the decolonized nations and 
the third phase in which we are currently immersed. The third phase of nationalism, it 
has been suggested arises out of its conflicts with globalization. 
My dissertation is about nationalisms at crossroads, where I address the need 
to identify other categories that challenge the centeredness of nationalism as a 
discourse. Terrorism, I argue is one of these categories, a monolithic and 
heterogeneous one that defies theorizing in many ways but challenges these notions 
of nationalism. Terrorism has not yet been adequately developed as a discursive 
construct for reasons that are somewhat obvious, even as it exists in various 
configurations in the imagination of the public, informs political policies, takes on a 
new life in the media blitz that surrounds it and inspires fictional forms that focus on 
narratives of violence. Further, the recently declared ‘War on Terror’ by the United 
States anoints its political status in many more complicated ways. Terrorism with all 






It is my assertion that the third phase of nationalism we are immersed in is not 
a result of the direct conflict with the forces of globalization but it is instead the 
variant, can I say deviant forms of nationalism that now jostle onstage with the forces 
of nationalism, demanding attention and more importantly scholarly critical 
intervention. Ethno-nationalisms, counter-nationalisms, sub-nationalisms, 
secessionism – the list goes on but all of which are crucial variables that come into 
play with this reconfiguration of power.  
Theorizing (Anti)Nationalisms 
My intervention in this larger politico-cultural debate is through my identification of a 
key term, (anti)nationalisms to talk about these counter narratives of nationalism that 
I see as an umbrella term to include all forms of variant nationalisms like sub-
nationalisms, counter-nationalisms, fundamentalisms, extremism, separatism, 
secessionism, each of which, let me clarify, I regard and treat as uniquely different – 
as I make evident in the next few chapters2. The question that follows from this 
framing is how do these (anti)nationalisms tie in with terror movements that have 
shattered nationalist innocence across the world? Using this overarching category of 
(anti)nationalisms offers us a new space – an in-between space, to talk about variant 
nationalisms that are set up in opposition to nationalisms but are not congruent with 
terrorism.  Doing so, offers us the opportunity to address each of these variant 






these imaginings even while accounting for the political positioning of certain nation-
states that assumes moral superiority.   
Terrorism, I argue is not a homogenized monolithic entity that can be 
theorized in its entirety. It is unique, nuanced and has to be studied in its complex 
microforms at the grass-root levels to be effectively understood and combated.  In 
order to better understand the genesis of all terrorism (and there are several kinds) I 
see the need to first develop a discursive space to address its origins, articulate its 
paradigms and enunciate its limitations vis-à-vis legitimate political rebellions. It is a 
discursive space of in-betweenness that I flesh out at the interstices of well known 
discourses in this chapter, which once located can be then critically negotiated 
through the use of my category of (anti)nationalisms to enter the debate that 
surrounds theorizing terrorism. It is important to point out at the outset that I do not 
equate sub-nationalisms, counter-nationalisms and fundamentalism etc. with 
terrorism, where terrorism is the violent employment of terror tactics by resistance 
groups, not recognized as nation-states by the global community and that result in 
indiscriminate killing through unconventional means in order to achieve the political 
agenda of (anti)nationalisms. In my perception, these groups may not necessarily be 
defined by the geo-political space they occupy and can be widely dispersed in the 
nature of diasporic communities in this age of transnationalism. Keeping the ethno-
political, social, historical and economic ramifications of specific kinds of 






cinema) within both the local and the global context, as I do in my dissertation, I 
conclude that (anti)nationalisms are the geneses of all terrorist activities. Conversely, 
terrorisms can be argued as constituting the performative aspect of the political 
agenda of (anti)nationalisms. In other words, it is through a performance of terror that 
some of these (anti)nationalisms surface as terrorism. Let me clarify however, that I 
do mean not mean to imply that all (anti)nationalisms lead to terrorism.  It is the 
recognition of the heterogeneous nature of terrorisms and the urgent need for 
interrogation of the role of the nation-state in these imaginings that I argue, demands 
this examination.  
There is no established or official history of terrorism. Some critics trace the 
origins of terrorism to the eleventh century Islamic sect of Nizari Ismailites whose 
members, “Hashshashin,” (the source word for Assassin) were known for murdering 
their enemies as a religious duty. Others see it as a descendant of Anarchism, still 
others see it, as a byproduct of imperialism. Tracing the trajectory of terrorism we see 
it surface in the spaces where the nation and the state do not collide, where the 
boundaries of the state and nation no longer overlap, where the nation cannot be 
directly mapped onto the state. A meaningful study of terrorism in this age of 
globalization would therefore have to enter into dialogue specifically with discourses 
of postcolonialism, cosmopolitanism, transnationalism and theories of globalization.  
Henry Schwarz concludes his essay “Mission Impossible,” with some very 






in postcolonial studies. It forces us to first confront European notions of universality 
and then to re-imagine humanism since, he says, 
If postcolonial theory has offered powerful justifications for colonized 
states to separate from their oppressors, what can it tell us today of the 
widespread demands for ethnic and other homelands? How should 
international organizations such as the UN, not to mention powerful 
superstates like the US, respond to demands for autonomy such as those in 
Kosovo, Palestine, or Kashmir? What is the status of the nation today and 
who decides who gets one, who lives there and who is to be excluded?  
(Schwarz & Ray, 19) 
I do not attempt to answer all the questions raised by Robbins, but I hope to be able to 
open up newer ways of entering into a critical engagement with these issues using 
terrorism as a central material and theoretical rubric. 
Gayatri Spivak in her book, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, addresses some 
of the vectors that come into play in this rather complex algorithm of fundamentalist 
nationalism and its origins. She says:  
Fundamentalist nationalism arises in the loosened hyphen between nation 
and state as the latter is mortgaged further and further by the forces of 
financialization, although the determinations are never made clear. The 
first items in the following couples are fuzzy, the second abstract: nation-






Much manipulation, maneuvering, and mobilization can take place in the 
interest of the latter in the name of its fuzzy partner. Experience gained in 
the interim suggested another way of conjuring with nationalism, in the 
name not of the globe but of a global girdling (364). 
In mapping terrorism, this chapter shall interrogate the interstices within rhetorical 
strategies of dominant discourses from within which arise counter-narratives of 
nationalism - the “loosened hyphen” between nation and state. To use the analogy of 
textile that Spivak uses elsewhere in her argument, the manipulation of one in the 
name of the other, renders the tearing and rupturing of the “national” fabric so deftly 
woven in the ‘immediate postcolonial moment’ of resistance against imperialism. The 
crucial question to ask then is: are narratives of the nation being re-worked and re-
written?  
In this chapter, I shall first offer a historical overview on scholarship and 
theories of nationalism in an attempt to identify any intersections or disjunctions 
where I can locate a space to talk about my category of (anti)nationalisms as they 
surface in various forms like sub-nationalisms, counter-nationalisms, secessionism, 
separatism and fundamentalisms. Defining (anti)nationalisms and subsequently 
identifying them allows me to build on these fledgling possibilities to theorize 
terrorism later on this chapter. 
The second section of my chapter will address issues of gender, class, and 






nationalism had till the very recent past ignored ‘women’, current scholarship trends 
in postcolonial studies have forced the women question into the foreground. 
Terrorism is not “masculinized violence” as Robin Morgan would have us believe, in 
fact, absolving women of any accountability in terrorism as we know it today, is to 
silence the role of women in any resistance movement. Therefore, it is incumbent 
upon us to factor in the role of gender studies in analyzing terrorism. The ethical 
question also comes into play in this rubric, where, to use Spivak’s term, we have to 
be “auto-critical” as we grapple with moral questions in an amoral academic 
framework.  Finally any study of resistance movements would be reductive if one did 
not take into account class issues in the construction of subjective identity. Nationalist 
movements have been cast as a derivative discourse pertaining only to an elite 
population. The question to ask then is: is terrorism, as we know it today an elitist 
pre-occupation as well? Perhaps cosmopolitanism serves to bridge these dialectical 
opportunities to engage with class issues and hybridity at the global level.  
The third section of my chapter discusses globalization with its implications 
of global financialization and my focus here is much more on the transnationalism 
that this brought about.  Is terrorism truly transnational? Using Masao Miyoshi’s 
model of Transnational Corporations and Multinational Corporations we shall reckon 
with the shift in terror tactics and terrorist agendas that signal a move away from a 
search for a homeland in the name of an ethnic group towards a desire to unify 






also briefly summarize all my contributions towards ways of theorizing terrorism 
through textual analysis in the following chapters. The conclusion will then look 
forward to newer ways of accommodating this growing phenomenon within the larger 
rubric of postcolonial studies.   
Contextualizing the Discourses of Nationalism   
Given terrorism’s predilection with nations, it is appropriate and imperative to use 
nationalism as a point of entry into this study so as to engage with the key discourses 
of nationalism. In 1882, Ernst Renan in his essay, “What is a Nation?” says: 
Forgetting, I would go even so far as to say historical error, is a crucial 
factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical 
studies often constitutes a danger for (the principle of) nationality. Indeed 
historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the 
origins of all political formations, even those whose consequences have 
been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality… 
(11) [emphasis mine] 
While there are several problems with Renan’s argument, it is in the interest of 
exigency that I choose to focus only on that part of his argument that is critical to my 
study – recognition of the symbiotic relationship between nationalism and violence. 
The selective appropriation of history as well as a specific degree of collective 






birth of these nations. Within the colonizer/colonized paradigm, the “forgetting” was 
crucial to the process of containment of violence in the periphery and imperative for 
the continued perpetuation of the myth of civilized nations3.  
Exactly a hundred years later, Benedict Anderson in his seminal text Imagined 
Communities, commenting on the changing political climate, observes, “And many 
‘old nations’ once thoughtfully consolidated, find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-
nationalisms within their borders – nationalisms which, naturally dream of shedding 
their ‘sub’ness one happy day … Indeed nation-ness is the most politically universal 
legitimate value in the political life in our time”(3). Anderson’s argument stems from 
a basic premise that nations are imagined communities that are at once both 
inherently limited and sovereign. Nations are imagined because members of even the 
smallest nation will never meet or know all their fellow members; they are 
communities because they are conceived of as “a deep horizontal comradeship”; they 
are limited because even the largest nation has finite albeit elastic boundaries outside 
of which lie other nations; and they are sovereign because they have their genesis in a 
time when divinely ordained dynastical rule was being challenged.  
To clarify, in my engagement with nationalism as a discourse I do not 
privilege Anderson’s theorization of nationalism which I know is now dated. I use 
Anderson’s theory as a point of departure, acknowledging his contribution as one of 
the first comprehensive theories to ground this discourse but I anchor my argument in 






choose to introduce and address all the critical interventions and refutations that 
surround this theorization today as they intersect with the development of my 
argument. 
Towards that end, let me continue. Anderson therefore posits that all nations 
arise out of and replace dynastic rule and religious communities. The two questions 
that instantly pop into my mind then are: if one were to conceive this process of 
nation formation in a contiguous time-space continuum, can one thus argue that 
terrorist movements that originate in monarchical realms like Saudi Arabia are 
legitimate bodies of people still in the process of imagining a nation? And secondly 
using Anderson’s argument, can we read resistance movements like the one that 
replaced the Shah of Iran, as legitimate imaginings of a nation in crisis?  
Umut Özkirimli points out the inadequacy of Anderson’s argument 
concerning the relationship between nationalism and religion by examining the 
religious aspect of nationalisms.  J. G Kellas refutes Anderson’s claim that religion is 
not always replaced by nationalism and uses the examples of Ireland, Poland, 
Armenia, Israel and Iran where he says religious institutions have reinforced 
nationalisms. Therefore, he undermines Anderson’s contention that nationalism was 
fostered by the decline of religious institutions. Greenfeld, on the other hand argues 
that contrary to Anderson’s argument nationalism arose at a time when religious 
sentiment was on the rise – at the time of the Reformation. Like Kellas, he suggests 






consciousness. Anthony D. Smith relates this relationship, what he calls “the 
superimposition (or uneasy coexistence) of mass religion on nationalism” to modern 
day crises faced by India, some parts of Europe and the former Soviet Union. He says 
that this is hardly surprising given that a significant part of the popular myths, 
symbols and memories on which modern day nations rest, are drawn from world 
religions (Özkirimli, 153). 
Anderson theorizes the concept of time by differentiating between time in the 
past and in the present. For time in the past, he uses Auerbach’s notion of 
“simultaneity” that elides with Walter Benjamin’s concept of “Messianic time’,” 
which suggests the “simultaneity of past and future in an instanteous present” (24) 
Anderson then goes on to talk about “homogenous, empty time” in the present 
context of calendars and clocks. Homi Bhabha, in his brilliant essay, “DissemiNation: 
Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” takes issue with this notion 
of single, empty, homogenous (western) time through his theorization of “double” or 
“split” time that he argues cannot be represented in unmediated contemplation. 
Acknowledging Bhabha’s argument about the inherent and constant tensions between 
the pedagogical and performative in the ambivalent temporalities of the nation space,  
it could still be argued that Anderson’s concept of simultaneity has been co-opted by 
the ideologues of fundamentalist movements. For example, in India, the Hindu Right 
(Bharatiya Janata Party, Rashtriya Sevak Sangh, Vishwa Hindu Parishad etc.) 






the past. This re-written history is then used to construct ‘a pure, unadulterated, 
untouched Hindu identity’ which can consequently be mapped onto the nation’s 
framework, to help imagine a Hindu nation. The past and the present therefore co-
exist in this critical moment of imagining.  
The advent of print capitalism, according to Anderson, served as a focal point 
for the burgeoning nationalisms in the nineteenth century. Extending this argument, I 
read the confluence of the electronic media and the Internet as having similar 
contributions towards the possible imaginings of an Islamic nation or what is 
popularly referred to as the “Arab street.” Hence the establishing of Al Jazeera TV as 
an alternate broadcasting source (as opposed to western media) with viewers across 
the world forces us to reckon with globalization at an unprecedented level where the 
center and the margins are being redrawn and not necessarily along national borders. 
 Anderson uses the term “unisonance,” to explain the rituals that establish 
nationalist behavior such as the singing of the national anthem at specific times. It 
marks a “special kind of contemporaneous community” and there is in this singing, an 
“experience of simultaneity” (145). Homi Bhabha’s theorization on the ambivalence 
surrounding the temporality of the nation subverts this concept of unisonance to 
suggest that this is not a simultaneity but a spatial disjunction that in the language of 
doubleness constitutes a split between “the continuist, accumulative temporality of 
the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative” (297).  I 






together and mobilizes religious groups through traditional bonding rituals that tie a 
religious community together. In establishing an Islamic nation, for example, one can 
talk of certain specific rituals that are designed towards constructing a nation along 
religious lines like the azaan, the reading of the Koran at five specific times a day, 
etc. or in the case of the Hindu revivalist movement, the conducting of jagrans4 – the 
ceremonial chanting of spiritual hymns. The term “ethno-symbolism” (used by 
scholars who question the inventedness and constructed nature of nations) I find, is 
useful to explain these persistent symbols, myths and memories that are an integral 
part of a nation’s collective memory – “the symbolic legacy of the pre-modern ethnic 
identities of today’s nations” (Özkirimli, 168). 
 Further, the fact that the Koran was not translated from its original Arabic 
until recently validates this argument along linguistic lines. So a Muslim from 
Indonesia, India, Pakistan or France with different linguistic backgrounds would still 
read/recite from the Koran in Arabic. Similarly, the Sanskrization of Hindi, the 
attempt to “cleanse” Hindi of any possible adulteration with Urdu, and the need to use 
terms from Sanskrit (a dead language for all practical purposes) to fulfill the vacuum 
created in the language (Hindi) by technological advances, is a paradoxical example 
of this desire to close linguistic borders5. Can this be interpreted as another example 
of the past being revoked to harness the future?  
Several critics have taken exception to Anderson’s assertion of the nation as an 






Imagination of national Cinema,” argues against the ‘limited’ nature of nations as 
imagined communities in this age of transnationalism. He contends that all nations in 
some sense are diasporic, “forged in the tension between unity and disunity, between 
home and homelessness” (Higson, 65). He elaborates on this conflict between 
rootedness and dispersal, pointing out, 
The public sphere of the nation and the discourses of patriotism are thus 
bound up in a constant struggle to transform the facts of dispersal, 
variegation and homelessness into the experience of the rooted community. 
At times, the experience of an organic, coherent national community, a 
meaningful national collectivity, will be overwhelming. At other times, the 
experience of diaspora, dislocation and de-centredness will prevail. It is 
times such as these that other allegiances, other sense of belonging, besides 
the national will be more strongly felt (65). 
Since my focus on the formation of national subjectivity derives largely from a study 
of cultural experiences, I concur with Higson’s argument that not only allows for the 
possibility of belonging to two or more nations simultaneously but also accounts for 
shifting and divided loyalties in terms of cultural allegiances.  His example of three 
different media experiences in terms of their reception by British audiences illustrates 
the diversity of responses translated through individual cultural frames of reference. 
One can conclude that unlike the community forged through print capitalism at the 






creates a national collectivity that on the one hand, is not limited and on the other is 
not fixed and is largely unstable.  This also serves to substantiate my assertion that 
diasporic communities may or may not respond to the same national imperatives at 
every given point in history. And that this tug of war in allegiances towards the nation 
becomes vital in any study of the reception and perception of representations of 
terrorism in cinema.  
A final point that I would like to draw from Anderson’s argument is his 
assertion that “nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love” and 
that the cultural products of nationalism – anthems, poetry, music, arts etc., are 
articulations of this love. So in other words, a nation can be defined by the 
willingness of its citizens (and I use that word hesitatingly) to die for their country. 
“Dying for one’s country, which normally one does not choose, assumes a moral 
grandeur which dying for the Labor Party, the American Medical Association or 
perhaps even Amnesty International can not rival, for these are all bodies one can join 
or leave at easy will” (144). Hence the grandeur stems from the illusion of purity, of 
something fundamentally pure. Andrew Parker in Nationalisms and Sexualities6 
focuses on nationalism as a love for the country – “an eroticized nationalism” (1). 
What then, is the seductive power of this love? As I write this, a Palestinian suicide 
bomber killed three Israeli teenagers in yet another suicide attack in Tel Aviv, a 
strategy that seems to have become an integral part of the Middle East turmoil. 






of dying for the nation, we commemorate heroes, we create martyrs, we celebrate the 
tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The ritual is clearly pre-meditated, for in these deaths, 
the nation lives on.  Robin Morgan in her book, Demon Lover, asserts, “Without the 
propaganda of the hero myth, murder is a sordid business. With the hero myth, any act 
of violence is not only made possible but inevitable: the rapist is transformed into a 
seducer, the tyrant rules by divine right, the terrorist reconstitutes the hero” (56).   
But the terrorist retains a liminal identity till she or he is re-instated into the 
nationalist discourse as a martyr or a freedom fighter. I would, therefore, argue that 
given the terrorists’ pre-occupation with borders, their liminal identity is ironically 
marked by their lurking on the margins. At once the insider and outsider, in many 
ways they occupy a space outside of the narrativizing discourses – the loosened 
hyphen between nation and state. I take this up for further discussion in Chapter 4 in 
my analysis of the hero-protagonists of several Bollywood films whose lives shadow 
this liminal existence between belonging and not-belonging.  I contend that it is this 
desire to be rooted and whole that is signified by their eventual capitulation to born-
again patriotism, and although not all of them die martyrs, it paves their re-entry into 
civil society.   
Nationalism in the Postcolonial Context  
The critical framework of this analysis however needs to be extended to the 






Masao Miyoshi, like Benedict Anderson and several other theorists argue that the 
myth of the modern nation-state had its origins in the 1800s in the West as a function 
of colonialism.  Hence the myth of the nation-state was complemented by the “myth 
of the mission civilisatrice” whereby the voyager’s racial and social superiority was 
established over the heathen savage barbarians. In other words, Miyoshi states, “In 
the very idea of the nation state the colonialists found a politico-economical as well as 
moral-mythical foundation on which to build their policy and apology” (732). The 
change in agenda of colonialism from trade to the annexation of colonies was 
correspondingly complemented by the formation of nation-states in the western 
world, and national identity, which was constituted by the dual process of affirmation 
of the ‘Self’ and the deconstruction of the ‘Other’.  
Frederic Jameson talking about “Third World Literature,” based on the 
problematic premise of the Three Worlds theory, states, “all third world texts are 
necessarily … to be read as … national allegories” (Ahmad, 78). Aijaz Ahmad in his 
critique of Jameson’s argument questions the categorization of Third World 
Literature constructed as an internally coherent object of theoretical knowledge, and 
furthermore, it’s being exclusively defined in terms of the experience of colonialism 
and imperialism. In addition, Jameson’s thesis privileges nationalism as a valorized 
ideology because of its exclusive emphasis on the political unit that is the nation. It is 
a slippery slope argument since that leads us right back to the initial assertion that all 






argument is in his delineation of nationalisms in Asia and Africa as either progressive 
nationalisms or not-so progressive nationalisms. He posits, “Whether or not a 
nationalism will produce a progressive cultural practice depends, to put it in 
Gramscian terms, upon the political character of the power bloc which takes hold of it 
and utilizes it, as a material force, in the process of constituting its own hegemony”. 
(79) Ahmad’s position therefore allows for both progressive and not-so-progressive 
nationalisms by introducing ethical and material valence to the nationalisms. 
 Craig Calhoun in his theorizing about nationalisms posits three dimensions: 
nationalism as discourse, nationalism as project and nationalism as evaluation. 
Nationalism as a discourse is the production of a cultural understanding and the 
rhetoric to frame the aspirations of a people in terms of the idea of the nation and 
national identity. Nationalism as a project is social movements and state policies by 
which people advance the interest of the collectivities that are nations - in historical 
progression - through increased participation of citizens in an existing state, their 
demands for independence and self-determination, or through the amalgamation of 
territories. It is the final dimension of nationalism as evaluation that allows us to 
interpret the nation as a site for dissension, wherein  
political and cultural ideologies … claim superiority for a particular nation; 
these are often associated with movements or state policies, but need not 
be. In this third sense, nationalism is often given the status of an ethical 






ethical imperatives that nationalism came to be associated with excesses of 
loyalty to one’s nation – as in ethnic cleansing, ideologies of national 
purification, and hostility to foreigners (6). [emphasis mine] 
However, Calhoun like several other scholars sees the nation as a discursive 
formation, and he foregrounds Partha Chatterjee’s argument warning us of the 
implications of assuming that all later nationalisms are derivative discourses since 
specific nationalist ideologies are rooted in local conditions and experiences. 
Chatterjee’s rejection of Anderson’s modular form of nationalisms was based on the 
premise that nationalist imagination is not predicated upon identity but on a difference 
with the modular form of nationalisms that were founded in the West. He introduced 
a whole new dimension to studies of nationalism as a discourse. In Chatterjee’s now 
very famous words: 
If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined 
community from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them 
by Europe and the Americas, what do we have left to imagine? History, it 
would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be 
perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true 
subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of 
colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial 
resistance and postcolonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain 






Gender, Class and Ethical Questions 
It is through the process of the erasure of differences in nationalistic discourse that 
gender, class as well as the regional (local) are obliterated and subjugated so that 
ideologies of homogenization among citizens help to foster, maintain and 
institutionalize hegemonic patterns of domination and suppression. It is as a critique 
of nationalism, as an ideology that builds an army of homogenized citizenry, that 
nationalism emerges as a discursive discourse, cognizant of the erasure of differences. 
Eve Sedgwick, laments the inadequacy of the term ‘nation’ and piling difference 
upon difference, she argues for the relativism of the definition whereby there is no 
‘normative’ nation.  
The “other” of the nation in a given political or historical setting maybe the 
pre-national monarchy, the local ethnicity, the diaspora, the trans-national 
corporate, ideological, religious or ethnic unit, the sub-national locale or 
the ex-colonial, often contiguous unit; the colony may become national vis-
à-vis the homeland, or the homeland become national vis-à-vis the 
nationalism of its colonies; the nationalism of the homeland may be co-
extensive with or oppositional to its imperialism; so forth (5). 
Or simply put, the nation is ineluctably shaped by its various definitional ‘other’. 
Several scholars like Gayatri Spivak, Jenny Sharpe, Anne McClintock and Sangeeta 






nations, engendering the nation as it were and interrogating the trope of nation-as-a 
woman. Thus, in the historical experience of particular feminisms in the context of 
national liberation movements, “the imaginings are regularly predicated upon 
construction of women’s bodies” (13). Their bodies become ciphers in the imaginings 
of male resistance fighters, as Valerie Moghadam points out using the example of 
how the Taliban used the purdah or the veil as a rallying point for mobilizing 
resistance against the modernizing regime in Afghanistan. In doing a comparative 
study (focusing on women’s rights) between the Iranian Revolution (a cross-class 
populist Islamic movement against modernity) and the peasant and tribal based 
rebellion against communism in Afghanistan, Moghadam foregrounds some critical 
insights about Islamic fundamentalisms. The discontinuities and disruptions in 
writing the narrative of Islamic nationalisms become profoundly clear.  She writes, 
“Islamist ideologues reject national boundaries created by colonialism/imperialism 
which eventuated the dispersion and fragmentation of the Ummah Islam, the 
“imagined community” of believers. Rebuilding the Ummah is mandated by Iran’s 
Islamic Constitution of 1979. And yet, concrete Islamist movements – influenced as 
they are by twentieth century discourses and social structures – are also nationalist”.  
(425)  
 In the same anthology, Mary Layoun talking about women’s voices in 
Palestinian national narratives, suggests that in order to accommodate women’s 






aspects of literary narratives – “who speaks these stories, their constructions of time 
and space, and the postulations of narrative telos” (43). It is through this narrative 
performance that Palestinian women engender in their own particular ways the 
narrative of Palestinian nationalisms.  
 Robin Morgan’s book The Demon Lover: On the Sexuality of Terrorism, part 
theory, part poetry, is one of the few studies that attempts to link women’s issues to 
terrorism via sexualism.  Although she does address the gender question and its role 
in terrorism, Angela Gilliam critiques Robin Morgan for not taking into account “the 
systemic or structural properties of the domination of women and men” and for 
defining womanhood as “almost supranational and above culture” and her treatise 
thus becomes an analysis that is “simultaneously separatist and relativist” (231). Also, 
note my earlier criticism of Morgan’s definition of terrorism as masculinized 
violence, where the terrorist is primarily male. A terrorist according to Morgan, is 
“the logical incarnation of patriarchal politics in a technological world” (33). 
Morgan’s women are the mothers, the daughters, the sisters and the wives of 
terrorists, since for her, “the majority of terrorists – and those against whom they are 
rebelling – are men” (24). 
Calhoun points out that nationalisms are overwhelmingly male ideologies that 
affirm masculinist practices as rooted in traditional cultures. However, his argument 
parts ways with Morgan’s in that he critiques these androcentric leanings. In 






imaginings, he distinguishes between the representation of men and women in “the 
way national strength is defined so often as international potency and military power; 
men are treated as potential martyrs while women are mainly the mothers. It is in 
content – militarism and the appropriation of patriarchal traditional culture for the 
most part – that nationalisms are especially sexist” (114). He goes on to argue that in 
form, nationalist agendas for individual rights have provided/and can provide a space 
for women to claim their rights as citizens, an argument that I do not find completely 
convincing.  
 The other interesting argument that he develops is about contemporary Islamic 
nationalism, and how despite its traditional and fundamentalist content, it shares, to a 
large extent, the discursive nature of western nationalisms (an argument similar to 
Moghadam’s). However, he makes the claim that this categorical identity 
(nationalism as a discursive discourse) bridges the gap between the individual 
Muslim within the specific Islamic nation and the Ummah Islam.  Calhoun writes, 
“This is part of what makes fundamentalist Islam so threatening to various formally 
more traditional governments like the monarchies of the Gulf States. These Arab 
states are precisely not nationalist and not organized around modern ideas of 
citizenship” (114). So although Iran and Iraq are nation-states based on the premise of 
universal citizenship for men, in monarchies like Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia 






 It is my contention that the dangerous mix of religion and politics acts as a 
catalyst, precipitating religious fundamentalism along ethnic lines. India, with its 
nascent Hindu revivalist movement brings the agenda of political violence to the 
forefront. In discussing the politics and the eruption of Hindu nationalism in India, 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak posits that it is not only the political power brokers in the 
Rightist parties who have in the name of “historically authoritative national identity” 
aided the forces of fundamentalism but that “there is an isolationist counter-
nationalism among the ideologues of the left parties” as well. She says, “some 
professed anti-nationalists of the diasporic left, taking a passionate stand against 
religious nationalism in the country of origin, betrayed the power of the reactive 
nationalism of the ex-patriate” (363). 
Sumantra Bose as cited by Sangeeta Ray in Engendering India echoes these 
thoughts. Bose says that positing communalism as the “antithesis of Indian 
‘nationalism,’ frequently results in the postcolonial ‘secular state’ and the freedom 
movement before it, being absolved of most if not all culpability in the rise of 
‘communalism’ and specifically of ‘Hindutva’… Yet there has been a widespread 
reluctance among scholars of contemporary India, and of the growing problems of 
communalism, to situate the rise of Hindutva within a broader more substantive 
critique of the modern Indian state” (150). Any meaningful study of fundamentalism 






Analyzing the post-Babri Masjid ethnic violence in India in 1992, Amedeo 
Maiello, argues that though the current wave of ethnic-religious violence across the 
world is largely festered by processes of globalization and global transformation, it 
would be reductive to apply the same paradigm to the Indian situation. It is 
imperative for us to recognize “the reality of a transnationalist capital order which, 
although contributing, does not appear to completely or fully determine the 
development of ethnic confrontation” (100). According to Maiello, the genesis of this 
violence can be traced back to the initial development policies instituted by the state, 
which is now exacerbated by the current restructuring policies in the age of 
globalization. Satish Deshpande similarly identifies two specific kinds of 
nationalisms in India – one based on religious-communal identity and one that is 
explicitly based on the modernistic ideology of development (176). While on the one 
hand, Deshpande suggests that it is the constant confrontation of these two co-
existing forms of nationalism that has eroded the national fabric, Sumantra Bose on 
the other hand, suggests that the relationship between communalism and secularism 
in postcolonial India is dialectical as opposed to adversarial. Maiello’s argument is 
completely different from both Deshpande and Bose in that he sees communal and 
ethnic confrontations as a direct result of the mismanagement of the implementation 
policies of the modernistic ideology of development.  
Hence, Maiello introduces a new vector into this algorithm – skewed 






an imbalance between regions. The increase in social and economic disparities further 
coalesced the ethnic conflict and the class conflict. These regional imbalances had 
another serious repercussion in terms of the migration of large bodies of regional 
populations that led to the migrant/non-migrant confrontation in the metropolis. In 
Bombay, the Shiv Sena (the fundamentalist Right wing Hindu party) used this as a 
rallying point for their demands for preferential treatment in terms of employment 
and, I may add, to subsequently demand recognition of their indigenous Marathi-
Hindu identity. (This historico-political identity has its moorings in the Maratha-
Mughal wars, spearheaded by Shivaji in resistance to the Islamic Mughal rule across 
the subcontinent). Finally, Maiello hypothesizes that while Balkanisation in the 
Indian context is only a remote possibility, he acknowledges that: “when economic 
grievances deriving from a lop-sided distribution of development resources ignite 
strong primordial sentiments, secessionist movements, as is the case in north-east 
India and Kashmir, take root” (106). 
What I find fascinating about the numerous ethnic-religious conflicts in India 
is the difference in the motivating forces and the political alliances forged in these 
separatist/fundamentalist/militant/terrorist campaigns. Contrary to Maiello’s 
argument, is the example of Punjab (with its resilient agrarian economy, it was one of 
the richest states in India in the post Green Revolution era) where secessionist 
demands for an autonomous state were not only led by the upper classes but also 






the United States. On the other end of the spectrum is the Naxalite movement in 
Bengal and to some extent in Bihar that is a mobilization of the lower classes (the 
subaltern) along with the Muslim community that draws its inspiration and political 
support from the Leftist political parties in the country. The point I am trying to make 
is that a comparative analysis of politico-religious fundamentalisms has to be 
grounded in “difference”.  
It might be useful to frame these two kinds of violent political movements in 
the first case as reflecting the global (with its transnational nature and support from 
the periphery) and in the second case as the local (rooted in its regional causes of 
class conflict and denial of resources). Sangeeta Ray references these transnational 
moorings in the re-imagining of nations by foregrounding the significant co-opting of 
diasporic Indians with intimate ties to the “homeland” by the Hindutva movement. 
The persuasive rhetoric of Hindutva “allows them [the Indian diaspora] to seek, 
understand, and claim a ‘sense of their cultural identity’ and, especially for displaced 
Hindus, authorizes a ‘mentalscape’ for the ‘enhancement of [their] sense of self-
sameness and continuity in time and space” (151). Is this again, another example of 
the pervasive powers of ‘unisonance’?  
As we just pointed out, national imaginings have been cast as elitist 
preoccupations as opposed to subaltern resistance movements that come from below. 
It is my contention that in attempting to categorize terrorism, that along with its 






from subaltern resistance movements. This distinction becomes crucial in 
differentiating between resistance movements, legitimate campaigns for self-
determination and autonomous governments that are predicated on violence; and 
terrorism - which we define as the politics of the last resort.   
Several sociologists have studied the profile of terrorists in their efforts to 
understand this growing phenomenon. While I do cite these studies, I am aware of 
some inherent problems with this exercise that I choose to state right at the outset. 
While these studies validate my assertions, I am cognizant of the fact, that they are 
dated (one of these studies is from groups active during 1966-1976). I will argue that 
given the obvious shift towards global terrorism and our collective knowledge of the 
sophistication of terror tactics post-September 11th, the results of these earlier studies 
can only be further corroborated by our current awareness. The second problem that I 
identify with using these case studies is the inevitable bias of such profiling only as 
far as the process of choosing the initial pool of subjects for the study.  
Amongst these is a study by Charles A. Russel and Bowden Miller who drew 
a sociological profile of a terrorist based on the compilation of data about 350 
terrorists, spanning terrorist organizations from Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Iran, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Palestine, Spain, Turkey and Uruguay. Using the differential of 
the ‘modern urban terrorist’ and the ‘rural guerilla fighter’, their findings substantiate 
that:  i) despite some variations, urban terrorism remains a predominantly male 






two-thirds came from the middle and upper classes in their respective regions of 
origins (with the exception of the IRA that has a constituency arising from the lower 
socio-economic classes);  iv) what consequently follows, most of these hailed from 
families with a professional background; v) two-thirds of these had university 
education with graduate or post-graduate degrees and with a leaning towards 
technology, engineering and the sciences – but covering a range from lawyers, 
engineers, physicians, doctors etc.; vi) Many were bilingual and educated abroad; vii) 
finally, 75 – 80% were single (Morgan, 63-65). 
Some of these findings have been rendered questionable in light of current day 
events while some as I stated earlier, have been further validated. In another 
sociological study from a feminist perspective that focused on Islamic 
fundamentalism, Moroccan theorist, Fatima Mernissi, cites similar findings, that the 
fundamentalist is “neither uneducated nor uncultured”. Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s study of 
34 Egyptian Islamic militants reveals, “that the fundamentalist militant belongs to the 
middleclass, favors scientific branches of knowledge, and performs exceptionally 
well, especially in medicine, engineering, technical military science, and pharmacy” 
(Morgan, 65).  
 Making the connection between real world terrorism and cinematic 
representation underscores a similar representation. All of the films discussed in my 
dissertation, clearly focus on the disavowed middle class in India, Iraq or the US. The 






resistance guerilla with no access to funds and arms.  They are like the 
fundamentalists mentioned above, part of the struggling middleclass, disavowed, 
disenfranchised for various reasons and predominantly male.  
Transnational Terrorism 
Globalization has taken on new meanings today with the emergence of transnational 
corporations, exchange of technology and global markets and increase of capital flow. 
Collapsing borders add a whole new dimension in today’s world as the European 
Economic Community redefines the traditional notion of the nation-state with free 
borders and a common currency. The global configuration of power structures has 
shifted and this re-figuring with its economic and financial repercussions has 
introduced a whole new dynamic into this equation. In my dissertation, the ongoing 
conflict between nation and nation-state inflects several of the (anti)nationalisms that 
I take up for detailed analysis. Arjun Appadurai, in his essay, “Difference in the 
Global Cultural Economy,” reasserts the conflict between nation and state in the 
global era of cultural politics when he says, “the state and the nation are at each 
other’s throats, and the hyphen that links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than 
an index of disjuncture” (304).  Some critics of globalization have argued that it is the 
deterritorialization and the displacement of populations that have weakened the 
moorings of nationalist discourse and set adrift floating populations with alienated 






“the very idea of terrorism, then, allows state violence to don the cloak of legitimacy” 
(4). By pushing the role of the nation-state to the forefront, Meeuf defines the 
construct of terrorism as being based on a set of binary oppositions: “legitimate 
force/illegitimate violence, civilization/barbarism, order/chaos, and good/evil making 
terrorism the binary opposite of violence by the nation-state” (4). 
To restate my earlier point of the sophistication of the terror instruments used 
in the September 11th attacks, the tools of technology have been used and misused by 
terrorists to achieve their agenda of violence. Their profiling as seen in the studies 
shown above re-affirms this. It is my contention that the face of terrorism has 
changed considerably over the last decade. With the advent of the Internet, satellite 
communication systems, direct TV and online banking, terrorism translates into Jihad 
online. This metamorphosis also signals a huge shift in the agenda of terrorist 
campaigns – and marks the advent of global terrorism. Terrorism, in its earlier 
manifestations, was territorial in its manifesto, closely interlinked with politics of 
self-determination and rooted in the local cultures, ethnicities and religions. These 
campaigns fueled by the politics of expediency and short-term gains were restricted to 
certain regional areas and ethnic communities. However, the global village with its 
financialization brought about economic repercussions and the growing disparity of 
power structures, aligned certain disempowered groups with a common agenda. The 
politics of globalization as “westernization” in so many ways feeds into the 






homogenized cultural formations will replace any local cultural and economic 
structures. It is this fear, and this rationale that is largely responsible for rejection of 
all things western. The emphasis of my research is on this form of global or 
transnational terrorism and its implications of shifting loyalties that ascribe to a 
common agenda of communities of violence (both real and imagined) across national 
borders.   
 One of the crucial questions that I address is the shift from local terrorisms to 
global terrorisms and this is perhaps best illustrated through an analogy. Regional 
terrorisms about seeking a homeland, like the IRA, in my analogy are like local 
companies that comprise a local constituency. The shift, as I call it, occurred in the 
last decade. To elaborate, I draw on Masao Miyoshi’s distinction between definitions 
of multi-national corporations (MNC) and transnational corporations (TNC), which 
he says differ mostly in the degree of alienation from their countries of origin.  MNCs 
are “headquartered in a nation, operating in a number of countries. Its high-echelon 
personnel largely consist of the nationals of the country of origin, and the corporate 
loyalty is, though increasingly autonomous, finally tied to the home nation”.  A TNC, 
on the other hand, “might no longer be tied to its nation of origin but is adrift and 
mobile, ready to settle anywhere and exploit any state including its own, as long as 
the affiliation serves its own interests” (736). Linking this to terrorism, the 
comparisons are obvious. Osama Bin Laden, originally a citizen of Saudi Arabia, 






mujahideen and other Saudi Arabian, Pakistani, and Iranian citizens amongst others, 
against the Communist Soviet regime. It was a Jihad with a difference as it was 
clearly about freedom for the Afghanistani people, and about resistance against an 
invading Soviet army8.  So while the actual foot soldiers may have been of different 
national origins, the people who spearheaded the movement were clearly tribal 
Afghan and Pashtun leaders. I equate this with a multinational corporation. Osama 
Bin Laden, as founder-leader of Al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization, exiled from Saudi 
Arabia, operating first out of Syria and then Afghanistan and now out of Pakistan, 
Kashmir – we can only guess; with its cadres drawn from almost fifty nation-states, 
hosted and supported by the politics of the Taliban, funded by clandestine terrorist 
states, and waging attacks on the people of the United States and the interests of the 
United States, advocating the cause of Palestine against Israel, of ‘Azaad Kashmir’ 
against India and heralding the coming together of all Islamic nations against the 
West, and the infidels: terrorism is truly a transnational corporation. It is adrift, 
mobile and has no national allegiance and it exploits its national origins since it 
chooses affiliations that serve only its own self-interests. Transnational terrorism has 
arrived.  
 There are two facets of transnational terrorism that need to be addressed. The 
first is the importance of citizenship being invoked as a privileging enterprise. For 
example, in the case of John Walker Lindh, now known as the ‘American Taliban’, 






United States to Yemen and then to join the jihad led by Bin Laden - his American 
citizenship has been repeatedly invoked to explain away the misguided passion of his 
youth. Yaser Esam Hamdi, is another American Taliban, who was brought back to the 
United States from Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. His “American-ness” is effectively 
only the citizenship he holds (solely by virtue of being born in Louisiana) since he 
left the United States as a child and moved back to Saudi Arabia with his parents, 
who are citizens of that country. The politics of citizenship and its attendant 
privileges becomes problematic in this scenario. Are they to be tried as conspirators 
or traitors, we are yet to find out as the case is still in process. 
 The second facet is even more disturbing in its implications. On January 28, 
2002, Wafa Idris, a 28-year-old Palestinian paramedic and a Fatah activist from al-
Amari refugee camp near Ramallah, became the first female suicide bomber in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. Three other female suicide bombers including Dareen Abu 
Aisheh and Ayat Al-Ahras followed suit. While traditional groups like Hamas have 
been less willing to acknowledge these women as martyrs (by virtue of their sex) the 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a more ‘secular group’, has claimed all four. The 
ramifications of this growing phenomenon are multi-faceted – the gender issues, the 
change in the terrorist profile, and the inflection of gender in the martyrdom process 
of Jihad. This has brought to the fore, the more ‘liberal’ interpretations of religious 
extremism, with Iraq and Palestine being commended for their more “liberal” as 






Saddam Hussein ordered a memorial to Wafa Idris in Baghdad, in an even more 
interesting development, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Britain, Dr. Ghazi Al-Qusaibi 
wrote an ode to suicide bombers, “The Martyrs,” which specifically celebrates Ayat 
Al-Ahras amongst others. Need I explain the political implications of a Saudi Arabian 
diplomat in Britain - hailing from a nation-state that claims to be an ally of the United 
States and Britain in this war against terrorism - writing an ode to a Palestinian 
bomber?  
You died to glorify the word of my God 
In the land that was glorified with the Israa 
Did you commit suicide? 
[No] We are those who committed suicide 
In a life whose dead are [still] living. 
[O] Our nation we have died … 
… O nation we are dead 
But mother earth refuses to accept us… 
Tell ‘Ayat’ the bride of Heaven… 
Everything is beautiful we are ready 
To sacrifice for your eyes 
The pure of our nation confronts the criminal 
When the steeds are castrated [Emphasis mine]9. 






female are clearly set up. It is when the “steeds” (read the masculinized male?) are 
castrated – the much dreaded and ultimate emasculation – that the people (men and 
women) must give their lives in the final sacrifice. For what purpose?  Al-Qusaibi 
answers that too – for women like “the beautiful” Ayat, “the bride of heaven” – it is 
to be received by Fatma, the daughter of Prophet Mohammad in Paradise. The 
women of this nation are “the pure” – the nation is essentialized in the figure of the 
woman and nationalism manifests itself in its inherently hierarchical and exclusionary 
form. The emasculation is clearly reinforced in the choice of verbs Al-Qusaibi uses 
for the male subject of these failed nations – failed, wept, knelt down, pleaded, 
complained, and the imagery it invokes in ‘kissed Sharon’s shoes’.  
The other more crucial question to ask is whose nation? What nation? Is this 
again a reference to the figurative Ummah Islam since the geographical boundaries of 
“the land” here obviously do not overlap with the current day nation-state of Saudi 
Arabia? The “land” and the claim to “our nation” can be explained drawing on the 
categories of “heterotopia” and “utopia” in the way Satish Deshpande develops 
Foucault’s terms to distinguish between geographical places (concrete, physical) and 
abstract, imagined spaces.  Utopias according to Foucault are “sites with no place” 
and refer to “fundamentally unreal spaces” not real concrete places that “represent 
society itself in a perfected form”. Heterotopias on the other hand, are “real places – 
places that do exist”. Deshpande redefines the term heterotopias such that “they 






Hence Deshpande argues that heterotopias function as an “ideological hinge, linking 
social subjects with a possible moral identity that they could assume to inhabit”10. 
The “nation” that Al-Qusaibi is reclaiming then is the heterotopia of Palestine on 
which he projects the paradise-like virtues of a utopia, the imagined Ummah Islam. 
While Palestine is a real place, this heterotopian identity is not a natural process but a 
socialized product refracted through religious ideologies. It is thus a transformation of 
the Palestinian conflict so that Palestine as a heterotopian site has opened up 
possibilities for a pan-Islamic identity that reflects the utopian identity of Ummah 
Islam and it forges a bond for people (and by this I mean the people who ascribe to 
these ideologies) who are therefore entitled to a sense of belonging. Bin Laden 
similarly co-opts the Palestinian Intifada for his own purposes. One can also read 
Israel as a heterotopia for Jews, an argument I will have to leave for another time. 
Terrorism as a Trope in Cinema 
In the course of my chapter, I have examined discourses of nationalism tracing it 
from its conservative and androcentric origins to its more discursive and inclusionary 
forms looking for collusions and collisions with (anti)nationalisms. Using terrorism 
as a rubric, I develop a discourse that derives and partakes from theories of 
transnationalism, globalization, and the changing focus of postcolonial studies, since 
most of what already exists by way of studies on terrorism is in many ways 






that I choose to focus on is too contemporary, it is happening even as I write this. The 
theorizing will follow – it is but a matter of time. This dissertation is an exploration of 
this discourse using cinema, fiction and the global media as points of entry into 
examining this problem.  
 Having theorized the category of (anti)nationalisms and created a discursive 
space to talk about this new category, it is important to make the final connection 
with my choice of cultural media and its depiction of terrorism. Cinema and nation 
have been strangely congruent entities, even if nationalism as a theoretical discourse 
has never focused on cinema. Cinema studies however, have used nation as a salient 
mode of understanding cinema, whether it was as part of nation-building, or to talk 
about national-specificity or to identify a body of work that can be termed national 
cinema. The construct of nation has become crucial to cinema studies as the multitude 
of scholarship on this topic indicates. My preoccupation with cinema and nation is not 
to talk about the problematic of national cinema, but to talk about nationalism in 
cinema.  
 Two critics take a rather unique approach to nationalism in cinema. Sumita 
Chakravarty suggests that fiction film by its very nature is fragmented. This 
fragmentation in other words implies that film:  
can only present fragments of the nation and project them as evidence of 
the whole. The story of a couple, family or group represents/re-presents the 






always eclipsed in cinema and has to be reconstituted by viewers through 
its screen absence. It is the absence which marks the fullness of the nation. 
The fragment is therefore both the nation’s source of fear and its object of 
desire, its threat and its promise (226). 
Chakravarty’s argument is that the cinematic medium can almost seem resistant to 
national imaginings since it privileges the personal and the specific and foregrounds 
regionalism and the local. The representation of the majority population also 
subsumes regional specificities and minority cultures and yet, “in narrative cinema, 
the sense of collective identity can only be mediated and dramatized through the 
particular” (226). Therefore she articulates this only to foreground this inherent 
tension in representation and definitely not to suggest that cinema cannot reflect a 
national imaginary. She asserts that in Indian cinema, it is the fetishization and 
distancing of the stranger from within (the terrorist) as a hermeneutic strategy that 
accommodates terrorism in the Indian context. 
In my reading of Bollywood narratives of terrorism, I argue that the particular is 
incorporated into the larger whole through the clever use of the family as a 
microcosmic unit (with its local and regional cultural specificity) that stands in for the 
representation of the nation. Linking the family to the larger whole of the nation helps 
constitute a national imaginary that is no longer fragmented. The new world order 
created by this imaginary is also significantly a reworking of the same hegemonic 






women do not participate in the creation of this new identity but instead serve as 
iconic stand-ins for minority representation and are given no real voice in this new 
normative nationalism.    
Shohat and Stam, in their excellent essay, “The Imperial Imaginary,” 
problematize this relationship of cinema and the national imaginary pointing out how 
filmic chronotopes while very suited for representations of the national imaginary 
also contribute to an asymmetrical development of some national or racial 
imaginaries at the expense of others. Transnationalism further complicates this 
creation of national imaginaries, mediating between the historical and the discursive, 
making visible some hegemonic power structures and rendering some invisible. My 
category of (anti)nationalisms, I argue gives voice to these lesser developed national 
imaginaries, imaginaries of resistant groups that become the ‘Other’ for the privileged 
nationalistic discourses. I develop this argument further in the context of Hollywood 
cinema in Chapter 5. 
The final connection I seek to draw is the interconnectedness of the violence and 
nationalism and how it manifests itself in the form of terrorism on screen. Cinema 
and multimedia both lend themselves to the spectacle of terrorism which enables the 
camera to reproduce the act of horror at 24 frames per second and reenact this image 
over and over again. The camera’s eye projects this gaze onto millions of spectators 
and revisits its enactment over and over again. The visual depiction of terrorism is 






powerful forms of multimedia like television creates the necessary screen space and 
allows for representation of this violence in myriad ways. As Meeuf, succinctly puts 
it, “its power located in the extent to which it can be made legible to a mass audience, 
terrorism in many ways only exists as a mass mediated text” (5). It is imperative to 
note that all such dramatizations of acts of violence depicted by the mass media cast 
the perpetrators of terror as illegitimate and structurally align themselves with the 
state’s perception of this act and its consequent response to it. Not limited by the 
immediacy associated with new coverage of such events, films that visit this 
phenomenon become sites for the negotiation of meaning and ideological 
implications of such acts. In the closed fictional world of cinema, meaning adheres to 
the narrative and thematic imperative of the film as it gets limited by the logic of the 
impetus that drives the plot. The conflicts that arise because of the tensions within the 
plot, both on-screen and off-screen, by its presence and its absence allows for 
possibilities of readings quite unlike its other multimedia counterparts. 
I conclude with re-visiting the paradigms that frame the ongoing changes in 
postcolonial studies. Amanda Anderson in her essay, “The Divided Legacy of 
Modernity,” formulates an argument for the place of cosmopolitanism in the current 
academic environment plagued by globalization and universalism. Despite some 
limitations, Anderson asserts that,  
there are many aspects of the reconfigured cosmopolitanism that are 






analyses from a participatory perspective that is nonetheless self-reflexive 
and critical; its exoteric genres and modes; its suggestive way of 
articulating relations among disciplinary formation, global position and 
lived ethos; its flexibility as a term that can describe various aesthetics, 
ethics, and intellectual programs; its desire to exert normative pressure and 
to refuse the fastidious pieties of negative critique; its linking of self-
conscious positioning to the tasks of translation, receptivity to otherness, 
and the ongoing project of universalism (286). 
Julia Kristeva, in the same vein of thought, eloquently articulates the need for a 
renewed look at integrating cosmopolitanism with universalisms as a discourse since 
she says, “… such upholding of universality appears to me as a rampart against a 
nationalist, regionalist and religious fragmentation whose integrative contractions are 
only too visible today” (27). The dangers of ethnic nationalisms can perhaps be 
countered only by civic forms of nationalisms. 
 Having made clear the theoretical connections between nationalism and 
cinema, my next chapter focuses on another kind of fictional narrative - two Indian 
novels, one written in Hindi and one in English. I use these to define the first kind of 
(anti)nationalisms as based in religious fundamentalisms in the Indian Subcontinent 
in both colonial and postcolonial settings. Riots or collective violence as a 
manifestation of this religious fundamentalisms, both Hindu and Islamic, are closely 






breakdown of civil society perhaps suggests that the answers to combating this kind 
of (anti)nationalisms lie elsewhere in civil society. 





1 Fatwa is a religious decree in Islam. I elaborate more on this in Chapter 5. 
 
2 It is my understanding that these are not generalized terms and need to be defined 
within a local and global context and I define each of these as they are taken up for 
analysis in my chapters.  
 
3 I revisit this argument in Chapter 3 with reference to collective violence.  
 
4 Jagrans, an all night singing of religious and devotional songs are becoming a very 
popular form of “performed” Hinduism. I revisit this greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 
5 Sumit Sarkar in his essay, “Patriotic Literature in South Asia” in Henry Schwarz 
and Sangeeta Ray’s anthology, A Companion to Postcolonial Studies discusses this in 
detail, in context of how Urdu was systematically replaced as the language of the 
courts, and consequently in literature in an attempt to counter-act the use of 
Persianized Urdu primarily as a language of the elite. Sanskritized Hindi, written in 
the Devnagari script was propagated as a “national” language to create a pan-Indian 
Hindu identity even though it was not similar to the vernaculars spoken across 
northern India and was neither the language spoken in most Southern Indian states. 
 
6 Parker cites two articles, in The New York Times dated July 28, 1990, George 
Brock’s “An ‘Ism’ that won’t go away,” questioning the formation of pan-European 
entities like the EEC and arguing that nationalism is an ‘Ism’ that has been the 
mainspring of History for two centuries, and a second article by Holly Hughes and 
Richard Elovich, “Homophobia at the N.E.A.” Parker’s argument is that the 
“commerce between eros and nation” can work in both directions. 
 











and a male rebellion primarily against males on this study. In the course of my 
dissertation, I have pointed out the problems with such an assertion. In addition, the 
increasing numbers of female suicide bombers (like Dhanu in the Rajiv Gandhi 
assassination, and Wafa Idris in Palestine followed by three others) seem to suggest 
that terrorist organizations are availing of this misassumption by using female 
terrorists as decoys. Other examples of female terrorists include Leila Khaled, who, 
on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, hijacked a plane in 
1969. In 1987, North Korean Kim Hyon Hui helped plant a time bomb on a South 
Korean airliner, killing all 115 people on board. The marked increase in the 
representation of female terrorist characters in popular cinema (Jude in Neil Jordan’s 
The Crying Game, Veeran in Gulzar’s Maachis, Malli in The Terrorist etc.) seems to 
reflect this trend. 
 
8 I discuss this in great detail in Chapter 4, where I define Jihad, its origins and the 
reasons for its polarization against the West and the US in particular. 
 
9 This is an excerpt from the text first published in the London based Arabic 
newspaper Al-Hayat on April 13, 2002. 
                "The Martyrs" 
May Allah witness that you are Martyrs, 
[May the] Prophet and Holy men witness to that  
 
You died to glorify the word of my God 
In the land that was glorified with the 'Israa' 
Did you commit suicide? 
[No] We are those who committed suicide 
In a life whose dead are [still] living.  
[O] Our nation: we have died 
Let us hear what eulogy says about us. 
We failed until failure was fed up with us… 
We wept until tears got tired of us… 











We pleaded until pleading asked for assistance… 
 
We complained to the idols in a White House 
full of darkness 
We kissed 'Sharon's' shoes, 
He cried: Slowly, you are tearing my shoes; 
Please! 
O nation we are dead…  
But mother earth refuses to accept us… 
Tell 'Ayat' the bride of heaven… 
Everything that is beautiful we are ready 
To sacrifice for your eyes… 
The pure of our nation confronts the criminal… 
 
When the steeds are castrated. 
['Ayat'] The beautiful – kissed her death 
While smiling with good tidings… 
At the time when our leaders escape death 
Paradise opened its doors  
And Fatma, Al-Zahra' received you… ['Ayat'] 
Tell those who issued 'the Fatwas' 
Against 'Jihad': 
'Don't rush!' perhaps your 'Fatwa' will be rejected by Heaven 
When the call comes for Jihad 
 
It is a time for the ink and paper, 
For the books and the 'Learned men' 
To be silent. 
When the call comes for Jihad 
There's no need for a referendum or a 'Fatwa.' 












10 Deshpande in his essay “Hegemonic Spatial Strategies: The Nation-Space and 
Hindu Communalism in Twentieth Century India,” uses these terms to specifically 
 talk about Ayodhya the mythological birth place of the Hindu God, Rama in context 
of the growing sentiment of Hindutva across the nation. His argument is that 
Ayodhya, which is a real place, has been transformed into a heterotopia through the 






Chapter 3: Religious Fundamentalisms 
A traumatic historical event usually finds the artistic and literary response 
twice. Once, during the event or immediately following it and again after a 
lapse of time, when the event has found its corner in the collective memory 
of the generation that witnessed it. The initial response tends to be 
emotionally intense and personal in character, even melodramatic. On the 
other hand, when the event is reflected upon with emotional detachment 
and objectivity, a clearer pattern of the various forces that shaped it is 
likely to emerge. Tamas is the reflective response to the partition of India – 
one of the most tragic events in the recent history of the Indian 
subcontinent (5). 
Thus reads the Introduction to a novella that took a nation by surprise in 1974 and 
later evoked an even more unprecedented response when it was televised as a 
television mini-series in 1988. It wrought an emotional and a political firestorm with 
its unmitigated exploration of the horrors of the partition and a raging controversy 
ensued. A lawsuit filed in the Bombay High Court resulted in a now famous judgment 
that said, “Tamas is an anatomy of that tragical period. It depicts how communal 
violence was generated by fundamentalists and extremists in both communities … 
how extremist elements infuse hatred and tension for their own ends at the cost of 






all...” (6) The judgment allowed for the telecasting to continue arguing that the equal 
handed description of both communities ensured that it was not malicious or 
inflammatory in its intent or content and would not cause further bloodshed. The 
Supreme Court of India upheld the Bakhtawar Lentin-Sujata Manohar judgment, 
observing, “It is out of the tragic experience of the past that we can fashion our 
present in a rational and reasonable manner and view our future with wisdom and 
care …There cannot be apprehension that it is likely to affect public order nor is it 
likely to incite the commission of any offence” (7). 
 One cannot say that controversy no longer surrounds any literary or cultural 
depiction of communal violence in India today like my discussion on several 
Bollywood films in the next chapter indicates. The crucial deciding factor for any 
cultural representation of such events seems to hinge on the secular nature of the 
Indian democracy which demands the equal representation and equal assignment of 
blame on all communities affected, Hindu and Muslim or Sikh. In films and on 
television, this is earmarked by a symbolic almost iconic representation of a minority 
figure, the necessary dialogue about secularism and humanism and any evidence to 
the contrary needs to be immediately negated by a reaffirmation of loyalty to the 
nation. In fiction, however, the artistic license seems to be far more lax, allowing for 
more freedom in representation of the disjunctions and fissures in society, perhaps 
driven by its more limited but intellectual and liberal audience. This difference in 






In this chapter I take a closer look at communal tensions that surface 
periodically in the Indian subcontinent, what I perceive as the underpinnings of 
Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism and that in my opinion, finally fuels terrorism in 
the Indian context. Several scholars have argued that all the communal tensions 
between Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent date back prior to the Partition of 
19471 that created Pakistan. And yet it was in the immediate aftermath of that 
decision to separate the land into two nations, to force a mass migration of people 
torn by their religious sentiments and driven by concerns for their safety to which one 
can trace the roots of recent communal discord. Even though constant but subtle 
references to the bloodshed, the mass migration, the huge loss of life and property 
abound in both fiction and film it was as if a unanimous silence prevailed on the 
subject of the Partition for years after the event.  Re-visiting the topic, it seemed 
would unleash the same forces of hatred on a society that was still recovering from 
the death and destruction it wrought. While I do believe that the Partition in 1947 was 
a momentous event woven into the socio-political fabric of India as a nation, it is my 
assertion that the roots of fundamentalism have flourished and resurfaced every once 
in a while in the nation-state’s history. I would thus argue that one can map several 
other major events in recent Indian history though none on the scale of the Partition 
itself, that have had significant repercussions in Indian society, like the assassination 
of Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguard in 1984 as a consequence of 






the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by Hindu fundamentalists in 19913 that caused Hindu-
Muslim riots across the nation, the Bombay bomb blasts of 1993 by Islamic 
extremists4 that triggered a similar response and the pogrom of violence in Gujarat 
after the burning of a train full of karsevaks5 returning from Ayodhya in February 
20026.  I draw on specific historical events to organize this chapter, tracing the 
interconnectedness of violence and religious fundamentalism in the subcontinent.  
At the outset let me clarify that in this chapter, in the context of these two texts, my 
category of (anti)nationalisms draws on religious fundamentalisms more than 
ethnonationalisms7 or regional nationalisms8 or linguistic nationalisms9 or 
subnationalisms10 or seccesionism11 as we know it in India today. In other words, 
although none of the other categories listed above are unknown in the Indian 
subcontinent, I choose to focus on religious identity as the primary marker in all the 
collective violence that manifests itself in the form of riots. A riot, that I go on to 
define later in this chapter, enables the participation of all like-minded citizens or 
denizens in the violence just as much as it demands that everyone else bear witness to 
the destruction it unleashes on society.  
In this chapter, I argue that in the context of the Indian subcontinent, religious 
fundamentalisms and their manifestation as riots or collective violence incited and 
orchestrated in their name, constitutes the first kind of (anti)nationalisms that I 
explore in my dissertation. It is my argument that religious fundamentalisms are anti-






religious or regional identity supercedes the nationalistic identity. Secondly, they are 
anti-national since in the rioting most of the damage and destruction is very often 
against state property or the existing civic infrastructure besides property owned by 
the other community. This aspect of rioting leads to and underscores the absolute 
predictability of the outcome – a breakdown of law and order which helps create a 
vacuum that terror groups exploit to their advantage. This becomes the third way in 
which collective violence or rioting provoked by religious fundamentalisms is anti-
national in its orientation because it provides the ultimate link to threats by terror 
groups towards destabilizing the nation-state. The fourth aspect of religious 
fundamentalisms that I identify as anti-nationalist is a little more indirect and 
complex. It arises out of the rejection of the westernized, secular, English speaking 
and modern identity associated with the nation-state, primarily the bureaucracy 
instrumental in the implementation of the state’s policies. Coding the nation-state and 
the ruling classes as western and modern implies that their nationalism is derivative 
by nature. It suggests that with the ousting of the British colonizers came the 
replacement with a new class of Brown Sahibs, remade in the same image. The 
outright rejection of this secular modern nationalism for another more homegrown 
and home-spun nationalism based on a religious, mythological identity fomented by 
religious leaders constitutes the fourth aspect of this anti-nationalist nature of 
religious fundamentalisms. These four aspects of Hindu, Islamic and Sikh 






the first kind of (anti)nationalisms that I examine in this dissertation.  
In this chapter I focus on the close analysis of two fictional texts as a cultural 
response to the earlier mentioned historical events – Bhisham Sahni’s Tamas (1974), 
set in the years just before the partition and Shashi Tharoor’s Riot (2001) set in the 
years leading up to the Ayodhya debacle.  I use these texts as a point of entry into the 
examination of Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism, to trace its origins in historical or 
political events, to determine the causes of violence that can abruptly erupt in its 
name and to interrogate the conditions in society that help foster and nurture such 
imaginings. This analysis spans several decades of Indian socio-political history, 
since I start with the discussing religious fundamentalism in a colonial setup which 
would be pre-Independence, move beyond the immediate postcolonial moment in a 
fledgling nation-state and then to events that came much after the establishment of 
India as a nation-state. The discourse that surrounds nationalism in these texts 
correspondingly shifts from being fundamentally derived from religious and ethnic 
origins, to anti-colonial and finally driven by other external impetus like ‘Other’ 
nation-states. I take a closer look at the local narratives of resistance within this 
discursive nationalism which as I pointed out earlier shifts dramatically in the course 
of little over half a century. My study of three narratives, each unique in terms of the 
time period, place, politics and the narrative form that frames these stories examines 
the formation of a dangerous subjectivity for these communities in relation to the 






Spatiality I will also argue plays a crucial role in categorizing riots. They are a direct 
result of the displacement of religion from the private realm into the public discourse 
and can be categorized in terms of four different spaces this violence occupies: the 
temporal space, the symbolic space, the social space and the sacred space.  I will 
define these categories that I develop and elaborate on this argument later in this 
chapter. Riots constitute the major component of all the violence and aggression that 
surface in both these texts I discuss in this chapter and I will focus on aspects of 
rioting and how it ties in with the development of (anti)nationalisms.  
Let me briefly summarize the storylines of both the texts that I take up for 
discussion in this chapter – Tamas and Riot. 
 Tamas   
Bhisham Sahni’s Tamas is a novella, written in Hindi, that captured the nation’s 
imagination with its simple but powerful storyline about the life in a city and its 
surrounding villages in a district near what would now comprise the north-western 
border of India and Pakistan. Sahni only clues us in about the setting of the novel 
through the discussions Richard, the English Deputy Commissioner has with his wife 
about visiting the nearby ruins of Taxila. While the names of several villages, 
tehsils12 and nearby cities indicate the setting is an undivided Punjab, the story 
revolves around several different protagonists - Hindu, Muslim and Sikh. This shift in 






perspective, from Nathu’s despair at killing the pig, to Richard’s issues with his wife 
Liza, to Ranvir’s initiation into the Youth Sabha, to Lala Lakshmi Narayan’s fear of 
being trapped in a Muslim mohalla13 to Shahnawaz’s unconditional help for his 
Hindu friends to Harnam’s Singh’s forced exile with his wife from the only home he 
knows, the storyline shifts from person to person, from one collective entity to 
another.  
It starts with Nathu, a poor chamar, a tanner by profession, who is asked to 
kill a pig by Murad Ali for a pittance - five rupees. Nathu buys Murad Ali’s story 
about the pig being required by the veterinary doctor and struggles to tackle the 
resilient pig. The pig is finally killed and as per Ali’s instructions it is hauled away by 
Kalu, the jamadar (the sweeper) just before the break of dawn. The dead pig (deemed 
unclean and dirty by Islam) is then unceremoniously left on the steps of the mosque, 
stirring trouble in the city. Meanwhile a group of Congress workers trying hard to 
follow Mahatma Gandhi’s resolve decide to step out singing patriotic songs which 
quickly turns into a mission to clean the streets of the community to foster pride in the 
local and civic infrastructure. Their own disdain at being forced to do this work is 
obvious and some of them perceive it to be meant only as a symbolic gesture and do 
not want to physically labor on public amenities. The trouble starts out early with the 
party being stopped from entering a muslim mohalla by Mahmood Saheb because he 
declares the Muslims who are accompanying the Congress party as traitors to their 






alone looks out for the interest of Muslims. The hurling of stones at the Congress 
party workers and the general feeling of unrest disrupts any further cleaning efforts 
and the party disperses immediately.  
We are then introduced to Vanprasthiji, a local Hindu religious leader as he 
leads his congregation in chanting Vedic mantras and shlokas (couplets from the 
Vedas). The tone of the meeting that is to follow is established early on for he says: 
Horrible have been the sins of the Muslims in the land 
Even the sky has refused us its favor and the earth its bounty (57). 
The discussion led by Members of the Executive Committee and prominent leader of 
the Sikh community focuses on how to protect the Hindus and Sikhs from the reprisal 
they fear by the Muslim community. The dreaded retaliation for the killing of the pig 
with its foul carcass polluting the steps of the mosque seems to be forthcoming 
according to this gathering. The rumor about a slaughtered cow and its parts being 
strewn in front of the Mai Sati Dharmasala according to a Sikh gentleman further 
inflames the Secretary who declares, “If they dare slaughter a cow, rivers of blood 
will flow in the city” (60). We are then privy to some of the arrangements made to 
ensure the safety of the Hindus and the Sikhs, which include the stockpiling of 
rudimentary arms like sticks, axes and knives. 
  Meanwhile we are introduced to Richard, the all powerful British Deputy 
Commissioner, and his wife Liza. Richard, at the helm of the administrative hierarchy 






meets and interacts with and this attitude extends to the contentious issues they 
present him with as well. He is an intellectual taken up with the ruins of Taxila, a 
collector of all things esoteric, his fascination for Indian history far outweighs his 
concern for the people he governs and the reality of the issues that surround them. 
Liza, largely repulsed by her own living situation and marital dilemmas is 
simultaneously bored by all things Indian as well as drawn in by Richard’s awareness 
of socio-cultural issues. Liza’s outsider perspective is objective and deprived of any 
cunning that inflects Richard’s administrative decisions. The tension builds up in the 
city, there are some stray incidents of people being killed in various localities which 
makes people rush to take precautions to protect themselves, like Lala Lakshmi 
Narayan rushes his family to safety in Shahnawaz’s Buick. The deaths of Milhki, the 
General and Inder, the perfume seller amongst several others fan the flames of 
revenge as the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs close their ranks, and prepare for the 
forthcoming bloodshed.  
Outside the city limits in the village of Dhok Illahi Buksh, Harnam Singh and 
his wife Banto, as the only Sikhs in an all-Muslim village, are forced to leave their 
home for fear of losing their lives. Their forced exile and the misadventures of the old 
couple reveal more of the intertwined nature of the lives of the Muslim and Sikh 
communities now fraught with dangers of communalism. Their son Iqbal Singh is 
chased and forcibly converted to Islam after being subjected to great ridicule and their 






honor. The clashes between the Muslims and the Hindus and the Muslims and the 
Sikhs intensify and once the fires burn themselves out, the British intervene to bring 
peace to the city and its neighboring villages. The deaths, the gang rapes, the 
destruction of property and the looting is registered and recorded by the Records 
Clerk in precise detail leaving out the horrific narrative that accompanies each 
incident. In the end, peace is restored, the bazaars reopen, people get back to business 
and the leaders of all communities get back to their amicable bantering over forming 
a Peace Committee.   
Riot  
Riot is the story of an American woman, 24 year old, Priscilla Hart whose love for 
India brings her to a small town, Zalilgarh, in Uttar Pradesh, India. As part of a 
program HELP-US to spread awareness about population control, Priscilla finds 
herself very closely involved in the socio-political landscape of the little town. She is 
conspicuously the only foreigner resident of Zalilgarh and her untimely brutal death 
on September 30th, 1989 during the communal riots, takes the town by surprise. The 
novel offers the reader an unusual insight into the life of Priscilla that unravels 
through the eyes of several different people – her parents Rudyard Hart and Katherine 
Hart, Priscilla’s letters to her friend Cindy Valeriani, from notes taken by Randy 
Diggs the Reporter for the New York Journal, through Lakshman, the District 






and finally through the outsider academic perspective of researcher and Professor 
Mohammad Sarwar. The novel gives voice to all these people amongst several others 
and the retelling of the same events offers a heteroglossic(as Bakhtin defines it in his 
text The Dialogic Imagination)15  rendering of the events surrounding the mysterious 
killing of an American woman in Hindu-Muslim riots.  
 Priscilla is drawn to the country where she spent her childhood, growing up in 
a country that fascinated her as much as it did her father a marketing executive with 
Coca-Cola. The pull of India manifested itself through the generations of the Hart 
family starting with Rudyard’s parents who worked as missionaries in India, then 
Rudyard himself who came with the forces of capitalism to help re-launch Coca-Cola 
in the country, and finally Priscilla, the doctoral student brimming with idealism and 
enthusiasm, wanting to work with and for the masses.  
The timeline for the story indicates that the events unfolded just a few years 
before December 6th, 1992 when mobs of Hindu Karsevaks stormed Ayodhya led by 
leaders of the Sangh Parivar (a collective group of several political parties aligned 
with the Right in India – Bharatiya Janata Party, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Shiv Sena, 
Rashtriya Samaj Sevak and Bajrang Dal etc.) Prior to the planning of this big event, 
the Sangh Parivar had mobilized Hindus all over the country to collect bricks 
anointed in several consecration ceremonies in neighborhood temples and bring them 
to Ayodhya, where they would be used to build a temple, the Ram Janmabhoomi 






in the town is palpable with a procession planned to celebrate Ram Sila Poojan 
(bricks anointed for the consecration ceremony of the new Ram temple to be built in 
Ayodhya) and the unexplained attack on two youth workers festooning the town on 
the eve of the planned festivities. Despite no clear evidence about the miscreants and 
their motives prior to the impending investigation into the attacks, the Hindus in the 
town mobilize themselves and prepare for battle.  The Hindu leaders are appealed to, 
requests for toning down the festivities are made but it is all in vain. Although the 
local Administration does their best to stop it from taking place, the passion and the 
militancy that rent the air overlooks any need for caution and restraint and the 
procession continues as planned. The procession makes its way through the town of 
Zalilgarh with police presence marking all the hotspots for rioting and communal 
tensions. A crude bomb is thrown at the passing procession in a Muslim mohalla and 
a boy is fatally wounded in the process. This sparks a near riot and despite heavy 
police presence and swift action by the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of 
Police, the mob cannot be controlled. Riots break out, seven people are killed, six 
Muslims and one American woman who was in the wrong place at the wrong time.  
 The novel also tells the love story of Priscilla Hart and Lakshman, the District 
Magistrate, who in his own words is “overweight, overworked and married” (260). 
Their secret meeting place, the haunted Kotli, also becomes Priscilla’s grave as she is 
brutally stabbed by an unknown assailant, waiting for her last assignation with her 






tragedy of her own love story and the child she carried in her womb, Priscilla dies a 
horrific death alone. The novel suggests at several reasons and several motives that 
might have led to her death – from Kadambari’s jealousy and sanctimonious 
behavior, Ram Charan Gupta’s (a local Hindu leader) desire for revenge, Ali’s anger 
at Priscilla’s meddling in his marital affairs, Geetha’s (Lakshman’s wife) request to 
the Swamiji to save her marriage or the Muslim boys who happened to have chosen 
the Kotli to make their amateurish bombs. Like the unknown factors that caused the 
riots to scorch the town with communal passion, Priscilla’s homicide remains 
unsolved. She carries the secret of her passionate love affair and of her unborn baby 
to her grave and despite Katherine Hart’s astute observations and deep understanding 
of her daughter, she fails to unravel the mystery that surrounds Priscilla’s life in 
Zalilgarh. Despite Katherine Hart’s questioning, Randy Digg’s investigative 
journalism, the mysterious circumstances surrounding her death remains unresolved. 
The secrets remain in Zalilgarh as does the scrapbook with all the sketching, musings 
and details that Katherine Hart was looking for while in India.  
Defining Communalism and Religious Fundamentalism 
Riots fuelled by communal tensions and religious fundamentalisms form the central 
conflict in each of these texts, as I stated earlier on in this chapter. There is however a 
significant shift in the roots of these fundamentalisms given the different historical 






steadfast in each of these cultural representations, it is the primordial identity of 
religious affiliation that overrides any other form of identity including nationalism. 
My chapter interrogates the factors that lead to this overarching desire for religious 
superiority and dominance spanning a few decades of Indian history starting with the 
Pre-Independence era. I examine the causes of religious fundamentalism, both as a 
response to internal political conflicts at the local as well as the national level and as a 
distorted reaction to larger external forces like globalization. It is in these localized 
narratives that one can read the reverberations of larger national events. As Veena 
Das (1990) argues, “It is not once the a riot starts other hostilities become conjoined 
to the major symbol of the major hostility; it is rather that, in order for diffused 
hostilities to translate themselves into violent conflict, a contiguity has to be 
established between specific, concrete, and local issues on the one hand, and a master 
symbol on the other, in terms of which the conflict is viewed in the public 
consciousness” (14). Thus the controversial Ayodhya issue becomes germane to daily 
life in Zalilgarh and the narrative of the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi of 1984 is inserted 
into the discourse of communalism in Zalilgarh through its resonance in Gurinder’s 
memories. In Tamas the characters repeatedly talk of historic battles fought centuries 
ago by the Marathas and the Rajputs against the Mughals. It is this larger context of 
macro events that frames the rhetoric surrounding the localized rioting with its 
dramatic cadences of explosive rumors, the constant slandering and the provocative 






Stanley Tambiah, in his anthropological text, Leveling Crowds: 
Ethnonationalist Conflicts in and Collective Violence in South Asia, argues that the 
term “communalism” for South Asianists has a very specific resonance in context of 
its colonial history.  It was used by the colonists to encompass all conflicts, clashes 
and collisions of all “religious, linguistic, regional and racial groupings” and 
consequently in South Asia today, the term has been “invoked and used with different 
affective and evaluative connotations and implications,” but always with a resonance 
of negativity and condemnation (23). Tambiah seeks to dispel the negativity long 
associated with the term to distinguish between what he sees as two kinds of 
communalism. One, he derives from the semantic meaning of the term  as communal 
solidarity and brotherhood, and the other as “conflictual, divisive and destructive 
tendencies in what are called ethnic conflicts, especially in their impact on the alleged 
requirements and maintenance of ‘nation-states’ and on the attainment of national 
integration” (27). It is the second kind of communalism that I choose to draw 
attention to as being congruous with the (anti)nationalisms I identified earlier on and 
that I examine in the course of this chapter. 
 Tambiah offers a subaltern perspective to this master narrative of 
communalism by citing Gyanendra Pandey, a noted Indian historian, who argues that 
the British used ‘communalism’ to describe all riots and public disturbances that they 
felt were driven by sectarian violence even if historical records prove to the contrary. 






sectarian violence between Hindus and Muslims would seem to show internal 
competition between Hindu upper and lower castes, and especially the social 
ambitions of mobile castes espousing religious orthodoxy, to be more salient than a 
monolithic Hindu-Muslim divide” (23). Pandey’s assertion of caste and class as 
significant variables in this explosive mix of collective violence in the subcontinent 
does in no way lack validation. The collective aggression and violence Tambiah and 
Pandey refer to most often surfaces in the form of rioting. 
In colonial India, the communal riot narrative was part of the official 
historical narrative controlled and disseminated by the state. A significant amount of 
recent scholarship focuses on investigations into these official narratives of sectarian 
and communal violence and its rhetoric in colonial India. They provide a very 
insightful examination of the official colonial account of this ‘native’ violence which 
was coded as barbaric, instinctive and bestial and distinctly different from the 
murderous European mobs of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Pandey, in his 
essay “The Colonial Construction of ‘Communalism: British Writings of Banaras in 
the Nineteenth Century,” observes that the colonialist reading of Indian history was 
characterized by “an emptying out of all history – in terms of the specific variations 
of time, place, class, issue – from the political experience of the people, and the 
identification of religion (or the religious community) as the moving force of all 
Indian politics. The communal riot narrative served to substantiate this reading of 






in the rhetoric used to describe this breakdown of law and order but also emerges in 
the practices and strategies used to contain this violence even in postcolonial India.  
Social Structures and Conflict in Pre-Independence India 
In colonial India, nationalism was a fledgling concept, powerful and yet quite 
abstract. It defined itself as a nation vis-à-vis the nation of the colonizer as it 
attempted to define Indianness in a socio-political context. The struggle for 
Independence and the desire to unite a peoples in the name of this struggle was 
political as much as it was social in its outlook.  Tamas is a powerful indictment of an 
era, wrought with political tension and social conflict. The tremors of the 
Independence movement had surfaced in every town, city and village as we see 
clearly in this novella and yet the cleavages in society are drawn along traditional 
lines of religious affiliation.  
 Tamas is as much about individual people as it is about the politics that 
surround them. Sahni almost treats the several political parties, the Congress, the 
Muslim League and the Communists as protagonists themselves, giving voice to their 
ideologies and to the resistance fomenting within them. It helps provide an insight 
into their helplessness in the face of all the lack of unity and the constant labeling of 
them as being religious in their constituency. The simple interpretations offered by 
the local leaders of their political and social mission, like with cleaning of the 






to comprehend the larger picture as well as their immediate desire to give in to their 
own selfish interests above all else. Independence and freedom seem largely foreign 
notions beyond their comprehension as they willingly turn to Richard, the Deputy 
Commissioner for constant guidance and help. Far from acknowledging Richard’s 
lack of desire to step in at the appropriate time or the symbolic importance of the 
airplane that simply hovers over the area and acts as a reminder of British Imperial 
power, alludes to the deeply shackled subjectivity of these people. Unable to rise 
above their local pettiness in a society fraught with economic imbalances, the people 
in the novella, debate about the differences within the political parties. The Congress 
Party with its agenda of nonviolence and community upliftment as advocated by 
Gandhi only serves to add to the confusion of the townspeople as is evidenced by this 
exchange between Shankar and Kashmirilal: 
‘Cleaning the drains is not going to bring swaraj any nearer’. 
… ‘Shankar, you must know it is one way of expressing our sense of 
patriotism. This is the least we can do. We must descend to the level of the 
poor and get behind their minds. If you go to work among the poor, will 
you get dressed in a coat and pantaloons? If you go to them in khadi and 
holding a broomstick, they will think you are one of them’. 
‘Ever since we took up reconstruction work the freedom movement has 
come to a stop.’ Shankar retorted. ‘Sweep the lanes and ply the spinning 






The ideology behind wearing khadi along with the rejection of any British milled 
items as a demonstration of Indian economic self-sufficiency is lost on these local 
townspeople for whom it is reduced to a mere technicality of eligibility in the local 
elections. The class issue continues to drive their identities and prevents them from 
identifying with the local issues of civic sanitation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure. The Congress Party is repeatedly referred to as being Hindu in its 
constituency with Muslims being relegated to second class citizens within its folds 
unlike the Muslim League which was considered the party that united all Muslims 
under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah16. The political rift between Hindus 
and Muslims was further institutionalized through such political organizations in 
which the eligibility for primary membership itself was based on religious affiliation.   
 Richard’s apathy towards the situation despite his love for India, its history, its 
literature and learning reflects the self-induced distancing of the British administrator, 
the colonizer, from the child-like antics of the colonized native populations. His 
arrogance about the inability of the Indians around him to appreciate their heritage or 
the past has a unique resonance of scholarly superiority. His cryptic disassociation 
with the people he governs coupled with his intimate fascination with their cultural 
heritage confuses his wife Liza who is unable to comprehend his ability to switch 
between two modes of existence.  Richard explains this in very simple terms, “The 
country is not mine, but the subject is” (35). In other words, Richard embodies what 






one aspect of Orientalism is/was an academic enterprise or tradition of scholarship 
entirely based on an epistemological and ontological premise of the Orient as 
distinctly different from the Occident. Furthermore, with respect to colonialism, Said 
says, “Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for 
dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing 
views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as 
a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” 
(3). Richard’s large personal collection of Buddha figurines, his samplings of Indian 
folk art and his books on the subject unsettles Liza as much as his collection and 
memorabilia from his life in Africa. The main room of the bungalow overflowed with 
“samples of African art, bows and arrows, beads, bird’s feathers, totems,” all 
collected while he served in Kenya” (36). Richard is a self-described student of 
history, a connoisseur of art, and a collector of artifacts. To him, the Indians are a 
subject to be studied as he explains to Liza, as to why all the people who live in the 
northern parts of country look the same, since they all came from the same stock 
basing his observation on the theory of the Aryan race migrating from Central Asia to 
the valley of the river Indus17. His excitement about his brilliant point derives from 
his next observation, “They know nothing. That’s the whole point. They only know 
what we tell them…They don’t know their history. They only live it.” (37)  Sahni in 
the well-rounded characterization of Richard captures the essence of the justification 






similar argument about the assumptions of colonialism:  
Colonialism, was not merely the product of a theory of progress that 
heirarchized races, cultures and civilizations; it was also the byproduct of 
the Baconian theory of objective, scientific, ‘true’ knowledge which strictly 
partitioned off the observer from the observed, the subject from the object 
of knowledge, the enlightened agents of history from the passive ahistorical 
laity, the rational from the irrational (20). 
Again, the conversations between Richard and Liza offer us invaluable insights into 
the British perspective of Indian social interactions, as Richard summarizes the main 
differences between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. He rightly points out the physical 
markers that give away religious identity as well as the differences in nomenclature. I 
will revisit these markers of difference in greater detail later on this chapter, as it is 
crucial to my study of collective violence and riots in the Indian subcontinent. 
Although Richard’s is a simplistic reading of ethnic diversity, it also leads the 
conversation to the larger discourse of imperialism:  
‘Tension between the Hindu and Muslims is mounting. There could be 
rioting, and bloodshed’. 
‘You mean these people will fight amongst themselves? When we were in 
London you told me that they were fighting against us’. 







… ‘They fight against one another in the name of religion and they fight 
against us in the name of the country,’ Richard smiled (42). 
Liza’s assertion that they are one nation at heart is countered by Richard’s dismissal 
of her simplicity and lack of guile. “Darling, the rulers don’t look for similarities, 
among the ruled. They are only interested in finding out what can keep them apart”.  
(42) That little exchange resonates with political and administrative shrewdness of the 
British Imperialists that eventually led to the two-nation theory and the subsequent 
horrors of the partition of 1947.   
 Another fascinating episode in the novel is Karim Khan’s public retelling of a 
well known Islamic parable about the prophet Khizr and a young Moses who wished 
to be his disciple. It tells the story of how Moses was to be initiated as a disciple by 
the prophet Khizr on the one condition that he not question any actions of the prophet 
no matter how repugnant or inexplicable they were. Khizr takes Moses to a 
neighboring village and they cross a river in a boat owned by a poor boatman. He 
then drills holes in the boat and causes extensive damage but he plugs the holes a 
little while later. Moses is baffled but no response is forthcoming from Khizr. A little 
while later, Khizr comes across a child and twists its neck killing it, again Moses is 
horrified. They continue on their journey and come across a broken wall which he 
proceeds to repair. Moses cannot fathom any of the reasons behind these acts till 
Khizr explains that he damaged the boat to help the boatman since the local 






of livelihood. He says he killed the child because he would have grown up to be an 
evil and cruel man and done harm to many innocent people and he built the wall since 
there was a treasure buried underneath and the village people would find the wall an 
impediment and destroy it only to find the buried treasure. The moral of the story, 
Karim Khan explains, is that God is all knowing and all seeing and for man to 
analyze the cause and effect of larger actions is an exercise in futility. He compares 
the British as rulers as having similar powers of omnipresence and the ability of 
foresight. He reminds his audience that the British are shrewd and always watching. 
His ingenious use of a religious parable to remind his spontaneously gathered 
audience of the British rulers as their common enemy resonates with timeless 
wisdom. It provides a very unique and viable alternative perspective of a possible 
marriage of politics and religion, whereby a religious rendering of a parable can 
harness nationalistic fervor in a colonial setting. However, his insight is marginalized 
as is the politics of the communists and the political scenario as reflected in this 
novella remains rabid with strife with people torn between their conflicting loyalties 
towards religion and the nation.  
 Besides religious differences, caste and class played a very important role and 
determined people’s lives. Society was delineated along caste and religious dynamics 
and the rhythm of the city was maintained by the well established division of labor 
along the same lines. In Tamas, the professions are specifically broken down 






are all Muslim) etc. As Sahni describes it,  
In the city there was a clear-cut demarcation of work. The Hindus owned 
most of the cloth shops, The Muslims, the footwear stores. The transport 
business was in the hands of the Muslims whereas the Hindus had a 
monopoly of the grain trade. As for the petty trade, it was evenly 
distributed between the Hindus and the Muslims (87). 
It is imperative to note that despite the interdependence of the castes, religious 
communities and classes of society, as I pointed out earlier, the demarcation of the 
social spaces each inhabited was clearly established and maintained by all segments 
of society almost like an unwritten agreement or social contract.  
 In Tamas, similarly the social divisions are recognized and respected by all for 
any disturbance to the rhythm of the city creates a ripple effect on all the trade and 
transactions. The first disturbance of any note as retaliation for the desecration of the 
mosque in Tamas is setting fire to the granary owned by the Hindu traders and it is 
this economic backlash that triggers numerous other episodes that spiral out of 
control.  
The implication of this division of labor also ensures that even within the city, 
neighborhoods are earmarked for certain castes, classes and religious communities. 
This ghettoization of communities seems to ensure safety in times of crisis and people 
who live outside of those specific areas like Lala Lakshmi Narain and Harnam Singh, 






and looted and totally dependent on the munificence of their friends of the other 
community like Shahnawaz Khan and Karim Khan for their passage to safety.   
  Class similarly plays a very important role in this aggression. Lala Lakshmi 
Narain’s appeal to Shahnawaz Khan is met with a gesture of friendship, as he and his 
family are rushed to safety in another part of town, Sadar Bazaar, in the big blue 
Buick that goes around untouched. The Lala’s concern for his property supercedes his 
concern for the welfare of his servant Nanku, who is ordered to first run an errand in 
the middle of the rioting and later told to stay home and guard their belongings. 
Similarly Raghunath’s family moves away from their locality to a big bungalow 
elsewhere, leaving the servant, Milkhi behind to look after their house and property. 
Shahnawaz’s random, gruesome and unwarranted act of killing Milkhi while 
retrieving Raghunath’s wife’s jewelry from their ancestral home goes undetected and 
indicates how class dictates the actions of these individuals before their religious 
affiliation does. Murad Ali, counts on Nathu’s cooperation regarding the killing of the 
pig, only because he knows that class and caste would ensure Nathu’s complicit 
silence. Sheikh Noor Illahi, in the end reassures Lala Lakshmi Narain that he had had 
the bales of cotton removed from the godown before the fire as a gesture of friendship 
cementing a lifelong bond of convenience.  
 In Tamas, unlike the master narrative of communal riots that informed official 
colonial history of India in the pre-Independence period, Sahni underlines the 






characters are divided selves, torn between the various affiliations they subscribe to in 
their social, political and economic worldview. Nathu’s killing of the pig is driven by 
economic necessity, as is Sheikh Noor Illahi’s gesture towards the Lala and similarly 
Shahnawaz’s help is extended only towards people in his own strata of society.  So 
unlike Richard’s simplistic rendering of social differences in the Indian context, my 
reading of Tamas illustrates the multiple facets of social interactions that came into 
play in determining a workable nationalism for pre-independence India. While 
(anti)nationalisms as I define them did not have a place in India prior to 1947, it is my 
argument that the master narrative of communal rioting was established and its 
reiteration in historical colonial accounts helped create the larger discourse that 
surrounds it even today.  
Communalism in present day India  
Some historians have indeed termed this communal violence as recurring convulsions 
in Indian society, or even as violent pathologies located in civil society. To briefly 
summarize some historical studies, noted historians Bipan Chandra and Mohanty18 
both argue that communalism in the Indian context can be seen as a disease in the 
body politic. Bipan Chandra like Tambiah’s earlier mentioned argument talks of 
communal ideology as being different from communal syncretism in that the former 
is exclusively based on an ideology of hatred of other religions and arises when 






a disease of civil society, Mohanty argues that it is a process of alienation from the 
authoritarian modern Indian nation-state.  Nandy makes a similar argument 
differentiating between religious faith and religious ideology which corresponds to 
the earlier mentioned communal syncretism and communalism. He however refutes 
the notion of violence as inherent pathologies in society and asserts that rioting is 
primarily an urban phenomenon, sometimes fostered by the complicit involvement of 
the agencies of state and its roots lie in the lack of institutionalized regulation of 
heterogeneity and differences in modern day society. Conflict, Nandy argues, was 
controlled and contained through processes that evolved out of the syncretism in 
society and which the modern Indian nation-state has failed to do in the current 
context. 
Riots, in my definition, include collective acts like arson, looting, destruction 
of property, killing, rape and other forms of assault against a specific social or 
religious group or against a political entity/organization or the state. While the last 
classification may suggest confusion with a political uprising or a revolution, riots 
rarely take on an organized character, in fact the spontaneity and lack of planning or 
discipline would clearly distinguish it from political acts of revolution and rebellion. 
Further, more often than not, riots erupt within a small enclosed world which 
encompasses both the perpetrators and the victims precluding issues of anonymity. 
However, the separation of the two after the fact has lead to ghettoization not 






the notions of anonymity and pointed towards the obvious complicity of politicians in 
the government as the rioters, armed with electoral lists of various political 
constituencies in Delhi, hunted down their Sikh victims. Rajiv Gandhi’s now 
immortalized words, “When a mighty tree falls, the earth shakes,” are a testimony to 
the political justification of this aggressive unwarranted violence in the face of a 
tragic assassination. 
Finally, I interrogate the sparks that ignite the collective violence in this 
society that engulfs and consumes local neighborhoods, involves perpetration of 
violence against people within the same social framework. Then, just as easily, out of 
the burning ruins and embers, like the proverbial phoenix, an altered social 
infrastructure re-emerges marking a shift in the dynamics of the population and more 
importantly it underscores the unequal and unfair renegotiation of spatial inhabitation. 
This constant undercurrent of communal tension along with the actualization of 
violence has steadily ensured a ghettoization of the minority communities in specific 
rural as well as urban areas in India today. 
Riots: Identification of Spatial Categories  
In my dissertation spaces and spatial categories become crucial to the narrative of the 
nation. All the narratives of the nation that I look at in the course of my dissertation 
seem to abound in depictions of people restricted to closed spaces or a form of 






globalization and the asymmetrical development of nationalisms in Hollywood 
cinema through the systematic use of cinematic space. 
Briefly, let me explicate on how spaces are used in these texts. Space signifies 
containment with reference to the Muslim mohallas in both Tamas and Riot as it does 
for Nathu waiting to kill the pig trapped in small space filled with rotting garbage and 
freshly spilled blood. For Liza, similarly her space is almost prison cell-like as she 
feels restricted within the confines of a large bungalow in a country she finds alien 
and inexplicable. The characters in Tamas seem to trade one closed space for another, 
from the supposed safety of their homes to the cramped attic of a neighbor’s house or 
to the sanctorum of a gurudwara. The Sikh women later even trade that for the 
confines of a well to save their honor. The wide open spaces in Tamas denote 
vulnerability not freedom as Iqbal Singh is hunted down like a dog before his 
humiliating conversion to Islam. Closed spaces have a very different connotation in 
the novel Riot.  Priscilla’s humble one room apartment with its minimal furnishings 
and peeling paint on the walls is like her life unadorned by any of the comforts she 
grew up with, barely recognizable to her grieving parents. Closed spaces afford 
Priscilla and Lakshman the privacy of the haunted Kotli as a lover’s paradise but it 
eventually becomes Priscilla’s bloody grave. The Kotli, out of bounds for everyone 
except the District Magistrate, and later Priscilla, also symbolizes Priscilla’s 
emotional and physical isolation from her social milieu. The love Priscilla and 






opening reflected again in the cracked mirror behind it, it exists only in the temporal 
moment. Spatially divided inhabitations mark Muslim mohallas from Hindu 
neighborhoods, they create self-contained bastis for the lower caste chamars just as 
much as they separate better developed areas from the lesser developed ones and they 
mark the boundaries of communal distrust.  
Veena Das, a well-known sociologist, in the Introduction to the text 
Communities, Riots and Survivors elaborates on the form of the riot, its temporal 
structure and the regulation of control over sacred spaces. She observes that time as 
duration in the context of riots goes beyond just an external dimension but instead 
becomes constitutive of its meaning. Hence it relates time to the event structure of the 
riot and the narrative within which it is set and secondly it points towards objectified 
calendars that are ritually marked. B Farida Shaheed, in her essay, “The Pathan-
Muhajir Conflicts 1985-6: A National Perspective,” about religious conflicts in 
Pakistan argues that every year during Muharram, one can anticipate the repetition of 
Shia-Sunni riots since it commemorates a historical conflict within the ritualistic 
expressions of the martyrdom of Hussain. In other words, the recurrence of this 
violence in the case of Shia-Sunni ethnic riots can be anticipated in calendrical time. 
Sacred spaces as Das defines them would include all pilgrimages centers, mosques, 
temples and churches that help define a religious community. It is “the control of 
scared spaces and their protection” that “continues to be an important symbol around 






While I largely agree with Das’s sociological delineation of the origins and 
structure of communal conflict in the form of riots, I clearly move away from her 
categories and definitions. To clarify, I do use her terms scared space and temporal 
space but I choose to imbue them with different meaning to define spatiality in the 
context of riots as occupying what I perceive as four unique kinds of spaces: temporal 
spaces, social spaces, symbolic spaces and sacred spaces.   
Temporal space as I allude to it here evolves from the fact that most 
communal riots in India are time specific and revolve around religious festivals like 
Muharram19 or events like the demolition of the Babri Masjid or the assassination of 
Indira Gandhi or even mundane events like an India-Pakistan cricket match. The 
timing of the conflict is critical with reference to the annual celebration of religious 
festivals or the clash of timing of two different events, the assassination of Indira 
Gandhi and the celebration of Diwali. In the novel Riot, the insistence of the Hindu 
religious leaders to go ahead with their planned procession in the face of the violence 
that erupts the prior evening establishes the temporality associated with the events 
that follow. Temporal space in the Indian context is as much dictated by the lunar 
calendar as it is the Gregorian calendar. And it is the shifting nature of the former that 
introduces an element of uncertainty and unpredictability to this space. 
The symbolic space would refer to the ritualistic rendering of religious events 
in the forms of processions, Rath Yatras, Jagrans20 or the religious posturing and 






brandishing of traditional weapons like trishuls21 and spears for Hindus to assert their 
readiness for Hindu militancy has similar reverberations. Rath Yatras were started by 
Bharatiya Janata Party leader L K Advani, in a nation wide effort to mobilize Hindu 
crowds to participate in the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. The spectacle of the adorned 
Rath22 as it proceeded on its journey from town to town across the nation helped 
elevate the discourse surrounding the controversial claim of the Ram Janmabhoomi 
issue to a higher plane of divinity. This transcendence serves a dual purpose: in the 
minds of the common man, it moves the debate beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of 
the nation-state to a higher court of divine law as much as it serves as an iconic 
reminder to the Hindu population of the glorious periods of Hindu history prior to the 
Muslim invasions and Mughal rule. In the Hindu epic Ramayana, the battle between 
Ram and Ravan over the abduction of Ram’s wife Sita, symbolically the fight 
between good and evil is celebrated through a series of Hindu festivals starting with 
Ram-Leela, the dramatic re-telling of the story of Ram, followed by Dussehra, the re-
enactment and celebration of the victory of Ram over Ravan and ends with the Hindu 
festival Diwali to commemorate Ram’s jubiliant return to Ayodhya.  Advani’s Rath 
Yatras in the imaginings of a Hindu nation can thus be read as another re-enactment 
of a victorious return to re-claim Ayodhya. This further opens up a plethora of 
possibilities to analyze Advani’s narcissistic desire to equate himself with the Hindu 
pantheon of Gods and how this identification resonates with the monarchical 







The third kind of space would be the social space within which riots seem to 
primarily function – the ‘hotspots’  Gurinder, the Police Chief of Zalilgarh, constantly 
refers to in the same novel. These would be the neighborhoods that are identified as 
being communally sensitive and where the violence is most likely to erupt. As I 
mentioned earlier, some of this is closely linked to the ghettoization that has occurred 
over the years as responses to prior rioting. Like in Tamas, in the face of impending 
trouble, people choose to move out of neighborhoods for fear of their safety and 
create new neighborhoods earmarked by exclusive populations of the same religious 
community.  Unlike the social organization in colonial India along the traditional 
lines of caste and class and profession, as I discuss earlier in this chapter, which was 
by no means unproblematic, Ashis Nandy argues that communalism is a result of the 
failure of the postcolonial secular nation-state to recognize and regulate difference. In 
other words, this implies the necessity of re-organizing the social infrastructure to 
accommodate this heterogeneity of populations as a primary function of the secular 
nation-state without which difference periodically resurfaces as conflict or collective 
violence.   
The fourth and final kind of space I identify is sacred space closely 
associated with the land itself. In my dissertation, it is also the most significant spatial 
category. Like Nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that were 






as I define them, provides one of the only ways to ground (anti)nationalisms to a 
specific location.  Unlike the other (anti)nationalisms that I deal with in this 
dissertation, the notion of scared space in localized narratives of resistance makes this 
the most rooted in the local, in national and regional specificity. It is the only physical 
space that at many levels marks the crux of all religious fundamental disputes in the 
world today. It is the sacred space of Ayodhya, the birthplace of Ram for the Hindus 
as much as it is the site of the sixteenth century mosque, the Babri Masjid built by 
Mughal Emperor Babur for the Muslims; it is the Golden Temple in Amritsar for the 
Sikhs, and the mosque that is polluted in Tamas. The notion of scared space can be 
further extended to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem for Jews, the nation of Palestine or 
Mecca for the Muslims. I make an argument in my previous chapter about Foucault’s 
notion of spaces as utopias or heterotopias and link it to the notion of Ummah Islam. 
Utopias would be imagined unreal places that represent society in its perfected form 
while heterotopias are real places onto which a community can project the ideological 
virtues of an imagined Utopia. Palestine like Ayodhya becomes a heterotopia around 
which new nations can be imagined. Claiming or reclaiming this sacred space be it 
Ayodhya, Kashi, Kashmir, or Palestine forges a bond of kinship or imaginings 
directly outside of the Nationalisms that formed nation-states in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  
Sacred space becomes further relevant in tying in the notion of the abstract to 






in for the projected desire for a homeland. Sacred spaces become integral to all 
narratives of nationalism that derive from a politico-religious identity.  
Configuring the Muslim as the Other 
In colonial India, the Muslim was the invader, the invading Turks as the Sikh women 
proclaim and in a strange moment of ‘unisonance’ (I define this term in my earlier 
chapter) the historical past and the present completely merge. It is a moment of 
reckoning in the sense that Hume used it – as the synthesis of time whereby in the 
context of a living present, certain aspects of the past are remembered and some 
aspects actively forgotten. For the purposes of my argument, unlike the “forgetting” 
that Renan23 talks about at the birth of all nations, the emphasis here would be on the 
active act of “remembering”. Renan says that the violence and bloodshed essential to 
the birth of all western nations was forgotten for purposes of sanitizing the 
nationalism that was to be built on its foundations. My argument here turns this one 
on its head. In the case of (anti)nationalisms, the act of remembering the violence and 
the bloodshed is crucial to retain the negativity associated with image of the ‘Other’. 
The question that needs to be framed is a simple one: what do we choose to retain in 
our memories, oral histories and in the cultural repertoire that defines our identity?  
Homi Bhabha refutes Anderson’s notion of unisonance as it exists in ‘single, 
homogenous empty (western) time’ by shifting our attention to the ongoing 






the performative. According to Bhabha: 
In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the 
continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the 
repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process 
of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the 
site of writing the nation (297).   
Anderson and Bhabha both acknowledge that a nation’s past considerably inflects its 
imaginary. The nation state evokes its past and writes its people into the continuity of 
the contiguous narrative that links its past and present but as Bhabha argues, the 
performative aspects that underscore repetition will surface to challenge the 
pedagogical enforcing of a rightful inheritance.  
Unlike the official narrative of historical continuity, the collective memory of 
the community abounds in multiple references to the atrocities committed in the past 
which resonate with the rumors of conflict in the present. Rumor-mongering is a 
critical part of communalism and feeds on the frenzy of collective memory of 
subjective violence. It is in the malicious recounting of survivor’s stories and oral 
histories that rumors take root blurring the boundaries of fact and fiction. In Tamas, 
the news of the desecration of the mosque with the dead pig’s carcass results in the 
rumor of the killing of a cow and its parts being strewn all over the city. In the 
Gurudwara later in the novella, rumors about a killing in the Khalsa School and the 






In pre-Independence India, Muslims were as much the outsiders as the British. 
Invaders from the historical past, Muslims remained the ‘Other’, even in the face of 
colonial subjugation.  In Tamas, Sahni characterizes this otherness is many ways. 
Despite Richard’s obvious indifference to the seriousness of the situation, the anger 
augments itself against the Muslims, and vice versa. Again in Riot, Priscilla is the 
meddling outsider but the Muslims remain the ‘Other’ to the Hindu fundamentalists. 
As an aside that I cannot resist, Tharoor creates a rich and powerful resonance in the 
novel through the Hart family history. Priscilla’s grandparents came to India as 
missionaries, her father as a Capitalist Coca-Cola executive and she herself, as a 
student and social worker, foregrounding three very different contextual interventions 
by Westerners in the Indian subcontinent. The textual reference by Priscilla to E. M 
Forster’s character Adela Quested introduces a whole other angle to this self-reflexive 
representation of the Westerner in India but that will have to be set aside to be 
discussed in another paper. 
The otherness of the Muslim translates into the religio-ethnic signifiers coded 
on the body. Richard explains this to Liza in simplistic terms about observing 
difference amongst the Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs. While he oversimplifies the 
details for Liza’s benefit, most of his observations are rooted in fact. In South Asian 
society, religious signifiers are obviously placed on the human body, identifying them 
instantly as Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. The male body it can be argued is essentially 






hair) grown out and never cut to make it Sikh. The other side of this same argument 
would be that the Hindu male body can be subjected to conversion as can the Sikh 
male body by cutting of the hair etc. unlike the Muslim male body which is ritually 
marked and cannot be made whole again. The beard of the Muslim, the little Fez cap 
and the ability to recite the kalma become little cultural weapons in the repertoire of 
fanatic frenzied mobs to help identify male members of the Muslim community. The 
lack of the same marks a Hindu or Sikh male who can be converted to the Islamic 
faith by the performing of the same ritualistic act like we see with the forced 
circumcision of Iqbal Singh in Tamas (190-192).  Iqbal Singh is also subjected to his 
hair being shaved off and to the forced eating beef (the cow being sacred to all 
Hindus and Sikhs) before being made to recite the Kalma.  “Before nightfall all the 
signs of Iqbal Singh’s Sikhism had been carefully obliterated; in their place were al 
the external Muslim signs. From an enemy he had been transformed into a friend, not 
an infidel, but a believer - a Mussalman.” (192) 
Deepak Mehta is his essay, “Circumcision, Body Masculinity: The Ritual 
Wound and Collective Violence” makes a powerful argument about “the inscription 
of circumcision by seeing how the male body is constituted, eclipsed and 
reformulated in three related domains”. The male Muslim body he argues 
“participates in three different zones of significance and initiates the processes of 
signification” (79). The male Muslim body is constituted through the ritual of khatna 






term musalmani (the act of being Muslim) and it becomes an alternate imagination of 
the body through circumcision with reference to the term katua. Muslims embrace the 
first two categories, privileging the wound as essential to the making of a Muslim but 
the term Katua referring to same act of circumcision as an act of destroying 
introduces stigma to the act by pointing towards another kind of cutting of the penis – 
castration. The rhetoric of the Hindu-Muslim riots is highly sexualized for purposes 
of provocation and these terms play into the fear of being ritually converted. It is the 
circulation of signs that reveals the slippage between the ideas of circumcision and 
castration which in the Hindu imagination becomes the bestial body.   
Rape has been documented as a very common war strategy and surfaces in 
communal violence within the same performative paradigm of ritually claiming 
human bodies. Women’s bodies become sites of resistance and in inscribing them 
through the act of rape, the community claims the women’s body as their own. Rape, 
unfortunately, is a very common form of violence in communal rioting and I would 
like to acknowledge the tremendously powerful scholarship that exists on women, 
rape and war but since rape does not feature in the two fictional texts, I shall not enter 
into that discourse. In fact it is precisely the fear of rape by Muslim men that 
motivates the mass suicide by the Sikh women as they deliberately jump into the 
community well to protect their honor.   
The constant repetition of historical references keeps this otherness alive. 






for the Muslim invaders as in the battle of Haldighati24. The Sikhs prepare for the 
violence by remembering their historical conflict with Muslims: “The Turks had 
come, but they were from the neighboring villages. The Sikhs believed they were 
settling scores with their traditional enemies, the same Turks with whom the Khalsas 
used to battle two hundred years ago. It was just one more link in a historic chain of 
battles” (193). 
Slogan shouting as I discussed before is a prominent part of communal 
violence and this verbalized form of assault usually precedes the more physical forms 
of violence. It takes on many forms, from the common religious cries like “Allah-o-
Akbar,”  “Vahe Guru,” “Jai Shri Ram” and “Har Har Mahadev” to the more 
complicated sexualized insults that seem to be an inversion of the tradition of political 
slogans at election rallies.  In Riot, the slogans are aimed at insulting the Muslim 
community with their pithy rhymes like “Mussalman ke do hi sthaan, Pakistan ya 
Kabristan,” (there are only two places for a Muslim, Pakistan or the cemetery) or “Jo 
kahta hai Ali Ali, uski ma ko choddo gali gali” (He who calls out to Ali, fuck his 
mother in every alley) (128). 
Finally, the role of the rumors in collective violence takes on a larger function 
vis-à-vis setting up of the Muslim as the ‘Other’. The Hindu Right in India has 
deliberately cultivated a stereotype of the Indian Muslim as a threatening outsider 
undermining the nationalist fabric of the nation. The perception that the nation-state 






its own. Ram Charan Gupta, the Hindu leader gives voice to some of these unfounded 
notions in his conversation with Randy Diggs. The Muslims he says are allowed their 
own Personal Law which permits them to take up to four wives and which he argues 
contributes to their growing numbers and because of which the population of 
Muslims will soon overtake the Hindu population. He complains about their foreign 
origins, the minority appeasement policies of the government and the pandering to the 
religious sentiments by permitting a state funded Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca each year, 
none of these or similar privileges he alleges are accorded to Hindus. Every issue 
from the Shah Banu case to Kashmir Land laws become part of this political master 
narrative. He says, “Why is it that no Muslim country anywhere in the world is a 
democracy? Look around you, anywhere on the map, they are all dictatorships, 
monarchies, tyrannies, military regimes. Take my word for it, it’s the only way they 
know. Muslims are fanatics and terrorists; they only understand the language of 
force” (57). Not founded in fact or logic (Indian Muslims are a mere 13.4 % to 80.5 
% Hindus), these stereotypical images nurture the Muslim as the enemy and conflate 
the issues the Hindu fundamentalists have against the secularist, modernizing mission 
of the nation-state with the Muslim minority. 
Communalism as a new Nationalism against Modernity  
Modernity enters into the discourse on nationalism and (anti)nationalisms as a 






clarifying the conflation of modernity with the nation-state as seen in these texts 
within the Indian subcontinent. I will then extend my argument to analyze other 
configurations of religious fundamentalisms especially Islamic fundamentalisms, in 
the global context, as being posited against modernity. Both these assertions look 
forward to the arguments I develop in the next two chapters of my dissertation.  
In my next chapter, I develop an argument that militant Hindu 
fundamentalism in the Indian subcontinent is a byproduct of the adversarial and 
dialectical relationship of two different kinds of nationalisms – one based on 
religious-communal identity and one that is explicitly based on the modernistic 
ideology of development. Fundamentalism in this framework is also set up in 
opposition to the modernizing and secularizing mission of the Nehruvian social 
development policies in India as I have illustrated in this chapter. One can thus argue 
that it is the imbalance of economic development, and the continued maintenance of 
social hierarchies along caste and class lines within the nation-state that negates the 
modernizing and equalizing nature of the enterprise. The “modernizing mission” of 
secular politics in India as I said earlier was in opposition to a primarily communal 
identity, which was traditional and pre-modern. Further, in creating a seemingly 
inclusive space for nation-building and national development, it automatically 
relegated its ‘other’ to a pre-modern or anti-modern status. This secular and modern 
identity was not without its problems. It created a pan-Indian homogenous elitist 






middle class elite was made possible through the stripping of its ascriptive religio-
ethnic markers as discussed earlier and by the universal adoption of Westernized 
ways, language and attire.  
According to Maiello, it (this elite) “spoke in the modernist idiom of secular 
nationalism, scientific technology and economic development; by adopting this 
idiom, the elite were able to render invisible its own ascriptive markers” (186). It was 
a community drawn exclusively from the upper caste and middle classes and it found 
its home in deterritorialized spaces offered by the metropolis, in this case, largely 
New Delhi. Despite its exclusive nature and its erasure of difference, it had hijacked 
the “modernizing” agenda, and any opposition to it, was therefore pre-modern or anti-
modern. It is this elite that constitutes the bureaucracy and the legal system 
(Lakshman and Gurinder stand in for these sections of society)  that Ram Charan 
Gupta loathes, “These people, they come to our districts with fancy so called secular 
ideas they have learned in the English-language colleges, and they try to tell us what 
to do. They, who do not understand their own culture, their own religion, their own 
heritage. Such people have no right to call themselves Indians. But they rule over us, 
you see” (56). While Tharoor’s novel is largely unique in that it gives voice to the 
some of the marginalized ideologies vis-à-vis the English novel in India, like the 
Hindu Right, he exposes their self-righteousness and their misappropriation of 
religious sentiment towards their own political ends. It is through the character of 






counterview to Gupta’s poisonous misinformation. He says: 
There’s been a recent change in the dominant ethos of the country … 
We’re seeing more and more of this demonization of a collectivity. Look at 
the things they are saying! Muslims are pampered for political ends they 
say: look at the Shah Banu case and Muslim Personal Law. Muslims have 
four wives, they exclaim and are outbreeding everyone else; soon they will 
overtake the Hindus! … I tried to argue the point at first with those Hindus 
who were willing to raise it with me, but found it almost too simple to do 
so. The Rajiv Gandhi government’s action on the Shah Banu case was pure 
political opportunism; it was a sellout to Muslim conservatives but a 
betrayal of Muslim women and Muslim reformers. … If Muslims have four 
wives – and not many do – how does that increase the number of 
reproductive Muslim wombs which still remains four whether by one 
husband or many? And by what statistical projection can 115 million 
Muslims ‘overtake’ 700 million Hindus? …But it doesn’t matter – this is 
not about logic or reasoning. The national mind has been afflicted with the 
intellectual cancer of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (114). 
Lakshman and Gurinder represent the elite who subscribe to a different identity – an 
Indianness at large. Lakshman with his self-criticism and introspective ways, his 
Indianness slightly at odds with his westernized education, his moral compass finely 






She embodies what his western education has taught him to desire – individualism 
and self-fulfillment. Yet he cannot give it all up for her as love cannot supercede his 
roles as an Indian son, husband and father. Finally it is tradition that tugs at his 
heartstrings. While Ram Charan Gupta’s Hindutva worldview is not validated, 
Tharoor’s complex characterization of Lakshman, in many ways, acts as an 
indictment of a bureaucracy and technocracy out of touch with the Indian majority, 
unable to translate their well meaning ideology into an implementation of the 
restructuring of social order. Spouting the secular idiom of the Indian nation-state, the 
view of religious tolerance and equality, Lakshman and Gurinder repeatedly find their 
hands tied by the legal system and the corruption of the politicians.  
In fact, if any, Tharoor privileges the views of Mohammed Sarwar, the scholar 
of History, whose research on a revered Muslim warrior Ghazi Miyan brings him to 
Zalilgarh. His research illustrates the syncretism in society what he calls composite 
religiosity as opposed to composite culture. He argues the need for “nonsectarian 
histories of sectarian strife” (64). He is not limited by his westernized education –  
while Lakshman’s speech is ridden with Wilde witticisms, Sarwar speaks of the oral 
histories of small time warriors of Medieval India. And unlike Lakshman’s secluded 
citadel of power, he inhabits the impoverished and riot afflicted habitation of his poor 
relatives. Sarwar is a man in touch with the realities of India, he freely moves 
between the center and the periphery. As a middle class academic with his English 






community he fears is fast being permanently relegated to the margins. His argument 
succinctly articulates the doubly marginalized status of the Muslim in India – the 
partition, he argues, courtesy of fanatic Islamists relegated Islam to a territorially 
inscribed area – Pakistan, denied to those who disagreed with a vision of a split India; 
and the Hindu fundamentalists deliberate desire to change the public discourse about 
Indianness would be to again deny the Indian Muslims a viable space in public 
discourse.  
The discourse about modernity becomes crucial to our analysis as it is 
employed in the service of establishing hegemonic structures of power. My analysis 
of this manipulation of the discourse on modernity in both the local and global 
context foregrounds the contradictions inherent in such imaginings. So even as Hindu 
fundamentalists reject the modern and secular ways of the Indian elite, in their 
diatribe against the Muslims in India they echo the exact opposite ethos, as we have 
just illustrated in this chapter. Muslims are thus relegated to a pre-modern, uncivilized 
almost bestial status to promote the superiority associated with the faith of the 
majority population. 
  Modern, civilized, Western – homogenous monolithic categories – all of these 
are used interchangeably in the context of religious fundamentalisms. What kind of 
classification links these terms together? To categorize something as ‘modern’ is to 
study it in terms of its temporality; to be civilized is to have progressed and evolved; 






political terms. Or let us think of them in terms of their binary oppositions – modern 
as opposed to traditional, primitive; civilized as opposed to savage and barbaric. But 
this gets complicated when we come to the term Western – as opposed to Oriental?  
I am deliberately shifting the debate here to focus on an analysis of the 
rhetoric used to talk about (anti)nationalisms specifically Islamic fundamentalisms. 
There is a need to unpack these homogenous and monolithic categories before we can 
even begin to explore the historical, political and economic origins of terrorism. 
Edward Said in his text, Covering Islam, comments on these ideologically 
loaded labels (he talks about the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’) and he says that they are 
enabling and disabling at the same time. However, he points out that ‘Islam’ is not 
pitted against ‘Christianity’ but the ‘West’ because the assumption is that: 
whereas the West is greater than and has surpassed the stage of 
Christianity, its principal religion, the world of Islam – its varied societies, 
histories and languages not withstanding – is still mired in religion, 
primitivity and backwardness. Therefore, the West is modern, greater than 
the sum of its parts, full of enriching contradictions and yet always 
‘Western’ in its cultural identity; the world of Islam, on the other hand, is 
no more than ‘Islam,’ reducible to a small number of unchanging 
characteristics despite the appearance of contradictions and experiences of 
variety that seem on the surface to be as plentiful as those of the West (10). 






the least of which is the “civilizing mission” of colonialism.  Sunder Rajan similarly 
grounds ‘modernity’ in a postcolonial context, when she says, “Modernity has never 
been simply the time of the present. It is now more than ever in postcoloniality more 
than elsewhere, a complex historical and cultural situation defined against the past, 
the traditional, and the ‘West,’ with different kinds of value attached to what it 
represents” (7). Modernity, thus like nationalisms – is ineluctably shaped by its 
“Other” – the past or the traditional or the West.   
Within the colonizer/colonized paradigm, the crucial question about race 
relations according to Stuart Hall, “is not whether man in general makes perpetual 
distinctions between groups with different racial or ethnic characteristics, but rather 
what are the specific conditions which make this form of distinction socially 
pertinent, historically active” (Sharpe, 5). The specific conditions that mark this 
distinction that Hall is talking about can be transposed to the current analysis of 
terrorism as well. Coding Islamic terrorism as an attack on modernity makes the 
western assumptions of superiority transparent; thus making the sanctioning of a war 
against terrorism inevitable. Hence the plethora of articles in the media about the 
regressive, traditional and sexist policies of the Taliban, imposed on Afghanistan, a 
nation that was originally “westernized”. We can condemn the imposition of the 
“veil” in Taliban ruled Afghanistan but we should not question the imposition of the 
abaya on “non-Muslim” female US Air Force officers stationed in Saudi Arabia25.  






imposition of the exact “same” traditional practices differs from one Islamic country 
to another – it marks the recognition of the specific conditions which make this form 
of distinction socially pertinent and historically active. 
Having defined modernity in the context of Islamic terrorism, let us examine 
this in the larger context of the history of terrorism, as we know it. Modernity, as we 
said earlier, can be defined in temporal terms. Using a central Western 
epistemological theory, Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, as a rubric – modernity 
suggests a move forward, a progression. Consequently, the “act of attacking 
modernity” is to privilege the traditional, and in the framework we just established, 
that is regressive.  
 Does fundamentalism then always constitute an opposition to the modern? 
Yes, but as I have shown it is the framing and the rhetoric that constitutes it as a 
discourse constantly in conflict with modernity and civilization and hence with 
Western thought that gives rise to these categories. 
Subaltern Secularism   
To bring my argument about religious fundamentalisms as (anti)nationalisms a full 
circle, let us revisit secularism as the opposing force to communalism in the Indian 
subcontinent. We have argued that in opposition to the Nationalism that developed in 
the immediate postcolonial moment, the Indian nation-state finds itself at crossroads 






nationalism. The Nationalism of the new nation-state post-1947 was nurtured as a 
Nehruvian dream of a secularizing, modernizing mission of nation-building which 
Maiello describes as “an illusive self-perception of a morally superior society 
anchored in the ethos of tolerance and brotherhood” that relegated the harsh reality of 
religious identity to the backburner (100). As an assertion of anti-western sentiment, 
it refuted the colonial paradigm of a communally divisive society, and attempted to 
exorcise the ghosts of Partition. Secularism became its byline in this goal of territorial 
integrity and modernizing mission. The failure of the nation-state through a 
succession of self-serving political governments to provide homogenized economic 
development throughout the nation, has in turn, given birth to several 
(anti)nationalisms that threaten this status-quo, Hindu fundamentalism being a 
primary contender.  
I have in the course of my chapter, shown the historical antecedents of Hindu 
and Islamic fundamentalisms especially in its manifestation as collective violence. I 
have defined spaces this communalism occupies and the rhetoric it uses to spew its 
hatred. Scholars now talk of the fragmentation within the Indian nation-state as a 
systemic crisis which can only be subverted through the continued prevalence of the 
ideology of tolerance, secularism and brotherhood. But just as the master narrative of 
communalism has its origins in colonialism, I would like to conclude this chapter 
with Homi Bhabha’s powerful analysis of the term secularism which resonates within 






Secularism he points out, like other concepts individualism, liberalism etc. are “ideas, 
and ideals, that are increasingly complicit with a self-reflective claim to a culture of 
modernity whether it is held by the elites of the East or West, or the North or South.  
We may define them in different ways, assume different political or moral positions 
in relation to them, but they seem natural to us: it is as if they are instinctive to our 
sense of what civil society or a civic consciousness must be” (208). Bhabha asserts it 
is crucial to understand that these complex universal concepts have been 
“transformed through their colonial and postcolonial contexts that are particularly 
important to our current social and cultural debates in a multicultural and multi-ethnic 
society” (209). In other words, these western ideals of government are themselves 
derived from the colonial and postcolonial experience. The classic form of secularism 
is a privileged secularism, a secularism of the elite as I have argued in the chapter. A 
subaltern secularism is not based on the utopian notion of universalism and 
individualism that bears no connection to the lives of the marginalized or the 
oppressed, it is instead derived in a social space communally shared with others and 
from the process of a collaborative and collective ethics of choice in which solidarity 
is not based on similarity but on the articulation and recognition of difference. 
Can one assume that it is this subaltern secularism that the two fictional texts 
ambivalently meander towards? These novels unlike the films we analyze in the next 
two chapters focus largely on the fissures that split society, they enhance the nature of 






limitations. The films, on the other hand, I argue point towards the similarities and the 
homogeneity and build towards a nationalism that encompasses all. By foregrounding 
difference and the focusing on the debate that surrounds its expression in secular 
society because of the failed nature of the state’s policy of modernized secularism, 
perhaps the fictional texts open the possibilities for the emergence of subaltern 
secularism?





1 Partition refers to the formal creation of Pakistan as an independent Islamic state out 
of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The word Partition in Indian history resonates 
with the horrors of the forced mass migration of millions and the trauma of sectarian 
violence that ripped a nation apart 
 
2  The assassination of the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi on October 31, 
1984 by her Sikh bodyguards was in response to “Operation Bluestar”, a military 
operation that took place June 4 to June 6 1984. The Indian armed forces entered the 
Golden Temple (the holiest Sikh shrine) for the purpose of flushing out the heavily 
armed Khalistan separatists who were using it as a base of operations to carry out 
terrorist activities across Punjab. The anti-Sikh riots referred to here took place over 
three days in November 1984 in response to the assassination of Indira Gandhi and 
claimed thousands of lives. 
 
3 Ayodhya, has long been the controversial birthplace of the Hindu God Ram. The 
Bharatiya Janata Party led by L K Advani initiated a Rath Yatra in 1990 to rally the 
masses to march to Ayodhya and take back the holy site from the Muslim Mosque; 
the Babri Masjid supposedly built there by the Mughal Emperor Babur in 1528 AD 
after destroying the original temple. As to the authenticity of this claim, it is still 












in the courts and the site had been closed for worship by the Supreme Court of India. 
On December 6th, 1992 a huge mob of Karsevaks stormed the mosque and destroyed 
it which caused communal tension across the country.   
 
4 The Bombay bomb blasts took place in March 1993 as a supposed response by 
Islamic terror groups (linked to the Bombay mafia) to the widescale riots that 
consumed Bombay from December 6-12 and then again from January 7-16 after the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992.  
5 The term Karsevaks is used to refer to people who offer their services for free 
(volunteer) to a religious cause. It originates from the Sanskrit words kar (hand) and 
sevak (helper). It has been used to refer to people who offered their services at 
Ayodhya to build the Ram temple and rather controversially to refer to people who 
demolished the Babri Masjid. Also, after Operation Bluestar, referred to earlier, 
karsevaks helped in rebuilding the Harmandir Saheb in the Golden temple at 
Amritsar.   
6 The Godhra riots captured the nation’s imagination with the carnage that followed 
after a bogey of the Sabarmati express carrying Hindu Karsevaks returning from 
Ayodhya was destroyed in a fire killing 59 people on February 27, 2002. The 
accusations that a 100 people strong Muslim mob was responsible resulted in 
widescale violence across Gujarat that many feel was partially unleashed by the Right 
wing government in the state of Gujarat, under the leadership of Chief Minister 
Narendra Modi. Rakesh Sharma’s documentary Final Solution released 2004, 
captures the politics of hate and the complicity of the Hindu fundamentalists in the 
genocide that rocked Gujarat. 
 
7 Enthnonationalisms I define as nationalism based on ethnic identity for example the 
movement for Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka fuelled by the for LTTE or the 
Liberation  Tigers of Tamil Eelam. They claim that they are the only legitimate 
representative of all Tamils in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and control significant 












8 Regional Nationalisms would include nationalism that derives from a regional 
identity like the conflict in Kashmir. The demand for a Kashmiri homeland is based 
on what they often refer to as Kashmiriyat and while Islam does play a role in it as 
explained by the forced exile of Hindu Kashmiri Pundits from the valley, the 
regionalism supercedes it. However, it is also a secessionist movement in its demand 
for an independent Kashmir, a new nation-state. 
 
9 Linguistic Nationalism in the Indian subcontinent has not really translated into a 
conflict beyond the constant assertion and refusal of non-Hindi-speaking states 
especially in Southern India to recognize Hindi as an official language of the nation-
state. 
 
10 Sub-nationalisms would include the demands for the creation of new states within 
the larger republic of India. For example, the splitting of Bihar into two and the 
creation of a new state Jharkhand or the creation of Uttaranchal out of the largest 
Indian state of Uttar Pradesh etc. It is not marked by a legitimate separation from the 
nation-state but a fragmentation that can be incorporated and assimilated within the 
larger national body.  
 
11 Secessionism is marked by a desire to secede from the nation-state. The demand for 
Khalistan, a new homeland for the Sikhs as an independent nation-state to be created 
out of Punjab is clearly a secessionist movement.    
 
12 Tehsil was a district in Colonial India governed by a tehsildar.  
 
13 Mohalla is the Urdu word for a local small neighborbood. It resonates with notions 
of community in the sense of brotherhood.  
 
14The ritual is known as Sati, and performed by Rajput women to protect their honor 
against Islamic invaders known to rape the womenfolk or to take them captive. 
Women, once widowed would rush to kill themselves in a ritualistic fashion either by 











husbands.  In this case, the Sikh women jump into the well to save themselves from 
being dishonored.  
 
15 “The novel orchestrates all its themes, the totality of the world of objects and ideas 
depicted and expressed in it, by means of the social diversity of speech types and by 
differing individual voices that flourish under such conditions. Authorial speech, the 
speeches of narrators, inserted genres, the speech of characters are merely those 
fundamental compositional unities with whose help heteroglossia can enter the novel; 
each of them permits a multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links 
and interrelationships (always more or less dialogized). These distinctive links and 
interrelationships between utterances and languages, this movement of the theme 
through different languages and speech types, its dispersion into the rivulets and 
droplets of social heteroglossia, its dialogization--this is the basic distinguishing 
feature of the stylistics of the novel.” (The Dialogic Imagination, 263).  
 
16 Muhammad Ali Jinnah also referred to as Quaid-e-Azam was the founder leader of 
Pakistan. As President of the All Indian Muslim Leagues, he helped found Pakistan as 
an Islamic nation-state in 1947. 
 
17 This is now a contested theory and the Aryan question is now explained away as a 
series of small scale migrations and consequent assimilations over centuries. 
 
18 Mohanty as cited by Veena Das in Mirrors of Violence. 
 
19 Muharram is a Shia commemoration of the martyrdom of Hussain in the Battle of 
Karbala in the month of Ashura. Shia Muslims take out processions on Muharram. 
While Sunni and Shia are more alike than dissimilar, there are significant theological 
differences that implicate history, class, ethnicity, culture, and faith and have practical 
consequences for the relationship between politics and Islam. 
  
20 Jagran is a relatively newer form of Hindu worship with the singing of religious 











is broadcast over loudspeakers and many see it as a reaction to the Islamic call for 
Prayer (Azaan for Sunni Muslims) five times a day similarly broadcast from the 
minaret of a mosque by a muezzin over a loudspeaker.  
 
21 Trishul is a trident associated with the Shiva, the destroyer in the Hindu trinity. 
 
22 Rath is the Hindi word for an adorned chariot associated with legendary rulers, 
warriors and the Hindu divinity.  
 
23 I elaborate on this in Chapter 1. 
 
24 The battle of Haldighati took place in 1576 between the Rajput King, Rana Pratap 
Singh of Mewar and the Mughal Emperor Akbar.  
 
25 I refer to a lawsuit filed by Air Force Lt. Col. Martha McSally about a Pentagon 
policy that required women in the military serving in Saudi Arabia to wear traditional 
Muslim garments specifically the abaya when they travel off base. Other restrictions 
imposed by the Pentagon include prohibiting women military personnel from driving  
a car, going off base without a male chaperone, and being forced to sit in the back of  
the car. The lawsuit was filed on the basis that it was discriminatory against women. 
The Pentagon has since revised the wording from ‘required’ to ‘strongly encourages’ 








Chapter 4: Reaffirming the Nation: Bollywood and Terrorism 
The 1990s in India saw a sudden spate of Bollywood films1 that dealt directly or 
obliquely with terrorism, some of which were obviously influenced by real-life 
political events. The use of terrorism as a narrative strategy, backdrop or as the 
central conflict in these films could be attributed to a changing political climate in the 
country and the amalgamation of several political and historical events centered 
around socio-political change that had suddenly metamorphosed into “hydra-headed” 
monsters of terror. Mani Ratnam’s film Roja released in 1992 marked a series of 
firsts in Indian cinema. It was one of the first films to deal with terrorism onscreen, 
and to successfully transition from the localized regional film to the national 
cinematic space (originally produced in Tamil, it was widely accepted in its dubbed 
version by the pan-Indian audience of Hindi films) and the first to successfully 
popularize song lyrics within that largely Hindi-speaking audience, even though some 
verses were retained in Tamil and Malayam.  In my argument however, all of these 
firsts are crucial in setting the stage for a close analysis of how narratives of terrorism 
in film inflect and shape the discourses of nationalism through the conflicted 
relationship of the local and the global (in this case the regional and the national)2. By 
locating this analysis in the specifics of this conflict between the regional and the 






despite its supposed secular impulse to introduce inclusiveness and heterogeneity in 
order to reflect India’s diversity, only serves to promote and reaffirm a homogenized 
nationalism.  
The questions that arise out of this popular use of terrorism as a narrative 
strategy can be used to interrogate the genesis of these movements in complex 
historical and political issues, in conflicts of ideologies of religious intolerance and 
ethnic cleansing and most certainly in responses to economic and capitalist 
hegemonies. Even as Nationalism is predicated on difference upon difference, 
terrorism in India and subsequently its depiction in popular film cannot be treated as a 
homogenous whole. This chapter seeks to define terrorism as it is represented and 
constructed in cultural/historical terms specific to the Indian context through the close 
analysis of four Hindi/Urdu films: Mani Ratnam’s Roja (1992) and Bombay (1995), 
Vidhu Vinod Chopra’s Mission Kashmir (2000) and Khalid Mohammed’s Fiza 
(2000). I will also touch upon other films like John Mathew Matthan’s Sarfarosh3 
(Rebel Ahead, 1999) and Gulzar’s Maachis4 (The Matchstick, 1992) briefly in the 
course of my discussion.  
My analysis will be divided into the following three sections: the first section 
locates these films in a socio-cultural, political context, and provides exigency for the 
analysis. I contextualize terrorism in historical and political terms very briefly here, to 
trace its roots in political decisions and historical events that were cited as 






section of this chapter frames these films in a larger generic category of trauma films 
whereby the collective memory of traumatic events (in my thesis, I specifically deal 
with violent acts of terrorism) centers on the paradigm of remembrance/forgetting 
even as it is articulated in the public sphere through the use of the cinematic medium. 
The third section focuses on a closer reading of the narratives of terrorism in each of 
these popular films. It is my argument that these mainstream films foreground 
terrorism as a narrative strategy which helps to promote a normative notion of 
patriotism that despite its attempted symbolic and equal handed acknowledgement 
and representation of difference only serves to enhance and reaffirm a homogenized 
nationalism that erases difference, marginalizes minorities and celebrates the nation 
even as it questions the nation-state.  In the final section, I further develop my earlier 
argument about Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism in the Indian subcontinent not 
just as a byproduct of the adversarial or dialectical relationship of two different kinds 
of nationalisms – one based on religious-communal identity and the other that is 
explicitly based on the modernistic ideology of development - but more as a third 
kind of nationalism, an (anti)nationalism, which emerges from my analysis of these 
films and I argue is a result of both the dialectical and the adversarial relationship of  
the earlier mentioned kinds of nationalism. 
Framing Terror Narratives in Bollywood Cinema 






paradise’ motif in Hindi film. Kashmir with its picturesque valleys and snow covered 
terrain had long been the Bollywood5 cinematographer’s dream, featured as a 
backdrop for the song and dance routine in hundreds of Hindi films - for example, Raj 
Kapoor’s Barsaat (1949), Shakti Samant’s Kashmir Ki Kali (1964) and Ramanand 
Sagar’s Arzoo/Love in Kashmir (1965).  The political climate and violence in 
Kashmir through the 1980s had forced filmmakers to move beyond, using alternative 
and more expensive locales abroad like the Swiss Alps to recreate the snow capped 
mountains so dear to the Hindi film audience. Mani Ratnam’s film, Roja, not only 
introduced terrorism in Kashmir as a new narrative  strategy in Bollywood cinema but 
in many ways metaphorically reclaimed Kashmir for the national film audiences 
through its use as an integral and invaluable on-screen cinematic space6.  This re-
claiming of Kashmir as an onscreen space further echoed the nationalist agenda of the 
political rightwing through which the middle class Hindu bourgeoisie could claim 
intervention in the act of reclaiming Kashmir (India’s only Muslim majority state) as 
an integral part of India. Further, the identification with the westernized, middle class 
professional yet patriotic hero (he works as a cryptographer for the Indian 
government), helps make that process of reclaiming Kashmir seem not only like a 
tangible and achievable goal but in its inclusiveness reasserts the role middle class 
Indian citizens can play in that process. As Tejaswini Niranjana, in her essay, 
“Integrating whose Nation? Tourists and Terrorists in Mani Ratnam’s Roja,” argues, 






assertive, and self-confident middle class that is also claiming for itself the spaces of 
the nation and secularism premised on Hindutva” (79).  
The plot centers around a popular and much abused strategy by which 
militants routinely took senior government officials and foreign tourists as political 
hostages and used them as political ransom to negotiate the freedom of arrested 
militants. Ratnam through the clever use of this plot device unambiguously linked the 
terror strategies employed by militants in Jammu and Kashmir to the lives of ordinary 
citizens and government employees in the Southern states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. 
It was perhaps this mapping of a truly national terrorscape in the film, a very 
successful narrative device that resonated with the cinema audiences nationwide. 
Roja, thus introduced a significant change in Bollywood cinema by moving beyond 
the pastoral romances and the rural/urban conflicts with its populist base in the Hindi 
speaking-belt of Northern India. It was the first of a string of films that successfully 
reconnected the vibrant political-scape of the 1980s and the 1990s to a newly 
emerging nationalist landscape in Hindi cinema. 
Roja was followed by several films that innovatively introduced the motif of 
terrorism in cinema. Films that used terrorism as a springboard to address issues of 
civil rights; films like Bombay7 (1994) that attempted to interrogate and respond to 
the events that shook Bombay in 1992/1993 and the communal riots that followed 8. 
Films like Maachis (1994) that revisited issues raised by “Operation Bluestar,” when 






Amritsar on June 5, 1984 which was being used as an arsenal and a safe-house by 
Sikh separatist groups demanding a secession of Punjab. The subsequent 
assassination of Indira Gandhi, then the Prime Minister of India on October 31, 1984 
led to mass scale killing and rioting against the Sikh community across the country9. 
Films like Dil Se (From the Heart, 1998) and The Terrorist (2000) that used suicide 
bombings as narrative strategies, triggered by the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the 
Prime Minister of India in May 199110 and of Beant Singh, Chief Minister of Punjab 
in 1995. These assassinations and terror attacks effectively brought these separatist 
movements from the fringes, the border states of Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam to the 
streets of New Delhi. Separatism and terrorism were no longer mutually exclusive 
and neither was it restricted to the border states, instead it became a part of the 
everyday existence not only in the main metropolitan cities, but by its introduction as 
a subject for several films that dealt with it tangentially or directly, it also succeeded 
in bringing these issues directly into the homes of millions of spectators across the 
country, through the media, and through cable TV channels and VCRs and DVDs. 
Furthermore, I argue that a very interesting trajectory can be traced through 
these films - a trajectory that suggests a distinct shift in the ideology behind these 
terrorist acts. From secessionist movements rooted in their demands for a separate 
state based on linguistic/religious lines in the case of Punjab as is seen in Maachis, 
and Kashmir in Roja to a more complicated progression in Mission Kashmir in which 






question; to the later films Sarfarosh and Fiza where the motivations for terrorism 
become ambiguous and amorphous, an amalgamation of several (anti)nationalisms, 
ranging from religion to a far more globalized form of terrorism driven by a 
widespread need to foster instability, violence and fear instigated for political and 
economic expediency. Terrorism is no longer restricted to conflict within the borders 
of the nation-state but it moves beyond that to a more global level, with clear 
emphasis on state sponsored terrorism to almost what can be termed transnational 
terrorism with its roots in more than one country, shifting and amorphous, bringing 
into question political alliances and economic coalitions. This is taken up for detailed 
discussion in Chapter 5.  
Ironically, this transnational terrorism as seen in popular cinema is not 
combated in a transnational tribunal since it raises too many hairy questions of 
accountability but instead the responses remain restricted to the confines of the 
established framework of law and justice within the nation-state. The equating of 
terrorist activity with criminal behavior is an interesting aspect of this phenomenon in 
Bollywood Cinema. So even as issues of national security are placed on the line and 
there are direct and indirect references to neighboring nations and some of these films 
do engage with the military response to a situation, there is no clear and direct 
allusion to the declaration of war against another nation-state. The constant 
underlying subtext of war, however, is fuelled by this resurgent nationalism and is 







The use of the rhetoric of war is commonplace in many of these films, some 
of it rather clichéd. Terrorists, as we have pointed out elsewhere in this dissertation, 
deliberately use the rhetoric of war to provide legitimacy for their actions. For 
example, the title Mission Kashmir suggests a war maneuver and as we soon find out, 
it is the codename for a terrorist plot in the making.  
All of the films discussed in this chapter, deal with specific acts of terrorism 
and its fall out in the lives of the protagonists and their families. Here are the brief 
plot summaries of the four films I deal with in detail: Roja, Bombay, Fiza and 
Mission Kashmir. 
Roja 
Mani Ratnam’s film Roja, starts out with non-diegetic sounds of a rural pastoral scene 
ruptured by the staccato of gunfire. The storyline starts out with the Indian army 
closing in on a wanted terrorist Wasim Khan, in the jungles of Kashmir. The theme of 
terrorism is established early on, as is the primary location of the conflict. The locale 
then shifts to a village in Southern India, Sundar Bhanpur and in that idyllic pastoral 
setting, we are introduced to the two young sisters Roja and Lakshmi. The arrival of 
the hero, Rishi, a cryptologist with the Indian Government, with his mother is almost 
an intrusion into this utopic setting and we are told that he is a prospective groom for 






marriage proposal, since she is romantically involved with someone else and the 
obvious solution to this embarrassing dilemma is for Rishi to marry Roja. (We are 
shown most of the interaction including the confession between Rishi and Lakshmi in 
flashback.) Unaware of the circumstances surrounding the switch and Rishi’s timely 
intervention to save the family from embarrassment, the marriage takes place much to 
Roja’s annoyance. The married couple returns to the city and tensions continue to 
mount. This clearly demonstrates and establishes Roja’s feistiness and single-
mindedness. Rishi is unexpectedly called away on a top security assignment to 
Baramullah, Kashmir to work for the Indian army.  The director cleverly uses the 
intercutting of shots accompanied by the sound of shutters clicking, to show us the 
training of the Indian army as well as of terrorists in Kashmir. These shots are clearly 
from the point of view of the terrorists and mark the degree of infiltration by terrorist 
groups into army occupied areas of Kashmir. Soon after his arrival, Rishi is taken 
hostage by a militant group headed by Liaquat Ali to negotiate an exchange for the 
release of Wasim Khan, the noted terrorist leader.  
The dynamics of the militant group are established very early on. Liaquat 
Ali’s daughter prepares meals, cleans the little hut and takes care of all the daily 
household chores. However, when she is slapped for opening Rishi’s restraints, he 
intervenes in the altercation. His transition from an ordinary man to a heroic citizen 
begins at that moment in time.  His desire to protect the terrorist leader’s daughter 






the Kashmiri woman is nameless and continues to be so throughout the film. The 
small resistance group, similar to the ones in Maachis and Fiza is run like a family 
unit. The militants are humanized, their pain and their problems are given voice, and 
Liaquat clarifies that “tum se hamaree jaatee dushmani nahin hai” (we do not have a 
personal enmity with you), even as he asserts that it all about their desh-prem, love 
for their homeland (Kashmir). Meanwhile Roja’s desperation to see her husband freed 
from captivity takes her to the military base where she meets Colonel Rayappa. In my 
reading of the film, her request that Wasim Khan be freed so that her husband can 
come home foregrounds the representation of the Indian woman’s priorities, personal 
over public, family above nation. The Colonel’s criticism of what he calls a selfish 
request, arguing that Wasim Khan had killed over 50 people and that he had been 
captured at great risk to the soldiers, speaks to a much larger debate about the politics 
of expediency as practiced by the Indian politicians. The debate between the law 
enforcement agencies (Indian Police force and the army) and the politicians on the 
policy of negotiations with terrorists has its roots in the kidnapping of Rubaiya 
Sayeed (daughter of Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed) in December 
1989, an event that many in India see as a watershed moment in the insurgency in 
Jammu and Kashmir. The release of five noted terrorists by the Central Government 
in exchange for Rubaiya’s life set a precedent that encouraged many militant groups 
across the country to use hostage taking as a common strategy to get their terms 






to such a request relegates this and all Indian women to the periphery of the debate on 
nationalism. Women in this film are seen as the repository of national values, their 
emotional investment in family and the personal is congruent with a man’s love for 
his nation. While the male citizen is able to easily rise above his personal affiliations 
and enter the public discourse, Roja with all her spirit and middle class origins is 
contained in her limited world of the domestic discourse. Her ability to enter the 
public forum is only possible with the intervention of another male, Chajju Maharaj, 
who despite his lower class origins and lack of formal education, acts as her translator 
and guide. Her language issues, she speaks only Tamil, seem to further restrict her 
access to public discourse. Language becomes a useful tool to distinguish between the 
local and the global in this particular situation where Hindi is the lingua franca of 
choice for this nationalism12 and affords the passport of access that she is clearly 
denied. She is dismissed readily and alike by the Colonel, the political leader and 
Wasim Khan underlining the assumption that she has no place in public discourse.  
The killing of the young militants at the border by the Pakistani forces is seen 
as a betrayal by Liaquat Ali. He senses defeat and the loss of his son, further 
humanizes him. He becomes a defeated man, ignorant and duped and with no real 
cause to fight for. 
Rishi’s attempts to escape come at a crucial juncture, and he defies the 
demand for the release of militants to ensure the safety of his life. Rishi transcends 






retribution as he takes matters into his own hands. His final escape and his 
confrontation with Liaquat Ali, is symbolic as Liaquat Ali recognizes his patriotic 
spirit and accedes to it. The film ends with a patriotic song about the citizen’s love for 
the nation and their willingness to sacrifice their lives for their nation at any point in 
time. 
Bombay 
Bombay, starts out with a very scenic panorama of the village of Malanpur followed 
by a shot/reverse shot of the protagonist Shekhar and a burqa-clad Shaila Bano. The 
ethnic markers in the family homes and their attires establish that Shekhar comes 
from a middle class conservative, traditional Hindu family and Shaila Bano from a 
lower class Muslim home. The romance between the two occupies a significant 
amount of screen time and allows for the usual Bollywood cinema devices – 
cinematography that celebrates nature during the monsoon season with several song 
and dance sequences along with the use of specific blurring to highlight the eye 
match.   
The song “Tu hee re, tere bina main kaise jiyoon” (You are the one, how can I 
live without you, in my reading of the film marks the emotional consummation of 
their relationship symbolized by her shedding of the burqa13 as she runs into his arms. 
This shedding of the burqa is not only the shedding of her inhibitions and hesitations 






from this forbidden love, results in the confrontation of Bashir Ahmed, a brick kiln 
owner against Narayan Mishra, the trustee of the Hindu temple in the village. This 
confrontation is a visually powerful moment in the film, which I go on to analyze in 
detail later in the chapter. Despite all the opposition, the threats of bloodshed etc. the 
young couple decides to run away and Shaila Bano slips out of her house after paying 
her obeisance to the holy Koran.   
 Bombay, the big city affords the anonymity this Hindu-Muslim couple is 
looking for – the only place where new social structures can be made and old ones 
broken. Shekhar and Shaila Bano set up home in Bombay, as tenants of Mr 
Malgaonkar. Even as they struggle to keep social pressures from entering their little 
private world, the strange world of tenancy affords enough opportunities for the 
complete invasion of their privacy. The landlord requests that some of his guests stay 
with the young couple and their presence in the bedroom prevents them from 
consummating their marriage. The world of religious fanaticism is always right 
outside their door.  The saffron flags of a strident militant Hindu brigade scare Shaila 
Bano as does the landlady’s reaction to her name. Significant to all this religious 
unrest fomenting in the city, is Shaila Bano’s easy adoption of Hindu attire. She dons 
the mangalsutra14 and starts wearing sarees and bindis, traditional markers of Hindu 
married women. The couple has twins and attempts to reconcile their differences 
between their respective faiths by naming them Kamal Bashir and Kabir Narayan. 






the claim of ownership of the boys by the grandfathers.  
The politically fanned flames of religious extremism buoyed on by the march 
of Hindu sevaks to Ayodhya affects even the small village of Malanpur. We are 
shown the hysteria of crowds impassioned by this desire for karseva (community 
service in the name of god) and the door to door campaigning by the Shakti Samaj 
group seeking donations. There is deliberate usage of actual footage of the Ayodhya 
debacle and the destruction of the Babri Masjid through the use of still shots of 
newspaper articles before it cuts to the riots that ensued. The riots bring mayhem, 
death and chaos to their doorstep and kindle unusual and unexpected friendships 
across religious lines.  
Like Rishi, the protagonist from Ratnam’s earlier film in his trilogy on 
terrorism, Roja15, Shekhar makes the transition from ordinary citizen to a passionate 
patriot, from a citizen to a hero. The children get lost in the chaos of the riots and are 
saved by some policemen and the initial intervention of the state reinforces the 
effectiveness of law and order. Subsequently, the failure of the nation-state in the 
riots that follow the bomb blasts is evident. I take this up for discussion later in the 
chapter. 
Fiza  
Fiza is a story of the Ikramullah family in Bombay, comprising of a mother Nishatbi, 






us to the family and the political climate prevalent at the time (1993) in Bombay. The 
close up shots of the mother and sister establishes sympathy early on for the family 
even as the montage of black and white stills from actual footage show the viewers 
the aftermath of the riots in the form of heaps of dead bodies scattered on the streets 
and carcasses of burnt BEST buses16.  
 The film begins with Nishatbi in the police station wanting information on her 
missing son, six years after the fact. The use of a song sequence focusing on Hajji 
Ali, one of Bombay’s most famous Muslim shrines, with aerial rotating shots 
establishes Nishatbi’s faith in her religious beliefs even as her clothes, her demeanor 
and the mode of greeting emphasizes her Muslimness to the viewers. These are clear 
ethnic markers as are the shots of minarets and domes and the use of Urdu, the 
language spoken by Muslims in the country.  Having set the stage for this Muslim 
family now consisting of only the mother-daughter duo, the film moves on to show us 
the daily life of Fiza, whose lack of male protection makes her vulnerable to 
harassment by the men in the community. Her love interest is a rich, Hindu boy 
whose initial overtures are rejected by Fiza, as she attempts to provide for herself and 
her mother on her own terms. Fiza’s inability to find a job is a direct comment on the 
nation state’s failure to tackle unemployment and the consequent hopelessness faced 
by the youth of the country.  
 Fiza, who has lost hope of ever finding her brother unlike her mother, one 






desire to seek the truth about what happened that one night, takes her to meet Police 
Inspector Prakash Ingle. His version of the events that unfolded that night clearly 
establishes Amaan’s innocence and foregrounds the complicity of the police force. 
The deliberate rejection of help for a Muslim citizen by the police, along with the 
taunting (“Bhagne ka hai, ja Pakistan ja,” You want to run, go to Pakistan, go) is 
justified by the Inspector as looking out for the greater good of the people at large. 
Saving one life then, he says, would have meant more lives lost. His reckless and 
uncaring attitude dehumanizes him, categorizing him as representative of an uncaring 
nation-state.  
  Fiza’s quest for the truth takes her to two prominent religious leaders, VK 
Singh and Sayyad Saheb, who see in her the perfect opportunity to rekindle religious 
sentiments for their political benefit. V K Singh represents the Hindu fundamentalist 
perspective, whereby all Muslims are outsiders, invaders who came to the country 
and stayed on, or conversely they are the ‘Other’ who went on to create Pakistan. 
Fiza, confronted by this Hindu fundamentalism is taken aback even as she 
emphasizes that her Indianness transcends her Muslimness. Fiza is welcomed by 
Sayyad Saheb, as one of his own, but told to leave old matters alone, since it might 
result in new bloodshed. The complicity of the politicians in aiding and abetting 
communal violence and their desire to exploit this for their own political advantage is 
made obvious through these interactions.  






fiance Shenaz, and locating them within their specific community firmly entrenched 
in their faith. In sharp contrast to the politician’s behavior, we see Nishatbi’s 
openness and willingness to embrace Aniruddh, Fiza’s Hindu boyfriend. Fiza comes 
to know of Amaan being in Rajasthan with a known terrorist group and travels in 
search of him. She finds Amaan and confronts him in what turns out to be a very 
emotionally fraught meeting. Amaan argues that he is fighting a jihad not against his 
country but against evil and injustice. In flashback, we are again shown how events 
transpired that night but from Amaan’s perspective and how he was eventually 
rescued by Muraad Khan, a terrorist leader. He was initiated into the gang and 
indoctrinated to take on the state represented by the police force to fight against the 
injustice faced by Muslims and Hindus alike.  
Amaan returns the prodigal son, the family is reunited and his responsibilities, 
as the only male member of the family, revisited. Despite all his attempts to reconcile 
with society, Amaan falls back on having to fight off the criminal element that 
plagues the local community and goes back to his old ways of taking the law into his 
own hands, and he becomes a killer. Nishatbi kills herself in grief, and Amaan comes 
back for the funeral and to console his sister despite being a killer on the run. Muraad 
Khan capitalizes on Amaan’s desperate situation and re-inculcates him with his 
doctrine of hatred. Amaan agrees to a mission to kill some corrupt politicians but 
does not succeed in doing so. His amateurish emotional reaction to the situation and 






he is expendable to the terrorist organization. In the end there is no going back for 
Amaan, though he vehemently clarifies his cause was not the same as Muraad 
Khan’s,  “Yeh nafrat nahin hai, nafrat ke khilaaf jihad hai” (This is not about hatred, 
it is a holy war against hatred) and death is his only way out.  
Mission Kashmir  
The film starts out with a picturesque establishing shot of a shikhara at sunrise, 
locating the film in Kashmir. The peacefulness is disrupted by a powerful explosion 
that blows it up into smithereens. The arrival of the policemen on location and their 
investigation introduces us to SSP Inayat Khan17 and his men. The camaraderie 
between the men and Inayat Khan’s instinctive heroic act to save his subordinate 
police officer, Kuldip’s life gives us an insight into the workings of the Police Force 
of Kashmir. Inayat Khan is depicted as a true patriot, driven by his love for the law 
and an exemplary police officer who puts his life on the line for Indian citizens as 
well as his own men. The event is staged to also show us cleverness of the device to 
lure the police in, as the militants plant IEDs on the docking platform which is 
triggered to blow up when the police rush in. Inayat Khan’s ability to see through this 
ruse and his quick response to the situation contextualizes the police as humane, 
intelligent and well in control. He is injured in the explosion and treated by a doctor 
who is later threatened for treating the SSP and then killed along with his entire 






reveal has issued a fatwa against the SSP which results in the denial of medical 
attention to his dying son. Irfaan dies while being rushed from doctor to doctor and 
the tragedy devastates both Inayat Khan and his wife Neelima. 
The death of his son because of the fatwa gives Inayat Khan a new mission to 
destroy Malik-Ul Khan and he proceeds to plan an attack. The scene then shifts to the 
house of a Kashmiri Muslim family, which Malik-Ul Khan and his men are using a 
safe house by forcing the owner to play host to the men and their arsenal. The 
planned attack to kill the terrorist and his men goes awry with the innocent family 
being killed in the crossfire as well with the exception of the young boy Altaaf who is 
rescued by Inayat Khan. Altaaf is witness to his parent’s and sister’s death and retains 
a strong image of the man responsible for the shootout – Inayat Khan in a facial 
mask.  Neelima, driven by her husband’s guilt over the death of the innocent people 
convinces him to adopt the boy, and Altaaf comes to live with the Khans. 
The trauma of his parent’s death is relived by the boy repeatedly and his 
frantic sketching of the man’s face in a mask consumes the boy’s life. The film 
depicts the happy memories of the family with Irfaan in flashback slowly replaced by 
shared moments with Altaaf. The replacement of one son by another as Neelima 
points out, helps resolve any issues of guilt for Inayat Khan. The plot also 
foregrounds the deep awareness and consciousness of difference instilled in the child 
as the six year old boy questions his adopted mother on her Hindu identity (which her 






names in the Hindu-Muslim context is introduced into the text, a thread that continues 
to inform the rest of the film’s narrative.  Neelima’s Hindu identity is highlighted by 
Altaaf’s observation even as her clothes, jewelry and language mark her as a Muslim 
wife. Her visits to the Shankracharya temple and the Hazratbal mosque with Altaaf as 
Inayat Khan later remind his adopted son, points towards her unique status of living 
in the in-betweenness of the two worlds. 
Altaaf grows up in the happy home of the Khan’s but ten years later, he 
accidentally comes across the mask worn by Inayat Khan on that night of the 
shootout. He makes the connection between his adopted father and the events of that 
night and finding his father’s service revolver attempts to kill Inayat Khan before 
slipping away into the night. Inayat Khan reflexively wrests the revolver out of the 
young boy’s hand and shoots at his retreating back. The mutual enmity is established 
that night, which only increases as the father and son finds themselves on the opposite 
sides of the law. 
Altaaf the terrorist–protagonist is born that night and he melts away into the 
shadows of the night, finding solace and shelter with the militants. He revisits the 
trauma of his childhood repeatedly and it fuels his anger and hatred against his father. 
Hilal Kohistaani, an infamous terrorist exploits this anger and recruits the young 
Altaaf into his terrorist outfit. The international links of this jihadi outfit with the 
jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan hint towards the larger scope and backing of this 






arms and ammunition as well the telecommunication systems available to these 
groups indicates access to unlimited funding. Kohistaani’s discussion with his 
backers reveals the details of the project ‘Mission Kashmir’ which is to use missiles 
to destroy the historic Hazratbal mosque on a Friday, killing thousands of Muslims in 
prayer antagonizing Muslims all over the country and inciting them to join the jihad.  
They also plan to use a TV tower to broadcast this event live, adding to the 
instigation, with careful shots of men in army uniform, corroborating the rumor that 
the Hindu forces of the Indian Army were responsible for this genocide18. 
Altaaf returns an adult and attempts to kill Inayat Khan a second time, by 
impersonating a police officer. He asks to meet SSP Khan which gives him away as 
Khan has now been promoted to an Inspector General of Police. Altaaf escapes after 
his unsuccessful attempt to the hideout where his comrades in arms are seen living in 
desperate conditions. In sharp contrast to the allusions of unlimited funding, the mise-
en-scene reveals cramped, bare and very basic living quarters of these men. The all 
male community is revealed to be all Muslim, indicated by the conversation and the 
names – Sadiq, Altaaf, Ghafoor etc.  
The plot shifts to the romantic mode with love blossoming between the 
childhood friends Altaaf and Sufiya Parvez, now a well known TV professional. The 
meeting brings back nostalgic memories of childhood that culminated in the fateful 
night of July 23, 1989. As opposed to the desensitized male community of the 






in Altaaf’s life nurtures his more sensitive and human side. He opens up to his 
emotions, reveals his vulnerability and succumbs to their loving presence. This 
creates sympathy for his appeal as a misguided and exploited individual who gives in 
to the tug at his heartstrings unlike the hardened Hilal Kohistaani. Even though Altaaf 
uses Sufiya to gain access to the heavily guarded TV station, and proceeds to blow it 
up, he returns to pledge his undying love to Sufiya. The plot then develops further 
with the added complications of the Indian Prime Minister’s scheduled visit to the 
area and the implications of Mission Kashmir and how it ties into that state visit. 
Inayat Khan’s Muslimness is brought to the fore and his integrity and loyalty 
questioned in light of his wife’s meeting with the terrorist son. Inayat Khan re-affirms 
his ability to handle the security detail for the Prime Minister but the accusation 
brings violence into their happy household and Altaaf’s plot to kill his father in a 
bomb explosion kills Neelima instead of the intended target, Inayat Khan. An enraged 
Inayat Khan, furnished with new information succeeds in unraveling the plot and 
gains access to Hilal Kohistaani. He manipulates him to find Altaaf and after a brief 
and bloody confrontation convinces Altaaf to switch sides by explaining the details of 
Mission Kashmir. Altaaf’s realization that he has been used and kept in the dark and 
horrified by the actual carnage that would result from this plan, kills Kohistaani, 
averts the missiles and saves the day. Father and son are reunited as are the lovers 







Placing these films within a film genre to provide a larger framework for analysis, I 
find Ann Kaplan’s theorization of trauma films in Hollywood derived from the genre 
of melodrama, useful as one of the entry points into this investigation and exploration 
of terrorism as a trope in Indian films in the 1990s.  Kaplan’s genre of trauma films is 
valuable to my analysis only so far as categorizing the body of Bollywood films that 
use terrorism as a trope because they all use specific historical or political events as 
focal points – Operation Blue Star, the Ayodhya aftermath or the Bombay bomb 
blasts. I should also clarify that Kaplan’s category cannot be uniformly applied to all 
bodies of work resultant from traumatic experience because of issues of cultural 
specificity and national specificity. As I analyze the representation of the trauma of 
these real life events being revisited in these fictional narratives, I locate my analysis 
in the context of the Indian subcontinent and more specifically in the tradition of 
Bollywood cinema to formulate and articulate the reworkings of the narratives of the 
nation.  
As I have pointed out earlier in Chapter 1, violence was an integral part in the 
birthing of all new nations as was the collective amnesia around that violence that 
forged the unity of these nations. For nascent nations emerging from colonialism, this 
public forgetting of the trauma of violence contributed to a healing process as a nation 






of memory surrounding that trauma of violence remained and re-surfaced in historical 
interrogations, scholarly analyses of public documentation, personal reminiscences, 
and cultural and social interpretations19.   
Kaplan, in her essay “Melodrama, Cinema and Trauma,” theorizes that:  
personal and social traumas caused by political and social transition were 
displaced into fictional melodrama forms where they could be more safely 
approached or remembered but also forgotten, in the peculiar nature of 
trauma (202). 
She further contends that in a culture, similar to that in an individual, an 
overwhelming event cannot be absorbed or assimilated and it re-surfaces in fictional 
forms, which may be marginally related to it, with an insistence on remembrance.  
Trauma films, according to Kaplan, therefore do not use the structured linear form of 
classical continuity in the Hollywood sense, but instead use other means like 
flashbacks, hallucinations, story fragments and nightmares to visually re-construct the 
event. To clarify, traditional Bollywood films do not follow the Hollywood style of 
continuity departing from the idea of linear continuity through the use of song and 
dance sequences. This awareness informs my nuanced reading of the critical 
departures from the narrative style within the Bombay film structure and how this is 
effectively used to evoke public memories of historical traumatic events. 
 So with regard to Bombay cinema, I argue that the disruption in the linear 






interpolate meanings into these gaps and fissures. It invites the spectator to actively 
engage in this process through diegetic and non-diegetic elements specifically 
through musical interludes and repeated images that often serve as a commentary on 
the cause-effect narration as much as it serves to reinforce the traditional Indian 
aesthetic of rasa or the mood of the sequence.  There is also a deliberate insertion of 
black and white stills, title cards, montage sequences as well as actual media footage 
that disrupt the narrative and are used to establish authenticity and provide historical 
relevance to these acts that echo through each of these films.  
To elaborate on this further, in Fiza, the first scene introduces us to the small 
and happy Ikramullah family and the unexpected circumstances that spiral out of 
control and lead to the disruption of their family life as they knew it. As narrated by 
Fiza, the female protagonist, the jarring sequence establishes the traumatic events that 
destroyed a family and this provides a segue into a montage sequence of black and 
white stills of the Bombay riots – dead bodies on city streets with close-ups of the 
charred remains of people, property and burnt buses. As the credits begin to roll, the 
audience identification and sympathy for the Ikramullah family, especially for the son 
Amaan, as an innocent victim caught up in a whirl of hatred and violence is complete. 
The montage sequence of the traumatic events is hence not only crucial to the 
storyline but through its interpolation forces the audience to re-visit the events that 
are instantly recognizable as a specific event (in this case the Bombay riots of 1993 






symptomatic of riots in general. The use of close ups of newspaper mastheads and 
headlines, title cards with place names and dates (like “Ayodhya Dec 6, 1992” or “Jan 
5, 1993 Dongni, Bombay”) help situate these events in geographical spaces and 
historical times. Ravi Vasudevan argues that the use of these features “place a film in 
the arc of recent public memory, and make it an intervention in the construction of 
that memory” (“Bombay and its Public,” 18). I would add that these films succeed in 
drawing in their audiences by making them bear witness to the recognition of certain 
events, whose public memory of the trauma is then consequently re-invented through 
their identification with the gaze of the protagonist.  
 My analysis of these five films within this larger framework of trauma films 
in Bollywood, helps formulate a construct of terrorism and consequently nationalism 
as it manifests itself culturally in the way these films envision and depict terrorism 
within the narrative and its representation on the screen. However, given the rather 
interactive nature of this viewing in Indian theaters, the more crucial and complicated 
construct of nationalism is one that plays itself out in the theatre vis-à-vis the 
spectators who bring their own emotional, passionate and nuanced experiences into 
this space. Their interpretation of these texts is steeped in cultural and political 
references and nuances that lie outside of this space and yet must be configured in the 
total viewing experience. It is specifically with reference to spectator-identification 
that using a terrorist as a protagonist, for example as in Maachis, Mission Kashmir 






significant hurdle of audience identification is to provide a context and justification 
for the actions of the terrorist- protagonist, as a victim of social and political 
wrongdoing. The trajectory of the plot, however, constantly shifts, allowing for 
redemption and sacrifice on the part of this terrorist-protagonist in the end.  The use 
of shifting points of view in these films addresses this issue somewhat by forcing the 
spectator to constantly renegotiate this construct of “national” identity to provide the 
yardstick against which terrorism can be defined. I argue, therefore that these films 
help the spectator articulate a new political formulation of citizenship vis-à-vis the 
representations of the anti-national through the dual process of affirmation of the 
“national identity” as well as the deconstruction of the “Other” or the anti-national 
which in each of these films is either obliquely or openly referred to as a community 
of violence that is aided and abetted by the neighboring nation-state of Pakistan20. 
Even as I emphasized and differentiated between the secessionist movements in 
Punjab and Kashmir earlier on in this chapter, it is significant that both these 
movements have received ample support from terror groups and state support from 
across the border. All of these films hint at this support, either obviously as in 
Sarfarosh (where the Pakistani military officer Major Baig is himself implicated in 
the process); or more subtly as in Roja, when Liaquat Ali says, “Yeh log us paar ja 
rahe the, training ke liye” (These people were going to the other side of the border for 
training – translation mine). In Bombay, there is an extensive discussion on who 






there, implying Pakistan). There are several such references peppered throughout 
each of these films. 
For all obvious purposes, the simplest motivation for terrorism according to 
these films is anti-national sentiments or any act of violence that can be read as being 
directly against the nation-state’s interests. These films, however, seem to take this 
beyond the simple and obvious nation/anti-nation polemic. Using the plot formula of 
the corruption of the state (police, politicians and bureaucrats alike) popular in Hindi 
films after the Emergency in 197721, these films add a new twist to this inefficient and 
hapless state machinery incapable of handling the new issues of terrorism, in fact in 
some cases contributing to it. In these films, the action in the plot is driven by 
characters with a grievance against the state and who can find common cause with 
terrorist groups and militant movements and thus be incited to these violent acts of 
destruction.  This helps draw a clear distinction between the corrupt nation-state 
wrought by inherent problems of greed, manipulated by politician’s ambitions and 
self-styled nepotism and the more amorphous nation symbolized by the just, modern 
and humane. Politicians like V K Singh and Sayyad Saheb in Fiza epitomize these 
corrupt politicians complicit in fuelling communal riots for their own political gain 
and who treat communities as potential vote banks and little else.  
The possibility of redemption for these terrorist-protagonists is also carefully 
charted out through the course of their actions. This is established by emphasizing the 






early on as victims of circumstances and later by clarifying that their actions as 
terrorists do not really target civilians or claim innocent victims. Guilty only of killing 
corrupt politicians and government officials or those whose actions identify them as 
being anti-nation, it provides for the possibility of their characters being redeemed in 
the eyes of society even if it can happen only through their death at their own hands. 
The notion of the anti-national therefore shifts predictably in the case of these 
characters whose final choices and actions place nation and society before self. Thus 
Altaaf’s final act of preventing the destruction of the Hazratbal Mosque and the 
Shankracharya temple reveals his real patriotism and his misplaced desire for revenge 
against society is replaced by his repentance, symbolized further by his father’s 
acceptance of him back into the familial fold. Moreover, each of these films deflects 
the violence and hatred from these terrorist protagonists towards characters like Hilal 
Kohistaani in Mission Kashmir, Munawar Khan in Fiza, Wasim Khan in Roja and 
Sanaatan in Maachis. All of these storylines play on the conflict between nation and 
state, whereby nationalism and the love for the nation permits the citizenry to 
participate in quelling any anti-national activities and in restoring order to a chaotic 
and corrupt society.  
Terrorism as it is seen in these films is in many ways represented as a 
gendered response to a personal situation – Altaaf in Mission Kashmir, is a forced 
witness to the brutal killing of his family caught in the crossfire between the police 






the spiraling violence of a fractured society, as his fiancée’s brother is mistakenly 
arrested and charged with the assassination of a Cabinet Minister in New Delhi. In 
Fiza, Amaan, denied justice and help by the police in a politically sponsored 
communal riot, finds solace in a militant group on the wrong side of the law. The 
traumatic event that shapes the future course of their lives is repeatedly shown in 
flashbacks, or introduced through different perspectives and as recurring nightmares 
within the fictional world of these films. In Fiza and in Bombay the experiences in the 
Mumbai riots are shown in black and white stills (actual footage of news coverage of 
the Mumbai riots) where the use of still photographic images disrupts the narrative 
flow to introduce horrific images that revisit the traumatic events central to the films. 
Having become outlaws, these young men become ideal recruits for a terrorist 
organization – disavowed, angry and driven by hatred and revenge. Their anger is 
further fuelled by the patriarchal rhetoric of Hilal Kohistaani who takes Altaaf under 
his wing, Sanaatan who moulds Kirpal Singh in Maachis and Munawar Khan (in 
Fiza) who reinforces Amaan’s desire to wreak terror on the society that he thinks 
failed him. Their rhetoric is predictable and equates manhood with family honor and 
community honor and it plays on the notions of qaum22 and mazhab23 that build 
community and brotherhood on communal and religious lines. Building new 
“nations’’ on a shared violent heritage or a common cause helps them fuel and spread 
their message of hatred.  This gendered response also plays out differently on the 






evokes the opposite reaction in Ajay Singh Rathod in Sarfarosh and he joins the 
Indian Police Force motivated by the terrorist act that left his father paralyzed for life. 
To go back to my earlier use of Kaplan’s model for trauma films, based on the earlier 
genre of melodrama, I assert congruence with the fact that these films occupy a space 
“between history and the unconsciousness” and therefore they offer “an imaginary 
focused on the private sphere of the family – where traumas are secret or hidden – yet 
in an arena structured by male power in the public sphere” (202).  
Let me elaborate on my argument further. It is my argument that in the case of 
all these protagonists, the family unit is the locus that helps provide the possibility of 
a stable social identity. A complete family unit assumes the presence of a father, the 
patriarchal head of the family, and a mother who is the repository of the family’s 
value system.  The absence of these crucial figures marks a significant departure from 
the norm and initiates a necessary upheaval in roles. Since in these films, this is 
disrupted by a traumatic event it has to be re-negotiated in a public space in order for 
the successful resolution of the conflict. Significantly, each of these family units lacks 
a father figure and the absence of the father signals a shift in authority from the absent 
father to the son via the mother. It is these fatherless sons (except in Sarfarosh, where 
the father is paralyzed) who move out into a public arena as they attempt to fulfill 
their filial duties towards their families. Entering into a fractured and fragmented 
society and being outside of the family unit directly results in moral transgressions 






their actions. These protagonists attempt to recreate an artificial family, with its own 
rules of organization. While the patriarchal role is easily fulfilled by the likes of Hilal 
Kohistaani, Munawar Khan and Sanaatan, the mother’s role in their lives is retained 
by their biological/adopted mothers. The bond of the mother-son relationship cannot 
be easily replaced and provides the unbreakable link to civil society and in the end 
makes redemption possible for these terrorist-protagonists. 
The desire to reconstruct an artificial family/community in Fiza fails to 
substitute itself for the real family as Amaan’s loyalty and commitment to the cause is 
constantly in question and the exclusively male community, based solely on a 
common hatred, cannot sustain it. Similarly, an attempt to re-construct this familial 
bond artificially in an “imagined community” in Maachis is seen when Veeran 
(Kirpal’s fiancée in Maachis) joins the terrorist cell as the missile expert. Her 
induction as a female member into an all male community upsets the equilibrium 
even as it reaffirms typical gender roles – for example, Veeran takes over the cooking 
and cleaning for the male members of the cell. The relationship between Veeran and 
Kirpal is also seen at variance with the existing bond amongst the rest of the cell 
members. Their relationship causes Sanaatan to take Veeran hostage when Kirpal is 
assumed to be a mole and he issues orders for her execution. The artificiality of the 
bonding in this community and the superficiality of the relationships formed hence 
become transparent and are directly contrasted with the actual family unit (Veeran, 






conflict and prolonged absence. 
In direct contrast to this, is the deliberate destruction of the real and adopted 
family units in Mission Kashmir. While Altaaf’s real family is killed as innocent 
bystanders in a confrontation between the militants and the police, Altaaf’s rejection 
of Inspector Inayat Khan as the adopted father removes the presence of a patriarchal 
figure in his life even though he continues his relationship with his adopted mother, 
Neelima who becomes his emotional center.   
In many ways this deliberate focus on the personal as opposed to the public, 
(the tagline for Philip Noyce’s Patriot Games reads, “Not for Honor, not for Country, 
but for his wife and Child,”) becomes crucial to the formal structure of this genre 
itself. Clearly the need here is to comply with the premise of audience identification 
with the protagonist, and at that level, it is the personal over the public that serves this 
interest best. It is only when the audience identifies with the protagonist’s personal 
dilemma, can they accept his transgressions against society and overlook his flaws, 
and allow for the possibility of his re-acceptance in society. Further, from the point of 
view of filmmaking, trauma needs to be personalized in order to capture an 
audience’s attention and evoke an emotional response while retaining the integrity of 
the plot’s limitations. 
Yet despite the focusing in on the microcosm of the family unit, the transition 
from the family to the nation is easily explained. The discourse surrounding a nation 






perpetuate this notion that family stands in for nation. Engendering the nation, in 
tropes like the rape of the nation further reiterates this connection.  
I cite several critics who point towards this primordial connection family and 
nation that becomes beneficial in disguising the abstract nature of the artificial 
imagined construct of the nation. Susan Hayward argues that this “closed, self-
referential, even vicious circle gets established whereby one concept feeds the other: 
threat to nation leads to (manifestations of) kinship, and kinship leads to nationalistic 
discourses (in the name of the mother nation etc.) –  i.e., a nationalism which in turn 
engenders the notion of nation” (89). 
Ravi Vasudevan in his essay on the film Bombay elucidates Shekhar’s transition 
from a concerned parent searching for his children lost in the communal riots to a 
patriotic citizen to make a somewhat similar point: 
The discourse of the family meets with that of state and civil society when 
the protagonist moves beyond his own concerns into a wider frame of 
action and restitution. Thus from the logic of recovering his family, the 
hero is thrust into the logic of protecting society.” (2) 
Or as S.V Srinivas argues,  
Roja interpellates the ‘common man’, upper-caste middle-class male really, 
to protect ‘national interest’ by fighting terrorism. The correspondence 
between family and nation serve to bring home larger problems like 






immediately recognizable ones like family well-being (1225). 
All these films however, in no way subsume the larger “national” interest using the 
non-diegetic elements like soundtrack music24 to reinforce nationalist and patriotic 
sentiments, to glorify this heritage, and to create nostalgia for the lost unified 
“nation”.  
Mission Kashmir begins with an establishing shot of a sunrise over a shikhara 
(houseboat) moored in Dal Lake and the serenity of the scene is shattered by a loud 
bomb explosion that rips through the shikara destroying it completely. Even as the 
flames consume the boat the soundtrack of the scene laments this change, 
Smoke, smoke, only smoke, smoke everywhere, 
In these winds of conspiracies, in these storms of intrigues,  
this hallowed land of the Gods has been bloodied 
we hear no more the sacred call of the conch, 
And no more the call to the faithful, 
Alas my land is cursed. 
… This is a battle for power, 
A war between politicians 
The blood of innocents is the color used to draw borders between our 
hearts25. (translation mine) 
This opening sequence suggests at intrigue and deceit using the metaphor of partition 






memories of an earlier partition marked with unmitigated horrors and bloodshed26. 
The metaphor of borders and fragmentation continues as we gradually see the 
unfolding of the details of the operation, ‘Mission Kashmir’. The mission of the 
terrorists is to use missiles to destroy two of Kashmir’s holiest shrines, the Hazratbal 
mosque, and the Shankracharya temple. The Jihad of these terrorists does not uphold 
the sacredness of its own religious shrines. The shift between religious terrorism and 
the hijacking of the religious manifesto for a completely different agenda is clearly 
underlined here in the winds of conspiracies and the battle for power. It is the 
perception of Kashmir as utopia before the horrors of terrorism that functions as a 
repeated motif in both Roja and Mission Kashmir. Similar to the sound track in 
Mission Kashmir, there is a celebration of the beauty of Kashmir in Roja, with its 
“haseen vaadiyan, yeh khula aasman” (beautiful valleys, the open sky) inherent in 
which is the lament of the possibilities of a loss. The patriotic spirit much heralded in 
the rest of the film reaches a crescendo with the final soundtrack 
Bharat humko jaan se pyaara hai 
Sabse nyaara gulistaan hamara hai 
Sadiyon se Bharat Bhumi duniya kee shaan hai 
Bharat Mata kee raksha main jeevan qurban hai. 
India is more loved by me than life itself 
Ours is the most exquisite garden 






I will sacrifice my life to protect Mother India (translation mine)  
In Bombay, a similar refrain is heard in the song, “Mazhab ko choddho, watan kee 
socho, hindustaani pehele sab hain ham” (Leave religion and faith, think of the 
nation, we are all Indians first). Even as we see this celebration of the homeland in 
verse in some of these films, we also see a shifting perspective on what constitutes the 
homeland. It is a specific location (more local than global in a sense) that is being 
celebrated not necessarily the entire nation. For example in Maachis, the two Punjabi 
songs “Chod Aaye Hum Woh Galiyan,”27 and “Chappa Chappa Charkha Chale”28  
talk of a utopic life in Punjab with its meandering rivers, and  fields ready for 
harvesting, using the idiom of love. Punjab, in these songs is engendered but becomes 
synonymous with romanticized love, not like the earlier mentioned mother-son love 
associated with the homeland.   
Ravi Vasudevan, in his essay, “National Pasts and Futures: Indian Cinema,” 
describes a new trend in commercial Indian films. He states that Hindi popular 
cinema has now “adapted realist characterization and an imagery of the ordinary 
citizen, but to different ends, promoting not a critical outlook on society and the 
nation-state but a patriotic attitude” (123). While it is true, that in some ways these 
films finally address a privileged cosmopolitan urban middle class audience and that 
the nationalism that is being realized in these films is presented as a homogenized, 
pan-Indian male identity that glosses over regional and linguistic differences; I 






society and the nation-state. In fact, as I argue over the course of this chapter, these 
films use this as an effective strategy to promote patriotism, placing nation over 
nation-state.  
A Third Kind of Nationalism as an (Anti)nationalism   
Given the nature of the trauma of terrorism and the recurrent fear of the fragmentation 
of the nation-state, using narratives of terrorism in popular film clearly seems to 
validate the legitimization of the transition of the spectator to the citizen. Roja, takes 
this patriotic discourse to a newer level and as Madhav Prasad argues, “… it becomes 
evident that the transaction between state and citizen can be expressed to the audience 
with a directness that disrupts the smooth channeling of emotional effects in character 
driven narration. Thus Arvind Swamy, the hero of Roja, can shift from the mood of 
romantic dalliance into the hortatory mode of passionate citizen” (Making Meaning, 
21).  Shekhar’s dramatic monologue to his friends at the end of the riots has similar 
overtones where he rejects the labels of Hinduism and Islam and asks them to 
embrace their identity as Indians. Similarly the discussion on loyalty and patriotism is 
given a new twist by Police Inspector Salim in Sarfarosh and Inspector General of 
Police, Inayat Khan in Mission Kashmir, articulating their anger at being unfairly 
removed from sensitive projects relating to the nation-state’s interests because of their 
religious persuasion. This justified anger and this constant demand for ritual re-






structured balance between the characters creating a larger secular social group that 
functions within the vertices of political citizenship and religious affiliations29. To 
borrow a term from Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, this is a perfect example of the use 
of “syncretism” as an artistic strategy, the practice of the “esthetic politics of the 
impure” (313). In the small world of the village of Malanpur, we are initially shown 
that Hindu and the Muslim worldviews are inexorably intertwined culturally in the 
social fabric marking a celebration of the hybridity and the intermingling nods 
towards a recognition of the heteroglossic realities. Similarly, we are also given the 
perspectives of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and Kashmiri pundits in Mission Kashmir.  
However, the cultural discourse of religious and communal tolerance clearly does not 
translate into the political discourse of a pluralist society. In the village of Malanpur, 
the declaration of a love relationship between Shekhar and Shaila Bano quickly 
ruptures this fragile worldview and the intrusion of the Ayodhya movement 
completely shatters the remnants of peace. To further expand on this, let us take a 
closer look at the actual representation of Hindu and Muslim ethnicity in each of 
these films.  
 Roja begins with a scene in a forest in Kashmir just before dawn with non-
diegetic sounds of birds etc. reminiscent of the pastoral which is abruptly ruptured by 
the sound of staccato machine gunfire. The soundtrack shifts to the Islamic call for 
morning prayer and the use of a blue filter for the entire scene casts an ominous tone 






we see the army closing in on a wanted terrorist, Wasim Khan, who is on the run. A 
title card informs the audience that the “Khoonkar aatankvaadi” or the bloodthirsty 
and dangerous terrorist has been captured. The scene immediately cuts to sunrise in a 
pastoral rural village, Sundar Bhanpur in Southern India and the vividly set up 
contrast between the two worlds cannot be more dramatic. The darkness that 
surrounds the scenes in Kashmir with its inherent violence and Islamic fanaticism is 
in stark contrast to the peaceful, colorful and bright world that symbolizes a Hindu 
village. Thus the first two scenes set the tone of this representation with the shots of 
Kashmir and Sundar Bhanpur at daybreak and the clever use of the soundtrack and 
lighting establishes the difference between the two worlds even though that is never 
commented on in the film. The audience can infer that it is a Hindu village in South 
India from the ritually coded markers of difference like the women’s sarees, bindis, 
jewellery, the wedding customs, names etc. The Hindu village seen here is presented 
as a normative Indian village symptomatic of an ideal, peaceful, united India that 
needs to withhold and keep the threat of Islamic fanaticism at bay. Rustom Bharucha 
describes the village of Sundar Bhanpur as one that is:  
essentialized as a totally harmonious social structure dominated by older 
women …Apart from a slight feud in Roja’s family which is countered 
through her grandmother’s intervention, there are no caste politics, no 
tensions, no panchayat politics, no blatant disparities of income – in short 






into the ‘realpolitik’ of Kashmir (1392). 
This depiction of a utopia is further developed through the film. In her reading of the 
film Roja, Niranjana rightly points out: 
As the Hindutva forces reoccupy the discourses of liberal humanism in 
India, an anti-colonial bourgeoisie nationalist project is refigured and the 
secular subject is reconstituted. The project is now one that bestows 
citizenship on the Hindu as Hindu, the supposed ‘tolerance of Hinduism’, 
allowing it to function as ‘truly secular’; in the demarcation of this new 
space of the secular, the communal Muslim is defined through a process of 
exclusion.  (79-80)    
She argues that Hindu ethnicity is normalized and we see that in repeated ways in the 
film from the funny irreverence associated with Roja’s prayers, to Rishi’s ability to 
co-opt modern ways despite his rootedness in the traditions of the village of Sundar 
Bhanpur. In sheer contrast to this is the depiction of Muslim ethnicity represented in 
the ways of Liaquat Khan and his family which is seen as backward, anti-modern, 
anti-national, intolerant and fundamentalist. The constant intercutting between the 
scenes of him praying with the sinister efforts of his group underlines this 
representation further.  I agree with Niranjana’s conclusion that: 
So while there is an ethnicity that is seamless with modernity, there are 
other ethnicities that are seen to subvert the project of the modern and must 






differently; the new nationalism is pro-western, and is thus by definition, 
anti-Muslim (1299). 
Going back to my earlier argument of the two kinds of nationalism (derived along 
religious lines or based on modernizing missions), I would conclude that it is the 
marriage of the two kinds of nationalism that helps us arrive at theorizing the third 
kind of nationalism – an (anti)nationalism. It becomes the representation of an 
unproblematic pairing of modern and western with this new hegemonic Hindu nation 
that provides for a reconstituted subjectivity. Hence, if difference and the assertion 
thereof is the marker of anti-colonialism; then ethnic markers that are presented as 
normative and those that are seen as illegitimate otherness help define the new 
(anti)nationalism. Mani Ratnam’s film Bombay, similarly characterizes this 
convergence between modernization and Hinduism, and draws heavily on the 
difference in representation of these two ethnicities. The film, according to 
Vasudevan, “figures modernity as evolving from the trajectory of Hindu subjectivity” 
(17). The world of Narayan Mishra, as a trustee of the temple and a pillar of the 
community is one of the upper caste, middle class wealth where labor and profession 
are not really mentioned except in the case of Shekhar who moves to Bombay for a 
higher education and goes on to become a successful journalist. The world of Bashir 
Ahmed, in contrast, is distinctly lower class associated with brick making and fishing. 
He is at once conservative whereas Narayan Mishra is traditional; he is given to 






Narayan Mishra falls back on verbal insults and threats. Interestingly what makes 
Narayan Mishra modern is his ability to give his son an English education and his 
vision which Shekhar eventually translates into progressive liberal views whereas 
Bashir Ahmed’s desire to give his daughter an education is still perceived as clouded 
in orthodox beliefs and shrouded in the veils of the burqa she dons everyday.  The 
burqa as a signifier of Muslim tradition surfaces repeatedly in this film and not just as 
a coded marker of difference that conceals and protects Muslim women; it is used at 
once to convey a suggestive intimacy as it shrouds them in secrecy even as it provides 
a disguise for a cross dressing Shekhar. More importantly when Shaila Bano struggles 
to free herself from the burqa when it gets entangled in the branches of a tree, it 
marks the final moment of her transition into becoming a Hindu wife.  
The veil of secrecy that marks their premarital sexuality however carries over 
and resurfaces in the lack of privacy and the forced barriers set up because of the 
presence of the children who visit and share their bedroom, in the sarees hanging on 
the clothesline and through the landlady’s constant presence. Despite this obvious 
lack of privacy, and the censorship that surrounds the visual representation of explicit 
sexuality in Bollywood films, we are still witness to a creative visualization of the 
consummation of their marriage.  Their sexuality is constantly displaced into a public 
forum, moving it from the ‘real - the here and now’ to the ‘imagined’. We see it at the 
time of the consummation of the marriage which is echoed in the intercut scenes of 






bizarre taunting of Shekhar by the prostitutes in the community, culminating in the 
very public request for a girl child during the song “Kucchi kucchi rakamma”.  While 
this is a trademark of Ratnam’s films30, we see this in Roja, as well, with the older 
women of the village very suggestively dancing to “Rukmani, Rukmani”, as the young 
couple consummate their marriage, I would like to point out, what in my reading is a 
significant departure in the case of the film Bombay.  It is the public suggestion of the 
sexual union between a Hindu man and a Muslim woman made socially acceptable 
and furthermore validated that is unique.  The consequent impregnation of the 
Muslim woman also plays into this new normative form of nationalism. The 
representation of the sexual union of a Muslim man and a Hindu woman, in 
Bollywood films while rare if not unknown, would never be similarly displaced into a 
public forum. For example, in Mission Kashmir, there is a depiction of a Muslim man 
married to a Hindu woman, but the only time their passion is shown onscreen it is 
interrupted well before consummation by an explosion that kills the wife, Neelima.  
Shekhar and Shaila’s sexuality transcends their marital union for in giving birth to 
twins that they name Kabir Narayan and Kamal Bashir, Shekhar and Shaila Bano give 
birth to the ideal concept of a unified nation with no religious or communal 
differences. And yet, even as the film departs from the norm and introduces inter-
communal marriage at the core of the narrative, it maintains the status-quo of Hindu 
hegemony by ensuring that the hero comes from the Hindu community, “thereby 






nation” (Vasudevan 12). Similarly in Fiza, while Amaan’s love interest is restricted to 
the small conservative community and he falls in love with his childhood friend, 
Shenaz, his sister Fiza, who epitomizes the modern, liberal, articulate, working 
professional, moves outside of the Muslim community, to fall in love with Anirudh (a 
Hindu friend). The end of the film is also imperative to my reading of this new 
modernized nationalism as pro-western and anti-Muslim. The deaths of Nishatbi and 
Amaan leave Fiza alone and her impending marriage to Aniruddh provides for the 
possibility of her being co-opted within the larger Hindu majority. This destruction of 
the Muslim family unit and its eventually being subsumed by the larger Hindu 
majority is indicative of this trend.  The modern, secular imagining of the nation is 
therefore rooted in a liberal Hindu nationalism that can allow the co-opting and the 
assimilation of any other minority communities as long as the Hindu patriarchal 
mores are well established and accepted. 
The Conflict between Nation and Nation-State 
To go back to my earlier point about the intersection and disjuncture of state and 
nation, these films foreground this separation while in some ways suggesting that this 
is an artificial divide. I have argued earlier that this conflict provides a point of entry, 
permitting the interpolation of the hero-citizen into the events that transpire out of the 
failure of the state to combat terrorism.  






enter into dialogue with the larger overarching discourse of nationalism as well. 
Much critical debate has centered on the film Roja vis-à-vis the role of the nation and 
the state, its representation and what many critics perceive as the failure and hence 
rejection of the state. Tejaswini Niranjana, in her essay, “Integrating Whose Nation? 
Tourism and Terrorism in Roja”, makes two critical arguments; firstly how the nation 
is being re-configured in the film and secondly how it marks the rejection of the state.  
In her reading of the film it is through Rishi Kumar’s patriotic gestures and his two 
acts of defiance that he succeeds in outmaneuvering the militants and circumvents the 
need for any government/military intervention. Therefore she states: 
The middle class, in claiming its complete identification with the nation, 
has to demonstrate that demands made on the state are not met. The new 
class has to show its self-reliance instead, for the state apparatus is 
outworn, out of date, however large and impressive it may seem (81). 
Venkatesh Chakravarty refutes Niranjana’s reading of Roja as a rejection of the state 
and using Foucault’s observation that the police and army as an extension of the state 
are only termini of power which are eventually localized in units like the family, 
argues that power returned to the family through Rishi is consequently power 
returned to the state. Hence, he argues: 
The apparent inability of the state in the film actually masks its silent and 
powerful ability and in that sense the ultimate victors in the film are the 






Kumar, the hero coincides …the entire narrative of the film is keyed to the 
disavowal of the violence of the state and the proclivities of female 
subjectivity. By such a disavowal, the state is affirmed rather than defeated 
(642). 
S. V Srinivas introduces a different perspective to this debate with his assertion that 
the army alone “is projected as the authentic voice of the state” (1226) It is his 
contention that politicians are not recognized as authentic voices of the state and 
therefore “the conflict is not between two representatives of the state but between one 
authentic representative and an unpatriotic (even if avuncular) opportunist” (1226).  
However, in my reading of the film, the distinction is not between the authenticities 
of the voices that represent the state as much as it is to the legitimacy provided to the 
nation.  In the film, the validation of Rishi’s Kumar’s actions and the nation vis-à-vis 
the inability of the state/army/politicians to provide for its citizens is momentously 
significant. Whether this happens because of restrictions arising out of the fear of 
setting precedence or the state’s desire to achieve what in Utilitarian terms would 
translate into upholding the benefits for a larger majority as opposed to an individual 
need is not imperative to my larger argument.  
  Niranjana’s response relocates the debate that ensued as a re-imagining of the 
nation counter to the formation of the state in the immediate postcolonial moment and 
her valid assertion of the film’s rejection of the state constituted a challenging of the 






I emphasize the ‘newness’ in order to indicate that a different kind of 
nation is now being imagined, a nation not necessarily congruent with the 
sovereign state of the 1950’s, a nation in which the assertion of true 
Indianness is not at odds with the erosion of economic/political economy 
(1299). 
To reiterate my overarching argument, militant Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism in 
the Indian subcontinent is a byproduct of the adversarial and dialectical relationship 
of two different kinds of nationalisms – one based on religious-communal identity 
and one that is explicitly based on the modernistic ideology of development. The 
“modernizing mission” of secular politics in India as I said earlier was in opposition 
to a primarily communal identity, which was traditional and pre-modern. Further, in 
creating a seemingly inclusive space for nation-building and national development, it 
automatically relegated its ‘other’ to a pre-modern or anti-modern status.  Maiello’s 
argument, unlike mine, does not see the two nationalisms as co-existent (he posits 
quite like Niranjana’s argument that religious fundamentalism is a direct result of the 
skewed economic development practiced by the modern, secular nationalists) but I 
agree with his argument that this secular and modern identity was not without its 
problems. It created a pan-Indian homogenous elitist identity, cut loose from any 
regional, religious moorings. It (this elite) “spoke in the modernist idiom of secular 
nationalism, scientific technology and economic development; by adopting this 






elaborate, it was a community drawn exclusively from the upper caste and middle 
classes and it found its home in de-territorialized spaces offered by the metropolis. 
Despite its exclusive nature and its erasure of difference, it had hijacked the 
“modernizing” agenda, and any opposition to it, was therefore pre-modern or anti-
modern. Further, the continued maintenance of social hierarchies along caste and 
class lines within the nation-state negated the modernizing and equalizing nature of 
the enterprise which was at the heart of the Nehruvian social development policies in 
India. In other words, one could argue that the failure of this secular modernizing 
mission provided ample opportunities for newer ideologies and re-imaginings of the 
nation. 
The nascent Hindu upper-caste middle-class (anti)nationalism that emerged in 
India in the 1980s with the burgeoning Hindutva movement and the concurrent rise of 
the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Hindu Right with its unprecedented electoral 
victories (till the 2004 general election)  seems to suggest that this ideology has 
indeed captured the imagination of a large constituency of the nation. It is a third kind 
of nationalism – an (anti)nationalism that we see play out in the films discussed in 
this chapter. Having co-opted the modernizing agenda as well as the religious 
communal identity, this (anti)nationalism derives from both a dialectical and 
adversarial relationship between the two earlier mentioned nationalisms as has been 
argued in the course of this chapter. The new ‘supposedly secular’ subject that these 






caste male subjectivity where the ideas of inclusiveness derive out of a Hindu 
patriarchal tradition that is willing to accommodate Liaquat Khan and his sister for 
their eventual loyalty to the nation, and Shaila Bano and her family for their almost-
assimilation into Hindu society. 
While there is an argument about the failure of the state or lack thereof in the 
film Roja; in films like Maachis, Fiza and Bombay it is the failure of the state to 
protect its citizens and to uphold their individual rights with the enactment of the 
Terrorist Prevention Act (TADA) that further separate the state and the nation in this 
discourse of citizenship31.  In Fiza, there is absolutely no ambiguity about the failure 
of the state and its inability to protect its citizens. Amaan’s desperate plea for help the 
night he is being attacked and pursued by a mob is instantly rejected by the Police 
Inspector Prakash Ingle whose response is clichéd and trite. The complicity of the 
police with the Hindutva movement is blatant as is the manipulation of the communal 
tensions to increase the electoral fortunes by the two major politicians and religious 
leaders Sayed Sahib and V. K Singh.  The dehumanization of the Police Inspector 
who is corrupt and open to bribery as well as the indifference of the policemen who 
Fiza interacts with at the Pakistan/Rajasthan border, coupled with the cynicism and 
suspicion of the gypsies towards them, is indicative of a police force, seen as 
ineffectual. In the aftermath of the riots, they seem unable to cope with the sheer 
numbers of atrocities inflicted on the victims and are completely overwhelmed by the 






cremations or buried in mass graves. The policewoman, who Nishatbi visits 
repeatedly for news of her son, is compassionate and understanding but the failure of 
the police to locate Amaan repeatedly undermines the effectiveness and capabilities 
of the state machinery. The breakdown of law and order in the city is further 
exemplified by the men who disrupt the gathering of the people in the park and come 
back to harass Fiza and it is only Amaan’s intervention and vigilantism that succeeds 
in thwarting their attempts.   
The use of automatic weapons as props is significant in Roja, Maachis, Fiza, 
Sarfarosh and Mission Kashmir as repeated motifs that demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of the standard state issued service revolvers that the police officials 
use against the unending supply of Kalashnikovs and AK-47s that the terrorists seem 
to have. The visual images of mass destruction that these automatic weapons, missile 
launchers and bombs wreak are graphic and clearly demonstrate the odds the law 
enforcement agencies (State Police, Crime Branch) etc. face in this struggle. The 
opening sequence of Mission Kashmir, posits two shots one after the other, a boat full 
of policemen with standard issue rifles and a single terrorist with an AK-47 –  the 
contrast cannot be starker, the implications are obvious. While these films implicate 
Pakistan in state sponsored terrorism and as an arms supplier, they do not question 
further where the arms are manufactured before being routed through Pakistan, 
though Mission Kashmir also implicates Afghanistan and other such allies in this. In 






that these films foreground this connection to the flow of transnational capital and the 
transnational arms supply.  
On a side note, the collation between fact and fiction becomes more 
complicated in that the hero-protagonist of Mission Kashmir, Sanjay Dutt was himself 
charged under the purview of TADA for the possession of illegal weapons and 
involvement in the Bombay bomb blasts in 1993, a fact that underlines the connection 
of the film industry in Bombay to the underworld that controls a large part of the 
financing of these productions32. These links to certain middle-east countries are still 
under investigation but again in an ironic twist, the financing of these films through 
these sources only serves to highlight the possibilities of cultural terrorism and the 
obvious control they exert over the production houses in the Bombay film industry. 
So despite clear references, and the use of plot devices like the arms trafficking in 
Sarfarosh, none of the assertions are corroborated and the suggestion that it is a part 
of a common well-established global terrorist network remains to be seen. 
  In terms of cinematography, the graphic and bloody cinematic images of 
violence and terror wreaking havoc on society through the use of automated weapons 
creates a climate of fear and anguish by which the spectator is vicariously traumatized 
through the re-enactment on the cinema screen. 
The failure of the state in Fiza is not just restricted to the situation of law and 
order but extends beyond to the corruption of the politicians, the problem of 






and the hopelessness of the qualified candidates who are turned away. While we have 
touched upon the “middle class” roots of this homogenized nationalism presented in 
these films, it is also crucial to note that for each of these protagonists earning a 
decent livelihood is the only way for upward mobility in society marked by 
hierarchical structures of class and caste. The unemployment factor resulting in an 
imbalance of economic development only adds to the frustration and helplessness of 
these young protagonists and leaves them susceptible to the endorsing ideologies of 
violence against the state.    
The lack of legal recourse for these protagonists suggests the final rejection of 
the state machinery. Unlike Bollywood films of yesteryears that focused on long 
courtroom dramas, none of these films use the legal system of justice to redress any 
of the issues. Instead, very unusual resolutions are used: in Fiza and Maachis, 
Amaan, Kirpal Singh, Jasse, and Veeran all take their own lives, justice is served but 
on their own terms. In Sarfarosh, the complications of a legal trial and the issue of 
diplomatic immunity for Major Baig, the Pakistani cultural ambassador, are 
circumvented by Ajay Singh who pits the two antagonists against each other tricking 
Ghulfam into killing the Pakistani major. Justice is served again, and the end justifies 
the means. Besides the issues of jurisdiction, several other complications come into 
play here, not the least of which is the sympathy factor for these terrorist protagonists 
like Amaan Altaaf, Kirpal, Veeran and Jasse who are at once victims as they are 






for narrative agency, inherent, in these films is the assumption that violence and 
communal tensions stem from within the existing social structures as shown by 
figuring aggression as located specifically in the community (like in Bombay or Fiza) 
and which can hence be contained by the direct action of the state and its citizens. It is 
imperative for the closure of the narrative that order be restored and that all ruptures, 
fissures in society are smoothed over in order to provide closure for the audience that 
has just been witness to the reenactment of a traumatic experience. It is in keeping 
with that desire that terror, riots and communal violence are seen not as a systemic 
long term problems but their treatment of it as criminal activity and within the 
jurisdiction of the Indian Police and the CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) that 
deal directly with domestic security, is a clear assertion of that. In all these films 
(with the exception of Roja where the army is called in, since Rishi Kumar is in 
Kashmir for a defense assignment dealing cryptography) the police are responsible 
for re-establishing law and order. In other words, it is seen and represented as a 
domestic issue to be handled within the borders of the nation-state. Even though there 
are references to terrorism as an extension of the three wars between India and 
Pakistan, in these films, this rhetoric is never validated.  
I would also argue that the use of the rhetoric of war for terrorist activity 
acknowledges recognition of their cause and further provides a legitimacy of their 
entity as a nation. In fact to extend this argument further, militant Islamic groups use 






rationality and justification that is universal, making cause with a larger global 
community and drawing on the religious tenets of Islam. These films choose to make 
the issues and causes murky such that Amaan’s jihad is humanitarian and not 
sectarian, it is driven by injustice alone, not religious motivation and is directed 
against the ‘elected’ representatives of the state not the citizens or the bureaucracy. 
This distinction made in each of these films between the nation-state and its 
functionaries allows for the possibilities of change in governance such that a renewed 
and resurgent nationalism (the problems of which have been addressed in detail 
through the chapter) can eliminate the gap between nation and the state, such that the 
nation can be mapped over the nation-state.    
As Ravi Vasudevan, in Making Meaning in Indian Cinema, argues, the state, 
is recurrently invoked as a political concept produced by film narrative in 
the form of an emblematic character, the narrative agent, and perhaps most 
complicatedly, the imaginary authority involved in the organization of 
narrative. It is as if the overarching political form governing our lives has 
intruded into the autonomous domains of cultural production, inviting us to 
imaginatively participate in the (re) fashioning of authority into an object 
of desire. In this role, it invites us to surrender our subjectivities to it, and 
does not operate as a brute vehicle of power. Thus in films such as Roja, 







The advocacy of active participation in restoring legitimacy to the nation-state 
through a populist re-imagining of the nation through Bollywood cinema has taken on 
a momentum perhaps in the tradition of nation-building first seen in the post-
independence Indian cinema of the 1950s and 1960s. The spate of films that use 
terrorism as a narrative has seen a steady increase since the early 1990s. This can be 
seen as a direct consequence of increased media attention to terrorism in India and 
hence as a cultural reflection of historical and political realities in India. It is also 
symptomatic of the increased fear of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons that 
have changed the political fabric of the nation especially in the case of Kashmir. The 
realities of the struggle in Kashmir and the Kargil war with Pakistan in March 2000 
brought to the fore the universal realization that the conflict is no longer spatially 
contained in Kashmir and its neighboring states but has begun to affect the realities of 
the majority and the nation at large. These films serve to foreground these issues of 
terror, violence and conflict even as they use the discourses of nationalism and 
patriotism to counter a climate of fear and political anxiety. As in the model of trauma 
films, the repetitive telling of stories about a traumatic event betrays a cultural 
symptom but “the mode’s adherence to realism, and thus to closure, seals over the 
traumatic ruptures that the culture has endured. The style reassures the viewer who 
leaves the cinema believing she is safe and all is well in her world” (Kaplan 203). 
As I point out earlier, there is a distinct shift in the terrorism and its causes 






Punjab) to the more amorphous terrorism, an amalgamation of several 
(anti)nationalisms in Mission Kashmir that departs from its religious and regional 
roots linking it to larger terror networks with global repercussions. I take this up for 
discussion in my next chapter, examining the transnational nature of terrorism today 












1 I choose to use the term Bollywood to connote Hindi commercial cinema that many 
have even called India’s national cinema. I steer clear of the term national cinema 
which I find problematic in many ways since it is not state-funded nor is it 
government controlled cinema. I understand that the term Bollywood is derivative 
and it implies an affirmation of the centering of Hollywood cinema in the global 
context. As a postcolonialist I do take take issue with this, except I do not see it as a 
validation of Hollywood Cinema. Bollywood Cinema to me is a tongue-in-cheek 
reference to a very popular and distinctly different style of filmmaking that does not 
derive from the Classical Continuity Style of Hollywood. The Bollywood film 
industry also produces more films per year than any other film industry in the world.  
 
2 I have elaborated on this conflict between the local and the global and its 
consequent repercussions in Chapter 1. 
 
3 Sarfarosh is the story of Ajay Singh Rathod, a young college student whose love for 
music, especially ghazals sung by a famous ghazal singer, Ghulfam Hasan results in 
an accidental meeting with Seema. Seema’s brother, Roshan is a record producer with 
exclusive rights to Ghulfam Hasan’s music. The budding romance between Ajay and 
Seema is interwoven through the film’s parallel storylines. The film’s main storyline 
is about arms trafficking from across the border from Pakistan. Some of those guns 
finally land up in the hands of tribals in a village on the border of Maharasthra and 
Andhra Pradesh. The brutal killing of a busload of villagers, sprayed with bullets as 
they flee for their life and other such incidents of violence connect the dots between 
the terrorist acts across the landscape of three states, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharastra, all connected through the narrative of arms trafficking. The film’s 
narrative links several kinds of (anti)nationalisms, from the Naxalite movement of 
tribal villagers in Andhra Pradesh to the jihad of Ghulfam Hasan as revenge for the 
Partition of 1947 to the Bombay underworld with its links to the Middle-east. The 
narrative moves back and forth in time and the repeated references to ACP Rathod 











whose fame precedes his actual screen presence. The narrative goes back to flashback 
mode to explain the genesis for his desire to fight terrorism. His personal life is 
completely changed after a terrorist incident leaves his father paralyzed and his older 
brother brutally killed because his father agrees to be a witness in a court hearing 
involving terrorism. Then the narrative goes back to present time with musical 
interludes that depict Ajay’s interaction with  Seema and his consequent meeting with 
Ghulfam Hasan. Meanwhile, in the course of the investigation Inspector Salim, as a 
Muslim finds his loyalty questioned, because he let Sultan get away. We are also 
privy to the odds faced by the police force armed only with service revolvers and the 
automatic machine guns, AK47s that all the terrorists use against them. Through a 
series of stake-outs and other investigative efforts, Ajay uncovers the nexus between 
Beeran (the Naxalite outlaw), Sultan, Patil and Rajan of the Bombay underworld and 
Mirchi Seth, the gunrunner in Rajasthan and Ghulfam Hasan the mastermind who 
under orders of a Pakistani Army General attempts to create situations of insurgency 
in India. The final confrontation between Ajay and his band of police officers at 
Ghulfam’s ancestral home brings together the three kingpins of this gunrunning 
network together – Ghulfam, Mirchi Seth and the Pakistani contact, Major Baig. 
Major Baig in India on a cultural mission, claims diplomatic immunity, and Ajay 
through his clever use of psychological tactics pits the two antagonists against each 
other, ensuring Ghulfam Hasan kills Major Baig. This series of events circumvents 
any travesty of juctice and ensures that Ajay has a perfect legal case against Ghulfam. 
Gulfam’s rant about the 1947 partition at the end and all its injustices in the name of 
religion is undermined by Ajay’s declaration of how millions suffered just like him 
and how India as a nation is attempting to heal those wounds caused by the horrific 
violence and trauma of the Partition.  
 
4 Maachis is a film about terrorism in Punjab. It takes a very poignant look at the 
circumstances that contribute to militancy in the state in the aftermath of operation 
Bluestar. The film focuses on the lives of three young friends: Jasse, his sister Veeran 
and his closest friend, Kripal who is also Veeran’s fiance. Their carefree youth is 
disrupted by Jasse’s wrongful arrest as a wanted terrorist by an aggressive police 












unable to get Jasse out of prison and despite his attempts at legal recourse, his every 
effort is thwarted by the relevant authorities. Jasse returns home, tortured and brtualy 
beaten. Overwhelmed by his frustration with the system, Kripal leaves home. He 
witnesses a terrorist act, a bomb blast on a bus giving him an insight into an alternate 
world-order and he turns to the perpetrators of the act, seeking a different form of 
justice. His request for help from the leaders of the terrorist outfit, Commander and 
Sanaatan, results in his initiation into terrorism. The films clearly links this terrorism 
 to the storming of the Golden Temple, the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the 
anti-Sikh riots of 1984 through the insertion of black and white stills of newspaper 
headlines. Kripal then finds himself, left with no choice and his initial hesitation to 
handle arms is soon replaced by a new found mission for justice, driven by his desire 
for personal revenge which conflates with the ideology of the group motivated by 
hatred and revenge against the nation-state. All the young male members of the outfit 
share stories of oppression and excesses of the state as well as injustice meted out to 
them at the hands of society in the 1984 riots. Kripal is trained to carry out 
assignments by the terrorist group, all the while fuelled by his anger against the senior 
police officer responsible for arresting Jasse. Meanwhile, Jasse is re-arrested and 
tortured repeatedly and in absolute despair, he kills himself in prison and his mother 
unable to handle the torture her innocent son undergoes, dies of grief.  Veeran, left 
alone, decides to follow in Kripal’s footsteps and joins the same outfit as a missile 
expert. The conflict between personal loyalty and loyalty to the cause quickly 
translates into anger and distrust between the members of the group when Kripal gets 
arrested trying to kill a senior police officer. His failure to take the cyanide pill to kill 
himself before being arrested is misunderstood as betrayal by Sanaatan who holds 
Veeran hostage. The film ends with Veeran’s escape and she visits him in prison 
where she manages to give him the cyanide pill she had taken away from him. 
Disillusioned and disgruntled, death seems to be their only choice and Veeran and 
Kripal take the cyanide pills killing themselves.  
 
5 I deliberately use the term ‘Bollywood cinema’ as opposed to other terms like 












do not only originate in Bombay but that adhere to a particular cinematic style and 
draw on certain specific characteristics associated with this cinematic form. Madhava 
Prasad in his essay “This Thing called Bollywood” argues that this popular term 
Bollywood suggests a kind of reflexivity that recognizes the “the contrastive values 
and pleasures it represents vis-à-vis Hollywood” and yet emphasizes its own 
uniqueness as a source of cultural identity.   
 
6 Though I make the point about reclaiming Kashmir in the context of nationalism, I 
 must clarify that Mani Ratnam used Wellington and Kulu-Manali as locations for the 
 shooting of Roja because of the political conflict.  
 
7 Mani Ratnam’s Bombay is a love story of a couple caught up in the violence 
surrounding the Bombay bomb blasts orchestrated by terrorists in 1993. (see below).   
 
8 On March 12, 1993, there were a series of bomb blasts in the city of Mumbai.  The 
Bombay Stock Exchange and several other buildings were destroyed and 257 people 
were reported killed. Later Hindu – Muslim riots erupted all over the city killing 
thousands more. The Mumbai Police was accused of being complicit in the rioting 
and the B N Srikrishna Commission was set up to investigate these charges. Fiza 
provokes this issue of police duplicity and its implications for Amaan. 
 
9 Juergensmeyer’s in Terror in the Mind of God does a comparative study of religious 
terrorism, its causes and consequences. In his detailed study of the Punjab problem in 
India, in his article, “Sword of Sikhism,” he discusses the violence and terrorism that 
marked the years 1981 – 1994. He further analyzes the initial peaceful campaigns for 
Sikh autonomy that were further complicated by the political alliances between the 
Akali Dal, a political party in Punjab and the Congress Government at the Center. 
 Bhindranwale, who led the separatist movement, was killed in the Golden Temple in 
June 1984. About 2000 people including innocent worshippers were killed and even 













10 Rajiv Gandhi’s brutal assassination by a suicide bomber in the town of 
Sriperumbudur, on May 21st, 1991 by an LTTE operative was the beginning of 
several such terrorist events in India. Suicide bombing was till then not a known form 
of operation for Indian terror groups.  
 
11 Rubaiya Sayeed was kidnapped on December 8, 1989, by a militant group called 
the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. They demanded the release of five 
imprisoned militants, Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Sher Khan, Noor Mohammad Kalwal, 
Altaaf Ahemed and Javed Ahemed Jargar. The Vishawanath Pratap Singh led 
 Congress Government accepted these terms and negotiated the release of the Union 
Home Minister’s daughter, Rubaiya. The five men were released from prison on 
December 13th, 1989. This was the first known case of negotiations with terrorists and 
established a precedent that the central government found hard to live up to in the 
following years. 
 
12 Linguistic chauvinism is a big problem for the Indian nation-state and contributes 
to the difficulties of promoting Hindi as a national language. Several regional film 
industries have flourished across India (Malayalam films, Telugu films, Tamil films 
and Bengali films are probably the most famous) part of my problems with declaring 
the Bombay film industry as Indian national cinema.  
 
13 Burqa is the outer robe worn by Muslim women, who observe Purdah or veil 
themselves especially in public or the presence of strange men. It is usually black in 
color, and is accompanied by the wearing of a headscarf with a mesh-like covering 
over the face.   
 
14 Mangalsutra, is a necklace worn by married Hindu women as a sign of their 
allegiance to the husband and his family. It is a significant moment in a wedding 
ritual when the groom places it around the neck of his bride declaring them officially 
married. It is considered auspicious and worn as a protection of the husband against 
evil. The mangalsutra is made of gold and black beads and depending on the social 












15 Mani Ratnam made a trilogy of films on terrorism, Roja in 1992, Bombay in 1995 
and Dil Se in 1998. 
 
16 B.E.S.T  buses (Brihanmumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking) are one 
the public transportation system in Bombay. Most commuters in Bombay use the 
local metro system.  
 
17 The Indian Police Service also called the IPS has a clear hierarchical structure. 
Most officers start out as Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP) followed by 
 Superintendent of Police, (SP) then Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), then 
Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), then Inspector General of Police (IGP), 
then Additional Director General of Police (Addl. DGP) and finally Director General 
of Police (DGP) who is in charge of the entire state. The hierarchy of the police force 
is used as a clever plot device to clarify how Kuldip manages to save Inayat Khan 
during the second attempt on his life. BSF or the Border Security Force also referred 
to in this film is another branch of law enforcement. The narrative hints at the usual 
jurisdictional issues between different law enforcement agencies.  
 
18 This part of the plot is a play on real historical events referring to the Indian army 
entering the Golden Temple and the immediate response by the Sikh community with 
a call to arms across the country. 
 
19 Some obvious examples come to mind regarding work done around the Partition of 
India and Pakistan, and the Holocaust. These include extensive research into 
historical documents that surround these two traumatic events. The scholarship that 
evolved around these two major historical tragedies ranges from the personal to the 
more public. The representation of these events in novels, diaries, films, and 
television series brought these events back to life and made them very much a part of 
public discourse again. 
   
20 Every Bollywood film dealing with anti-national elements makes clandestine or 











use characters of Pakistani national origin to explicate this point, some refer to the 
“state across the border” and others merely hint at enemy nations. Given the history 
of the four wars fought between India-Pakistan in the post-Independence era (post 
1947), Indian audiences are much attuned to understand these references.  
 
21 In 1977, Indian politics saw the emergence of an all powerful leader in Indira 
Gandhi, who declared a state of emergency and used the special powers vested in her 
by the constitution of India to override the Houses of Parliament, lash out at her 
political opponents, give her son Sanjay Gandhi free rein of the political powers of 
her office and establish a dictatorial setup in a democratic country. The powers were 
later repealed, the houses of Parliament were re-elected, but the time became 
synonymous with absolute, unchecked powers of the government. 
  
22 In Urdu, Qaum means nation with resonances of religious duty towards a 
community of our own. 
 
23 Mazhab in Urdu derives from its Arabic roots meaning to adopt a way or a code of 
 
conduct based on religious duties. In the postcolonial sense this can be codified as 
community or nation that adopts similar means of conduct. 
 
24 Rachel Dwyer and Divia Patel elaborate on the song and dance sequence in hIndi 
films in their Text Cinema India: The Visual Culture of Hindi film.  
 
25 All the films in my analysis have musical interludes with similar refrains, in Fiza 
there is the song “Piya Haji Ali” that celebrates the love of all religions where 
Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians all find solace and grace and in Maachis, it is 
echoed in the song “Chhod aaye hum woh galiyaan” that evokes memories of an 
innocent childhood spent in a land once prosperous and peaceful.   
 
26 The reference here is to the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 along religious 











in Maachis, Sanaatan repeatedly uses this as the origin of all state sponsored violence, 
as does Ghulfam in Sarfarosh.  
 
27 The song, “Chod Aye Hum Woh Galiyan,” is a song that laments the state of Punjab 
today in terms of its resplendent past. Punjab, for the longest time, was the richest 
state in India, given its flourishing agrarian economy. 
 
28 “Chappa Chappa Charkha Chale,” is a very rhythmic Punjabi folksong reminiscent 
of an agricultural based lifestyle, sung around a campfire. It is nostalgic and 
remembers the womenfolk left at home and glorifies their beauty and the daily rituals 
that so occupy them.   
 
29 The marginalized perspective of the Kashmiri Pundit, forced to flee Kashmir 
because of ethnic cleansing is articulated here, as is the Sikh policemen’s rendering of 
his family’s loss in the Sikh riots of 1984. While all of these positions are articulated 
none of these really engage in a meaningful dialogue with each other.  
 
30 Mani Ratnam uses choreography to depict sexual scenes to circumvent the 
limitations issued by the Censorship Board of India. For the longest time, Bollywood 
films used shots from nature intercut with shots of the couple to suggest sexual 
intercourse. Ratnam popularized this technique which had been used in earlier films. 
The lyrics to these songs while explicit found more universal acceptance than others 
that came before.   
 
31 TADA here refers to India’s Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 
that was repealed in 1995 following charges of violation of human rights under this 
ordinance. India is now in the process of negotiating the implementation of POTO 
(Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance) in Parliament, which is many ways a re-working 
of TADA.  
 
32 In its written submissions in the designated court trying the March 1993 blasts case 











122 others. It accused them of indulging in a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in the 
country at the behest of underworld dons Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon and others. 
Sanjay Dutt, confessed to the possession of an AK-56 rifle which violates section 5 of 
TADA that relates to possessing arms in a notified area. The CBI further alleged that 
arms and ammunition were transported from Pakistan and delivered to the Shekhadi 
and Deghi coasts in Maharashtra's Raigad district. (The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 








 Chapter 5:  The Theater of Terrorism 
Cinema, as we have discussed in our earlier chapter, lends itself to the 
depiction of projected narratives of nations and now global empires. It imposes a 
fictitious unity of national aspirations onto a willing and captive audience that shares 
common origins, language, location and culture. In my previous chapter, I developed 
an argument in the postcolonial context about the articulation of a normative and 
homogenizing nationalism in Bollywood cinema in India, analyzing the use of 
terrorism as a trope. Shifting the argument significantly from the margins to the 
center but within the rubric of postcolonial studies, I now examine the depiction of 
nationalisms and (anti)nationalisms in a more global context vis-à-vis Hollywood 
cinema.  
 Cinema, we note, has a grandiosity of scope that far surpasses the audience 
that Benedict Anderson referred to in the imagined communities that came about 
through print capitalism1. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, in their book, Unthinking 
Eurocentrism, make the argument that the fiction film of the twentieth century, has 
since inherited the legacy of the nineteenth century realist novel in the era of print 
capitalism, in capturing the imaginaries of nation-building. Cinema easily helped 
perpetuate the projected narratives of nations and empires and imposed a fictive unity 
on a diverse and heterogeneous population. The linear progression of a complicated 






imaginary, even as it negotiates the historical and discursive spaces essential to the 
configuration of national identity. Shohat and Stam go on to allude to the ability of 
cinema to introduce a whole new aspect to the imperial imaginary whereby the 
apparatus of cinema has “tended to be deployed in ways flattering to the imperial 
subject as [a] superior and invulnerable observer”. It is their observation that “the 
‘spatially mobilized visuality’ of the I/eye of the empire spiraled outward around the 
globe, creating a visceral kinetic sense of imperial travel and conquest, transforming 
European spectators into armchair conquistadores, affirming their sense of power 
while turning the colonies into spectacle for the metropole’s voyeuristic gaze” (104). 
Fatimah Rony in her text, The Third Eye articulates a similar perspective albeit in 
relation to her analysis of ethnographic films when she says, “ethnographic cinema is 
often harnessed to ideologies of nationalism and imperialism; it has been the 
instrument of surveillance as well as entertainment” linked to the discourses of 
power, knowledge and pleasure (10). I use this as an entry point into my own 
argument – it is my contention that none of these national imaginaries are constructed 
in isolation and their direct oppositional ‘Other’ is the discourses of 
(anti)nationalisms that are developed simultaneously albeit asymmetrically in the 
same texts. So while Shohat and Stam focus largely on how cinema uses spectacle 
and narrative to enact the story of colonialism from the perspective of the colonizer, 
in this chapter, I offer a different perspective to create a space for the discourse on 






In this chapter, it is my argument that the turn of the last century has taken this 
to a whole new level in what I see as the next stage of nationalism where the impetus 
of colonization and imperialism have given way to globalization and transnationalism 
and the notions of “Empire” resonate with a newfound context and nuance. The 
Hollywood films we deal with in this chapter, shape the national narrative along 
temporal and spatial lines that reflect a somewhat similar imperial imaginary that 
develops asymmetrically, thrusting certain national narratives into the foreground at 
the obvious expense of others. The transnational nature of this national imagining is 
the focus of my chapter as I analyze two Hollywood films and some documentaries 
that deal with terrorism but in the larger global context. Further, I feel that the use of 
the film format becomes crucial to interrogate the representations of these national 
imaginings even as they simultaneously straddle two or more cultures and rework the 
notions of temporal time.  
In Chapter 1, I discuss the useful notion of simultaneity drawing from 
Anderson’s idea of “homogenous, empty time” in terms of calendars and clocks to 
stress the importance of the coexistence of the past and the present in a critical 
moment of imagining (24). Hence, in our reading of the texts, The Siege and The 
Three Kings, we need to take into account, actual historical events as well as the 
temporal world created in these fictional films, and the present world events that 
shape our reading of these texts in context of the ongoing second Gulf War, all of 






and which mediate between the historical and the discursive.  The spectacle of terror 
and its depiction in formalist terms is the point of entry into this discourse.  
This chapter uses a two prong approach: the first is theoretical and draws on 
my theory of (anti)nationalisms as developed in the previous chapters even as it 
locates the analysis in a political, historical and globalized context. The second and 
more overarching approach is a formalist one that focuses on the physical spaces 
inhabited by the characters. This chapter therefore, hinges on the idea of spaces and 
the representation of terror as it unfolds on the cinema screen. Space, in the classical 
Hollywood style of continuity editing would necessarily have to be subordinate to 
narrative causality to create what Bordwell, Thompson and Staiger call almost 
“transparent space” in an effort to overcome the limits of the uni-dimensional cinema 
screen by effacing the picture plane. Continuity editing imputes a certain level of 
passivity to the spectator and establishes a specific set of expectations with reference 
to the narrative style. The 180 degree editing that maintains consistency with the eye-
line match also places the spectator as the ideally placed onlooker, acknowledging the 
onlooker and privileging his/her perspective.  Departures from this Classical 
Hollywood Continuity style of editing as we see occasionally in these films therefore 
jar the spectator out of pre-conceived film watching habits, which I will touch upon 
later in the chapter. It also presumes that the spectator ignores off-screen space, what 
Gombrich calls a ‘screen’, a blank canvas onto which viewers can project 






representation of screen spaces in these films thus induces the viewer to amplify the 
same thematic connotations onto the off-screen spaces, which in my argument, is 
obviously Iraq. 
We analyze how spatiality is used in these two films as we examine how the 
two films deploy the use of enclosed/open spaces, private/public spaces, and 
national/foreign spaces within the mise-en-scene and more so, how these designated 
spaces are represented within the filmic world.  In fact, I argue, that it is the mobility 
between spaces and sometimes precisely the lack of, that become crucial to the 
movement of the plot. Spaces are also crucial to the issues of jurisdiction as the 
conflict plays out between the characters in both the films. In the course of my 
analysis, this chapter also touches upon several other films, both fiction and 
documentary that have dealt with similar subjects like Mark Pellington’s Arlington 
Road (1999), Phillip Noyce’s Patriot Games (1992), Martin Smith’s Hunting Bin 
Laden (2000) and Steven Emerson’s Jihad! In America (1994). Let me clarify at this 
point that I do not posit the two documentary films as the realistic or authentic 
version of the historical events touched upon in these fictional films, I am conscious 
of their artificial staging and point-of-view editing and take this into account in my 
analysis. Both these documentaries are in the Expository Mode, which Bill Nichols 
defines as one that “addresses the viewer directly, with titles or voices that advance 
an argument about the historical world” (34). The Expository mode hinges on 






impression of objectivity and “the voices of others are woven into a textual logic that 
subsumes and orchestrates them” and used to substantiate the larger argument that the 
text addresses (37). 
 The first aspect of the simultaneity of time deals with the historical context of 
the terrorism in the United States, both domestic and international and its 
reverberations on the spirit of nationalism that defined the nation-state. Domestic 
terrorism was not unknown in the United States in the 1990s like in many other parts 
of the world, but unlike countries like India, Sri Lanka and other parts of Asia and the 
Middle East, tackling the issue of terrorism was not a significant component of 
domestic and foreign agenda. The first big act of terrorism in the United States was 
not the horrific act on September 11th, 20013 that has since become symbolic as the 
start on the “War on Terror” but it came way before that, on April 19th, 1995 with the 
Oklahoma City bombing that killed 169 Americans in the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building. The headlines read “Terror in the Heartland” and in the aftermath of the 
horror that shook the country, debate was fuelled by the cause, the reasons and the 
perpetrator’s motivation. Terrorism, hitherto unknown on US soil, has since shaken 
the country, shattered its nationalist innocence and introduced new vectors into 
nationalist imaginings. Timothy McVeigh’s execution in June 2001, has still not 
brought the chapter on justice to a close and a current Google search (August 24, 
2005) brings up 1610 results on the event, of which most websites seem to still focus 






Pellington (1999) made in this climate of paranoia and fear of the unknown, grapples 
with the subject of domestic terror groups driven by varied agendas and further 
rendered inexplicable by the immediate and effective secrecy that shrouds the 
investigation of any such events. It was one in a series of films that tuned into this 
climate of fear and attempted to replay the horror of terrorism on screen.  
Moving beyond the national stage, the real life link between domestic 
terrorism and international terrorism in the United States is anything but a tenuous 
connection. Timothy McVeigh, a Gulf War veteran, claimed that his knowledge and 
expertise was a direct result of his military training and offered the argument that this 
bombing was no different from the atrocities he had seen committed in the First Gulf 
War.  I do not wish to get into a dialogue with McVeigh’s defense and his 
justification of the act, but bring it up here, solely to point out how domestic terrorism 
and international terrorism are in some ways so closely linked in the vicious cycle of 
cause and event. The fragmented nation captured the imagination of the world at 
large, in real life, on cinema screens, the internet and TV channels and the events of 
September 11th, 2001 brought this terror alive on television screens across the world.  
 The connection of September 11th to the Gulf War, is a more immediate and 
obvious one.  In the summer of 1996, Osama Bin Laden declared a fatwa4 calling for 
Jihad against the United States of America. The fatwa was issued as declaration of 
war against the United States in protest of its policies in the Middle-East, more 






source – not the political monarchy that governs Saudi Arabia but from a single man 
on the fringes of Saudi society.  
The call to wage war against America was made because America has 
spearheaded a crusade against Islam sending thousands of its troops to the 
land of the holy mosques, meddling in Saudi affairs and politics, and 
supporting its oppressive, corrupt and tyrannical regime. These are the reasons 
behind singling out America as a target (Hunting Bin Laden). 
This Jihad and the implications of a war declared by a single man against the United 
States changed the notions of warring nations and reconfigured the roles of nation-
states in declaring war. Loyalties are now transcribed not by location, language, and 
culture in the present time and not even by geographical boundaries but by the 
imagined nation of the Ummah Islam5, the nation of Islamic believers that stretched 
across the Middle East before the British carved it up in nation-states. The notion of 
“simultaneity” echoes in this call for Jihad as it draws on the co-existence of the past 
and present in this critical moment of national imagining.    
Speaking in historical terms, September 11th , 2001 was not the first act of 
terrorism against the United States in this call for Jihad, as several attacks had been 
perpetrated against US interests abroad, from bombings of military barracks in Saudi 
Arabia (June 25, 1996) , to the bombings of two US Embassies in Africa (August 8, 
1998) amongst others. In Steven Emerson’s documentary film, Jihad! In America 






based in Potomac, Maryland gives voice to these sentiments when he said,  
If the Americans are placing their forces in the Persian Gulf, we should be 
creating another war front for the Americans in the Muslim world – and 
specifically where American interests are concentrated: in Egypt, in 
Turkey, in the Indian subcontinent, just to mention a few. Strike against 
American interests there (Chicago 1989, Jihad!). 
Steven Emerson defines Jihad as “an armed struggle to defeat non-believers or 
infidels, and their ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic Empire”. While this may 
have read as a line from a fictional work earlier, in a post-September 11th world, it 
resonates with meaning. It is not a question of the semantics of this definition 
however that will provide the answers – the answers lie elsewhere. Suddenly global 
terrorism or transnational terrorism, if you will, is a horrific reality. It is no longer 
restricted to isolated pockets but has its roots everywhere – Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, 
Somalia, Philippines, Indonesia, Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Jordan – the list is endless, and the terror network is truly globalized. 
 In attempting to historically and politically locate this phenomenon of 
representation of terrorism in cinema, I choose to apply parameters to my study 
because of the limitations of the scope of this study. While Islamic extremism can be 
traced to having its origins in the twelfth century, I restrict myself to exploring its 
roots in the Middle Eastern crisis and the Afghanistan crisis in the 1970s – 80s. I will 






are used to legitimize it as a movement in the minds of these communities that are 
based on a culture of violence. 
Bodansky in his text, Bin Laden: The Man who Declared War on America, 
identifies the mid 1970s as the boiling point in the Middle East, “when the Muslim 
world empowered by new petrodollar wealth, was exposed to Western Civilization as 
never before… the shock was immense” (xiii). He argues that leading Islamic 
fundamentalists were convinced that Western liberal thought and materialism were in 
absolute contrast to, and hence posed a direct threat to, traditional Islamic society 
governed by strictly regimented codes of behavior defined by Sharia6 (law governing 
mankind). The sentiment grew and spread from Iran to Sudan where Islamic 
governments were in power. In 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a major 
setback to the Muslim world. The people of Afghanistan responded with a call to 
Jihad against the Soviet Union. The United States fearing the increasing control of 
the Soviet Union over Central Asia launched a massive covert CIA mission to 
finance, arm and train the Afghani mujahideen in order to defeat the Soviet forces and 
destabilize the communist regime. According to Steven Emerson, three billion dollars 
worth of arms and ammunition was pumped into Afghanistan channeled through 
Pakistan’s secret service ISI. The call for Jihad against the Soviet Union resulted in 
the recruitment of several thousand mujahideen from Muslim countries across the 
globe. The defeat of the Soviet forces in 1989 and the end of the Cold War however 






uncontrolled across the Central Asian region. In 1991, the invasion of Kuwait and the 
threat of Saddam Hussein however, changed the political climate of the Middle East. 
The Saudi Arabian regime invited US troops into the region, and the US presence in 
the Middle East became another powerful source of dissension. Osama Bin Laden’s 
grievances against the US mark their beginning at this point in history. In 1995, the 
Taliban government came to power in Afghanistan and this fundamentalist regime 
with its implementation of the rigid and codified Islamic Law created a new 
resonance in the Jihad against the West. Several scholars have studied the causes for 
this dissension and anger against the “monolithic west” and the quagmire of politics 
in the Middle East. However, in the final tally, the monolithic, homogenized West in 
this Islamic extremist point of view translates into one single entity, the United States 
of America.  
The Siege: Jihad in New York City 
This conflict over US presence in Saudi Arabia becomes a point of reference for 
Edward Zwick’s film The Siege that deals with the bombings of military barracks in 
Saudi Arabia, and then goes onto the shift the battleground to the streets of New 
York, where random acts of terror like bomb blasts on a city bus, a Broadway theater 
and the FBI headquarters take a vice-like grip on the city. Anthony Hubbard, an FBI 
agent with the counter-terrorism unit is called in to investigate along with his 






the entry of Elise Kraft, a CIA undercover agent who seems to have much more 
information than she cares to share with Hubbard. The two start out with an obvious 
confrontation over jurisdiction that gets further complicated with complex issues of 
expedient foreign policy. Over the course of the investigation, the FBI headquarters 
are bombed and Hubbard is left strapped for resources and obviously emotionally 
distraught. The military is called in to patrol the streets of Brooklyn under the 
command of General Devereaux, and even as the fear of martial law brings a new 
found terror on the streets, civil rights are trampled upon and Hubbard faces off 
against this new antagonist. The Arab-Americans are subjected to racial profiling and 
herded into camps and Haddad’s son is among them. Haddad’s anguish at this rather 
telling lack of trust is perhaps the only example of the emotional price immigrants 
pay despite their legal status, citizenship and allegiance to the flag. The film resolves 
all these issues once the sleeper cells are identified, Elise Kraft’s identity is 
compromised and she is killed in the service of her country. Devereaux’s oversteps 
his boundaries and ignores the law and is finally arrested after a face-off (another 
Western convention) with Hubbard7. As the ideal protagonist, true American patriot 
and exemplary law enforcement officer, Hubbard saves the country and the day. 
Even as the film attempts to go a step further than the terrorist films of the 80s 
to un-demonize the stereotypical Arab-American as the ‘other’, it fails to develop the 
characters of the two Arab-Americans Haddad and Samir and in the end Samir’s 






the films that came before. The film thus clearly delineates Arabs as the enemy, elides 
the Arab voice and in fact goes further to rope in all Americans of Arab ethnicity as 
suspect.  The film does offer three spectatorial positions and each of them elicit 
sympathy and audience identification – Elise Kraft who has sacrificed much for her 
country and yet slips in a moment of weakness, General Devereaux whose patriotism 
as a soldier cannot be questioned though his megalomania is his undoing, and 
Hubbard whose idealism and passionate defense of the oppressed is above and 
beyond the call of duty.  However, the Arab-Americans are not fully fleshed as 
characters and in fact are feminized through their overly emotional investment in 
personal relationships above all else, as seen when a distraught Samir is reduced to 
tears while discussing his brother’s story and Haddad, even though he is a likeable 
character, ultimately puts family loyalty above the nation. The audience cannot relate 
to these characters and they continue to be the ‘other’.  
 The first scene in the film, The Siege, starts with a medium shot of the US 
military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, bombed to rubble in 19968. 
Edward Zwick’s film, The Siege attempts to contextualize terrorism by using actual 
footage of the Dhahran bombing, and President Clinton’s condemnation of this act as 
a point of entry into a fictional representation of terrorist acts in New York. The film 
is specific about the location (New York) and time period (late 1990s) and it uses a 
real life event and actual footage from news coverage as a narrative strategy for two 






as a persuasive strategy and secondly it also serves as a bridge for the film spectator 
between the real and the imagined worlds. It almost seems to cue the audience into 
treating this film as a realistic political film. The suspension of disbelief is complete.  
 Having set the stage by the presumed “kidnapping” of a prominent Iraqi 
leader, Sheikh Ahmed Bin Talal who is held responsible for the bombing in Dhahran, 
the focus shifts to New York. The use of unrestricted narration (the voiceover 
discussing the “package” and the editing) helps establish the cause and motivation for 
the terrorist activity that follows even though the spectator is not privy to the 
complete implications of this kidnapping. The crucial scene of the actual kidnapping 
happens off-screen even as the audience watches the stage set for the potential 
ambush with the goatherd, a very commonly used film device to dramatize 
abductions. The goats in the scene are a rather telling replacement for the common 
and familiar genre convention in Hollywood thrillers that use delivery trucks to 
overtake and surround the protagonist’s car and screech to halt immediately cutting 
off any escape route. This replacement of the image of powerful and seemingly 
indestructible trucks by a herd of goats, makes a very effective and yet subtle 
statement on the lack of economic and material progress in the petroleum rich Middle 
East and despite the Mercedes we see speeding down the desert roads, the stark 
contrast reflects the lack of homogenous development that marks the nation’s third 
world status.  The audience deduces from the language used “the package”, “the 






obviously American agents. Even though we are not introduced to the protagonist till 
later in the film, this use of unrestricted narrative zeroes in to the heart of the conflict 
clearly creating a focal point and aligning the spectatorial position with the good guys 
making the transition to Hubbard’s point of view instantaneous.  
This scene is interestingly played out with constant juxtapositions of shots of 
President Bill Clinton’s speech, “America takes care of our own” and the shots of the 
Sheikh being forced into a helicopter. The US response is decisive and instantaneous, 
even as the President re-assures the nation. The cross-cutting used in this scene is 
important as it instantly establishes the implicit connections between the bombings in 
Saudi Arabia of the US barracks orchestrated by an Iraqi leader and the US response 
which goes to the heart of my thesis of terrorism now being completely globalized. 
 However, the questions the film raises are not to do with causes of terrorism 
(which we see glossed over in the first five minutes of the film), but with the US 
response to terrorism on US soil. The film also completely ignores the ramifications 
of the US response on foreign soil that undermines the sovereignty of other nation- 
states. Iraq as a sovereign nation-state is not even acknowledged in the film that 
blithely equates Iraq with homogenized Islamic terrorism even as the film uses actual 
footage of the Dhahran bombings in Saudi Arabia. The film shifts between 
geographical spaces and political borders with an impunity that is only possible in the 
fictional world of the film, ignoring the boundaries of politically defined areas of 






case of Elise facilitating the entry of middle-eastern men into the US and Archie 
Gates being stopped at the Iran-Iraq border for similar reasons. 
The Siege deals with a one sided exploration of terrorism as it were, with the 
enemy comprising of a indiscriminate mix of Palestinian, Iraqi and even Lebanese 
peoples with no clear agenda and no shared heritage except an irrational common 
hatred of the US and its foreign policies. So unlike its predecessors9, this film does 
move beyond the stereotypical Muslim terrorist of unknown Middle Eastern origin 
towards a more developed conflict but it takes the exploration of the conflict only so 
far and not further. 
  This film is critical to my analysis of terrorism because this film foregrounds 
the enactment of the fictitious possibilities and scenarios as they may play out on the 
national stage in the event of a terror attack in the US. It touches upon several issues 
that in light of September 11th, have become a reality – issues of jurisdiction in terms 
of terror attacks, issues of racial profiling and the targeting of certain specific ethnic 
populations, issues of civil liberties and civil rights violations to name a few.   
The film having started out with a long shot of the desert landscape in 
Lebanon cuts to a bird’s eye view of a skyline dotted with mosques and resounding 
with the Islamic call to prayer. The camera is used here to clearly make the familiar 
unfamiliar as we come to realize that the skyline is New York City, more specifically, 
its Brooklyn suburbs. This de-familiarization of probably one of the most famous city 






and to imbed the localized nature of this globalized terrorism.  In keeping with 
familiar Hollywood panoramic establishing shots, the desert landscape, reminds the 
audience at the subliminal level of the Western genre, with the vast and desolate 
expansive views and a frontier just waiting to be remade in the image of the civilized 
world. The use of imagery in this film reiterates the Western paradigm in many ways 
and establishes audience expectations along similar lines. The constellations of power 
and hierarchical structures are not only maintained through the use of such popular 
and recognizable imagery but they are also reaffirmed at the expense of other racial 
and national imaginaries, in this case specifically Arab and Iraq.   
The protagonist, Anthony Hubbard, the head of FBI/NYPD Terrorism Task 
Force, with his Palestinian-American partner Frank Haddad, is called upon to find the 
terrorist cells across Brooklyn and destroy them. What complicates the politics of the 
film is the presence of Elise Kraft, a CIA agent who works undercover in Iraq and in 
the Arab-American community and US Army General, William Devereaux. The 
dynamics of the plot derive from this conflict of interest between the CIA, the FBI 
and the US army. While overtly they are all on the same side, their agendas are 
somewhat mutually exclusive.  
In my reading of the film, Elise (also called Sharon) represents the most 
problematic facet of the American counter-terrorism taskforce – as a CIA undercover 
agent, more so as a woman and specifically in her relationship with Samir Nazdhe, a 






avatars, Elise is finally a conflation of several ideologies some of which are in direct 
conflict with each other. She articulates a very liberal perspective when she tells 
Hubbard about the US foreign Policy in Iraq that created Sheikh Ahmad Bin Talal, 
who eventually and unbeknownst to the CIA, became the mastermind behind the 
terrorist bombings in New York. Elise confesses:  
The Sheikh was to help us overthrow Saddam. He was our ally. We were 
financing him…then there was a policy shift…its not that we sold them out 
exactly, we just stopped helping them. They were slaughtered. (emphasis 
mine)  
It is an acknowledgement of responsibility for a foreign policy gone all wrong, 
changed for political expediency and manipulated for short-term political gains. 
Hubbard forces the issue seeking clarification about the CIA training, “you taught 
them how to make the bombs, and now they are here … doing what you taught them 
to do”. This is not offered as an apology nor is it to suggest a justification of the 
terrorist activity that results in the loss of innocent lives. The books cannot be 
balanced so easily.  
And yet, Elise also represents the bleeding heart sympathizer of the Islamic 
cause, her dealings with Samir Nazdeh are suspect and more than once in the film, 
General Devereaux warns us “she has been compromised”. Multiple questions arise 
with respect to her being compromised. Is she compromised as a CIA undercover 






Compromised because her dealings with them are suspect? Compromised because she 
continued to help the Iraqi resistance by helping them enter the US after the foreign 
policy shift? Compromised because she is sleeping with the enemy?  Compromised 
because in some ways she presents the possibility of an alternative viewpoint, a leftist 
academic perspective, in a bipolar ideological world of right and wrong? Elise has 
transgressed in more ways than one, and there is no way for the narrative to sustain 
her. Her motives become questionable even as she attempts to locate the last cell. Her 
last words reflect this too, for she ends the Lord’s Prayer with a call to Allah – she 
finally belongs on neither side. Her loyalty to her country and her personal guilt 
cannot co-exist in life, but they can in death. Elise’s sexuality becomes significant to 
the conflict as her body becomes the site for the confrontation and her emotional 
investment in Samir is indicative of these constant political and emotional conflicts of 
loyalties that she experiences. Her use of her body to elicit information which 
consequently results in her being dismissed by the male political hierarchy is another 
very problematic aspect of the film. When Devereaux says, “How could you possibly 
remember who you are fucking?”  he speaks for a nation wronged by such moral 
transgressions and in sleeping with the enemy, Elise raises the horror of the specter of 
miscegenation that no one is willing to address leave alone acknowledge in the film. 
There are several such derogatory references to Elise’s sexual behavior in the film. 
Devereaux dismisses her professional expertise even though she is part of the 






Middle East … Between you and me, Elise Kraft would not know a Sheikh from a 
prophylactic by the same name”.  Uncontained female sexuality harbors the threat of 
overturned social and patriarchal norms that society cannot comprehend and 
furthermore it subverts the hegemonic structure and power balance in favor of the 
Arab male as the penetrate, while the reverse scenario can and is usually more than 
acceptable and interpreted as an expression and extension of the white male’s 
superiority and power play.  It is never made clear whether this use of her sexuality is 
an individual decision or a suggested official method of extracting information but 
her multiple identities and numerous roles eventually result in her death at the altar of 
nationhood and she is redeemed in her service to the nation10. 
Hubbard in contrast, is completely idealized. His moral compass is finely 
tuned, his friends are well chosen, his loyalty to his team is impeccable, his loyalty to 
the country unquestionable. He straddles the ideological fence, not for him the rightist 
conservative ideology that Devereaux represents nor the radical ideology that Elise 
represents.  He protests the racial profiling, he protests the herding of all Middle 
Eastern men in stadiums, he protests the unusual interrogation methods that 
Devereaux uses, and he protests the military patrolling the streets of New York. His is 
the measured, rational voice in a time of emotional and moral turbulence and fear. 
The film ultimately nods towards this perspective where the war is not against Islam, 
not all men of Middle Eastern origin are suspect, where racial profiling brings back 







He does not, however, represent the majority population of the nation in terms 
of his ethnicity or race but yet he stands in for the idealized American and his marked 
American-ness is what is clearly validated in the film. This choice of a black male 
protagonist here is similar to Mani Ratnam’s choice of a South Indian protagonist (as 
opposed to the typical North Indian protagonist of Hindi films). By depicting Arvind 
as the moral center of the Indian nation in his film Roja, Ratnam projects a desire to 
re-imagine a larger heterogenous community even as the film’s storyline reiterates 
and re-establishes the homogenous nature of this imagining and erases all signifiers of 
difference11. Hubbard’s “blackness” plays no role in the film and recedes promptly in 
the face of his American-ness even as the “Arabness” of the Arab-Americans takes 
center stage in the conflict. The film only shifts the issue of difference from one 
minority population to the other, choosing to incorporate some and exclude the 
others.  Thus Hubbard’s American-ness is clearly juxtaposed not just against Elise’s 
or Devereaux’s but also against the Arab-Americans, the Iraqis and the aberrant Iraqi-
Americans before the nation’s sense of justice prevails above all else. Shohat and 
Stam’s analogy of armchair conquistadors is complete with the American nation 
having conquered not just the warring nations of the middle-east and their policies of 
terror but it has also taken back and reinstated the moral center of the nation from the 
fringes of society that attempt at co-opting it. 






order, all the while using the ‘Other’, from without, the Iraqi warlords and the ‘Other’ 
from within, the Arab-Americans, to define the nation. Clearly undermining one and 
reclaiming the other, completes the nation’s imaginary, and restores faith in the new 
multi-ethnic American national identity. The clear reference to Japanese internment 
camps in World War II is another nod to the re-envisioned national imaginary that in 
its entirety encompasses a larger community of immigrants but only once they renew 
their pledge of allegiance to the nation.  
The spaces that the Arab immigrant community occupies in New York City 
are restricted to the boroughs of Brooklyn which as General Devereaux informs us is 
the general pattern of relocated immigrant communities, whereby they tend to live in 
contained parts of the city.  This containment to the boroughs of Brooklyn, voluntary 
or otherwise proves to be useful to the General as he can, he claims, “rumble every rat 
hole, trap, market…to find everyone whoever said a bad word about this country”. 
Similarly, even after the Arab-American men are rounded up the spaces they are 
forced into the enclosed stadium, reminiscent of a prison with its high barbed wiring 
and suggestive of holding cells. Other Arabs, even powerful men like Sheikh Ahmed 
Bin Talal are seen in dark dingy prison cells once he is taken out of his home 
environment.  Similarly, Samir, is also seen only in enclosed spaces like his 
apartment, which unlike the safe haven a home suggests, does not offer him 
protection against Sharon’s presence as she forces him to play informer or more so, 






moments. Finally, the bathhouse that represents all things holy is another enclosed 
space that is easily intruded upon by Hubbard and Haddad, and once again serves as a 
way of containment of the Arab terrorist who is cornered into defeat and 
consequently death. Haddad, in his weaker moment, is seen is his apartment secluded 
and in distress over his son’s fate. The Arab-American community, and the Arabs 
only occupy enclosed confined spaces – both private and public and the constant 
references to Gaza, the Internment camps, West Bank and Palestine, all echo this 
notion of containment. So, no space is left unchallenged, unconquered and the ease 
with which the Americans can enter and leave is what undoubtedly tilts the balance of 
power in their favor. The wide open desert horizon is reduced to and replaced by 
these closed spaces and the conquistador imagery that Shohat and Stam refer to is 
unconditionally complete.   
The role of the nation-state is echoed by the position and maneuvering of the 
US army by one megalomaniac general run amok, who clearly acknowledges that the 
Armed forces are trained to deal with enemy nations and their civilian populations but 
most definitely not their own, marking the clear divide between the nation and the 
nation-state. Hubbard’s stand-off with Devereaux in the end reins in the megalomania 
and reasserts the inherent benevolence of the nation-state towards its citizens by 
embracing the nation with its re-established moral center. The stand-off is reminiscent 
of the paradigm of the Westerns film genre, and though it is not the usual shoot out, 






asserts the law to arrest and take Devereaux prisoner.   
The Siege goes beyond the trope of one hero against the terrorists and enemies 
of the state to a more complex and further developed plotline that interpellates several 
positions of law enforcement and agents of counter-terrorism units. It does dispel the 
thriller notions of a one-man army but yet does not quite meet the initial expectations 
of a realist political film. The Arabs (of no clear national origin) are still the terrorists, 
hypervisible because of skin color and yet without a voice of any significant 
importance. Their nation is not defined and their national agenda is not defined by 
nation-states but only by religious and fanatic zeal which is in stark contrast to the 
rational, civilized and loyal Americans whose love for the nation supercedes all other 
loyalties. As a character in the film points out, “Sometimes in addition to being a 
nationality, being a Palestinian is a profession, a very lucrative one”. Being 
Palestinian, in this context is either about being a fanatical terrorist or in some ways 
even worse, a sell-out like Samir, ready to betray the nation. Nationalism in the 
Palestinian context in the film is not patriotism but a double edged sword with 
negative attributes whether as a friend or foe of the American people. The American 
nation is threatened, but only to be later reaffirmed and revalidated.   
 Shohat and Stam argue that cinema combines “both narrative and spectacle to 
tell the story of colonialism from the colonizer’s perspective” (109). Further, it 
disseminates the hegemonic colonial discourse and engenders “a battle of national 






world of diasporic populations with hyphenated identities, the conflict takes on a 
complicated hue. Arab-American audiences of films like The Siege are similarly 
subjected to dual national imaginaries, both at odds with each other, as the “us” and 
the “them.” The irony is lost out on the member of the crowd who proclaims, “they 
love this country as much as we do”.  This collision of national imaginaries within a 
single individual in the world of the diaspora thus revisits these questions of 
hegemony and imperialism as encapsulated by cinema and its spectatorship. 
 The film also uses other formalist elements to enhance the horror of the 
spectacle of terrorism and we are shown graphic scenes with bomb explosions on 
buses and Broadway theaters. It drives home the possibility of terror in schools and 
the narrative uses suspense in several scenes to create a false illusion of safety. Even 
as the federal government is having a strategy meeting, we see shots of the bomb 
being placed in the van and the pointed use of discontinuity editing as the bomb is 
activated. The constant cross-cutting back and forth between the two suggests the 
meeting as the potential target until at the last minute it switches to a shot of One 
Federal Plaza (the FBI Headquarters in the film), just before the van drives straight 
into it. So even as the film succeeds in instilling fear and insecurity in the American 
audience faced with possibilities of terror and its implications, the neatly wrapped up 
loose ends reaffirm all the confidence in the nation-state and its overarching ability to 
protect its citizens. The fissure introduced through the friction between the separate 






reworked and the transition from dissenting individuals to loyal citizens cheering on 
the Brooklyn Bridge is complete. When peace is restored, the nation can be mapped 
onto the nation state and though there is no obvious moral growth in the protagonists 
or effective change in the imaging of the nation and its subjects, the audience is 
reassured that the state and the nation can never be in conflict except in a transitional 
moment of crisis. 
Three Kings: The Global in the Local 
David Russell’s film Three Kings starts off at a very crucial moment of national 
imaginings, the US has just won a war against another nation, Iraq, and the film opens 
with the rowdiness of celebrating US soldiers in a war that they feel was rather short 
lived helped by the implementation of superior technology in modern warfare. The 
crassness of their jokes about their unfulfilled desire to see someone shot, and their 
insensitivity to the grotesque aspects of war is in direct contrast to the tone the rest of 
the film takes. The war may be officially over as the title card suggest “March 1991, 
War just Ended” but the film, Three Kings picks up on and showcases the violence, 
the outrage and the horror in this post-war situation. The lack of color in the film 
stock and the use of a “limited palette” make the bleakness and the horror of the 
proceedings even starker especially with the use of saturated vibrant colors in some 
key scenes.   






four US soldiers who find a secret map with the location of Saddam’s buried treasure 
of gold bullion stolen from Kuwait and stored in a secret underground bunker and set 
off in search of it. The main protagonist is Major Archie Gates of the Special Forces 
who devices and implements the plans, along with his team of Troy Barlow, Chief 
Elgins and Conrad Vigin. The rather common tale of greed and spoils of war fast 
descends into moral chaos as these American soldiers meet up with the Iraqi 
resistance, Saddam’s famous Republican Guard and the innocent citizens caught up in 
the crossfire. These aberrant outlaw-soldiers are unusual protagonists whose personal 
greed and amoral justifications of their actions set them apart from the usual hero-
soldiers of war films. They pledge allegiance to their own ambitions not the US flag 
and do not hesitate to put self-interest above everything else. Their plan is to get away 
to the bunker near Karbala and get the gold but the simple but ingenious plan goes 
awry rather early on when they are forced to confront the ugliness of the brutality 
perpetuated by Saddam’s soldiers on the Iraqi prisoners. Archie Gates decides to free 
the prisoners and eventually save them from the merciless beatings and cold-blooded 
killing. The Iraqi resistance leader, US educated Amir Abdullah, however quickly 
wisens up to the plan of this renegade group, and recognizes that they are acting on 
their own and not on behalf of the US army. He negotiates a deal to split the gold in 
exchange for his help and free passage across the Iraq-Iranian border. Using rather 
unusual methods of deception, Gates and his troop, manage to recover the gold and 






prisoner and interrogated and tortured but eventually is rescued, Conrad is killed but 
the rest of Gate’s band of brothers manages to reach the border. Barlow makes a call 
to his wife in the US, when held captive, providing details of his exact location and 
Adriana’s curiosity about Gates’s secret mission, gets the military involved and the 
group is stopped 100 yards from the Iranian border. Eventually Gates shows true 
compassion and rises above the greed and personal quest and trades in the gold 
bullion for the safe passage of the Iraqis. This unexpected gain in moral stature is the 
climax of a slow but steady transition from the initially insensitive and moral 
debunked group of soldiers to true heroes. Gates also successfully uses the media card 
to ensure this event is recorded by Adriana Cruz and the final credits assure us that 
Archie Gates, Chief Elgins and Troy Barlow are honorably discharged by the army. 
The film ends on this high note of how a small group of US soldiers acting on their 
own successfully save several Iraqi lives, the true heroes of a war that as Adriana in 
her news broadcast states, “they say has exorcized the ghost of Vietnam with its clear 
moral imperative”.  
 The film does not start out with a clear moral center specifically in its choice 
of protagonists, and furthermore, this is obfuscated by the constant allusions to a 
morally ambiguous war staged with closely monitored media management as well as 
the resounding references to the betrayal experienced by the Iraqi resistance. The 
errant American soldiers are told that the Iraqis were encouraged to revolt against 






slaughtered by the Iraqi soldiers in the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement. Several 
comments interspersed throughout the film allude to the question of a lack of a “clear 
moral imperative” and yet the film despite its seemingly anti-war agenda continues to 
perpetuate the neocolonial mission of its predecessors.  
 Not unlike the spaces we see the Arabs and Arab-Americans occupy in the 
film The Seige, the Iraqis in this film too, are seen as prisoners, in bunkers, in hiding 
places, in village squares that are enclosed and that have gates and guard houses. 
Unlike the American soldiers whose movement is uninhibited and unrestricted, the 
Iraqis are forced to live in enclosed spaces; their movement is restricted by Saddam’s 
soldiers and the lack of resources supposedly available to them. So, despite having 
access to a fleet of Mercedes and other luxury cars, they can only use them at the 
behest of the American soldiers. In a typical colonial paradigm, this situation 
symbolizes the childlike representation of this population that desperately seeks 
guidance of a western superior in order to achieve their own potential. Hence, despite 
the leadership of Amir Abdullah, and with access to all the amassed wealth in the 
bunkers, it takes the help of five American soldiers to get these Iraqis to safety across 
the border. 
 The vast, barren desert landscape in this film signifies the last frontier that the 
Americans have to conquer and civilize not unlike the landscape and associated 
imagery of the genre of Western films. There is no representation of Iraqi towns, 






small impoverished villages, villagers deprived of basic necessities like milk and 
water. The petrodollar wealth of the nation manifests itself only in the piles of Rolex 
watches, jewelry, gold bars and gold coins, and the fleet of luxury cars all 
incongruously hidden in bunkers that does not translate into the framework of a civil 
society but instead brings up images of piracy, with chests and trunks full of ill-
begotten wealth. While some of this representation is historical and factual vis-à-vis 
Saddam Hussein’s hoarded wealth, it is precisely the on-screen absence or exclusion 
of any other forms of civil society that I point towards in this film. Like the vast 
barren lands of the Western frontier waiting to be civilized and developed in America, 
as seen in the genre of Western films, it is this lack of development in Iraq that the 
camera focuses on.  The significance of this absence underscores the representation of 
this unbalanced, undeveloped, and uncivilized society that needs to be recast in the 
image of westernized civil society, another frontier to be tamed and then remade.  The 
representation of this nation itself is skewed to begin with and the nationalism that 
develops can only be asymmetrical as such. Hence, the nationalism in the context of 
the Iraqis is framed as two-dimensional, a hatred for Saddam Hussein and a desire for 
freedom brought by the Americans. Interestingly, this desire for freedom for the 
resistance groups translates into a desire to cross the border into Iran and into the 
constricted spaces of refugee camps. Like in The Siege, the only spaces fit for Iraqi or 
Arab habitation are always enclosed and contained. This is a rather telling and ironic 






these innocent Iraqis to freedom. One can only read this desire for freedom not as a 
legitimate desire to replace Iraqi nationalism with a nationalism of a different kind, an 
Islamic Nationalism as seen in Iran, but as an absolute inability to replace it with one 
of their imagining. Though the nation of Islam seems to be the uniting factor, it is not 
elaborated upon, as these disenfranchised Iraqis find refuge in a nation-state sworn to 
be Saddam’s enemy but also to the United States.   
 One of the most powerful moments in the film is also one of the most 
problematic scenes in the film. Barlow is taken captive and his interrogator engages 
him in a very forthright conversation about the war. His fluency in English, he 
explains, is courtesy the training the US army provided the Iraqi soldiers (then Allies) 
during the Iran-Iraq war as are the weapons and the military expertise. This ironic 
revelation is lost on Barlow as his Iraqi interrogator shifts the conversation to his 
curiosity about Michael Jackson. This moment is almost lost on the audience as well, 
especially since several such cultural issues are raised by curious Iraqis and used 
earlier in the film to generate humor. I foreground this particular example as the Iraqi 
interrogator articulates a rather profound observation about the innocuity of Michael 
Jackson’s personality. The pop star icon’s appearance and his obvious rejection of his 
own “blackness” troubles the Iraqi who sees it as the manifestation of the self-hatred 
the African-American community has internalized after years of oppression by the 
whites. This thoughtful insight based on his connection of a shared history of 






protagonists of the film the ‘Other’. The film does not clarify or interrogate this 
racism leaving the spectator to make the connections it only subtly hints at in the 
narrative. This analysis of racism is also counteracted through the depiction of racism 
in another scene later in the film, when Chief Elgin as the only African-American 
character objects to the use of certain racial epithets used by the US soldiers. In 
asserting his difference from the Arabs, Chief Elgin distances himself and his 
blackness from their colored skin. As the soldiers discuss the political correctness of 
distinguishing between their Arab allies (Saudi Arabians) and their Arab enemies 
(Iraqis), Elgin says, “I don’t give a shit if he is from Johannesburg. I don’t wanna 
hear ‘dune cocoon’ or ‘sand nigger’ from him or anyone else”. Barlow intervenes to 
say “The point is that ‘towelhead’ and ‘camel jockey’ are perfectly good substitutes”. 
Elgin’s objection is clearly an assertion of his self constructed in opposition with the 
foreign non-white population. The distinction drawn in the racial epithets used, 
ironically, becomes his marked attempt at disassociating his blackness from the 
Arabs, enunciating his belonging with the majority population in the US.  
 Lila Kitaeff, in her essay, “Three Kings: Neocolonial Arab Representation,” 
rightly argues that race plays out very interestingly in this film. Elgin’s character 
“reinforces stereotypical and liberal discourses of blackness”. Elgin is scripted as 
coming from the lower class population of Detroit, a major urban center for the 
working class Black population. Outside of his military service, he works as manual 






class. Elgin “is also presented as having greater athletic abilities than his white 
counterparts, as seen when he destroys a helicopter by hitting it with a football 
strapped with explosives” (9). His religious nature relates “to the liberal discourse 
defining blackness as the center of spirituality and morality” that seems to provide 
him with a protective spiritual armor and he is the only character who is untouched, 
the only one not killed, tortured or shot at.    
The torture scene raises this specter of racial oppression which is then 
projected back onto the Iraqi soldier by Barlow’s actions after he is freed. Even as it 
seems this has intruded into his consciousness, visualized by the projection of the 
horrors of the war onto Troy’s family in the US, his quick dismissal of the issue helps 
circumvent the situation. By reiterating the moral righteousness of the US 
intervention to save Kuwait he affirms his clear assertion of the mission’s overt 
objective and clouds any moral indignation. His refusal to shoot his torturer later is 
very significant. Kitaeff points out, how this “recuperates the US soldier-thief’s 
humanity so that narratively Taghmaoui’s (the Iraqi) complex depiction gets left 
behind” (8). So despite the candid observation and critical reference, there is no overt 
questioning of the role of the US in the Middle East, nor of the historical framework 
that preceded the military engagement in Iraq.  
Color is used to demarcate spatiality in the film. Saturated color stock is used 
to depict spaces that are idealized. These should be primarily off-screen spaces that 






imagination of the character, in full blown color, the director uses it to make a strong 
comment that disrupts the continuity of the film. Russell’s use of vivid color in the 
film for highly graphic scenes is a clever use of cinema in foregrounding certain key 
moments in the narrative. To portray the horrors of what transpires when a bullet 
enters a human body, the scene switches to vibrant color mode to not only make the 
unseen seen, but also to clearly enhance the experience for the viewer. Russell 
effectively uses the spectacular in cinema to visualize death and destruction. The 
stark humor, the casual long shot of a head being blown off, the fountain of blood that 
spurts out from the man’s neck as the head flies off, is instantly replaced by the grisly, 
intense color filled images of the internal organs of the human body, as the foreign 
object plows into it causing havoc. The imagery is grotesque, to say the least, and it 
captures the horrors of war vividly for the audience used to the spectacle of violence 
on screen12. Several such moments abound in this rather self-reflexive film about the 
horrors of violence and the spectacle of terror that have wooed the audience lulling 
them into passive spectators. To the American viewer, the war in Iraq is reduced to 
the palatable version of sanitized images broadcast in the ‘shock and awe’ campaign 
in the US media in which the bomb blasts and missile hits were shown through the 
telescopic lens of cameras. That media blitz not only captured the imagination of 
American viewers as missiles hit Baghdad in the second Gulf War but reiterated and 
reaffirmed the power and might of the most powerful country in the world. What we 






audience as raw images and perhaps even overly dramatized, unmitigated horror used 
for effect to break that passivity with which viewers see choreographed violence on 
screen.     
Color is also effectively used in the torture scene, with Barlow. The death of 
the Iraqi’s wife and child in the bombing allows the viewer into a rare moment of 
insight into the Iraqi’s perspective. And then, by showing the visualization of Troy’s 
family being destroyed by a bombing on US soil, again in saturated color mode, the 
audience is forced to identify with Troy’s traumatic realization of the possibilities of 
war. These deliberately provocative moments in the film jar the film’s continuity13 
and break the suspension of disbelief that most filmmakers nurture. The director 
deliberately uses unsaturated color for most of the film, to show the grimness and 
despair that the war and the bleakness of the Iraqi desert landscape represent and the 
vibrancy of the color in the scenes representing life in the US show the starkness of 
the happy idealized world untouched by the horrors of the war. However, this rare 
moment of identification is instantly downplayed by Barlow’s interjection of how 
Iraq had no business invading Kuwait and it was imperative that the US intervene. 
Any interpellation with the Iraqi subjective position that may complicate the narrative 
is withdrawn and all the audience is left with are some awkward apologetic 
interventions of anti-war ideology.  
There are several remarks in the film that hint at an ideology seemingly anti-






as a mission “to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam with a clear moral imperative,” while 
Ron remarks later, “You want to occupy Iraq, do a Vietnam all over again?” The 
comparison to Vietnam, and the lessons learnt from that war is a shadow still to be 
lifted decades later, and reverberations of that echo through this film with the constant 
obsession with the moral imperative that Barlow tries to impress upon the Iraqis. 
Some of the images in the film are also very powerful and subject themselves 
to a similar reading. What starts out as a joke, with the soldiers complaining of no 
action, not having seen anyone shot etc. results in the blowing up of a cow and that 
then becomes very ironic and telling later on in the scene. So that when the soldiers 
splattered with blood, not unlike butchers, enter a crowded village square and 
announce themselves as representatives of the President of the United States of 
America, the images that come to mind are certainly not that of liberators or heroes. 
Film audiences familiar with such liberation scenes from countless Hollywood films 
of the world war era, are no doubt taken by surprise again at this conscious attempt to 
thwart audience expectations. 
The action that follows is equally out of place in many ways, we see tankers 
pull into the village square and contrary to our expectations, they do not have 
gasoline but as we realize on their being blown up, gallons of milk pour out and 
almost drown the villagers watching. There is a distinct sense of relief for the 
audience expecting a massive explosion and multiple deaths, and yet, the distress is 






in this climate of distrust and suspicion. Russell uses the film devices of surprise and 
suspense, in a rather unique way to disrupt the continuity of the narrative and to 
provoke an unexpected response from the nearly passive audience. These constant 
interventions, manipulation of audience expectations serves the distinct purpose of 
unsettling any previously held beliefs even as the rest of the plot soothes any ruffled 
feathers. To a discerning audience, the message is very mixed and while the 
witticisms provide a lot of entertainment, they also add to the general confusion of the 
film’s world-view.  
The film is also self-reflexive in its use of media and technology to promote 
ideology and propaganda. The embedded media is seen as intrusive and has to be 
shepherded by the troops for their safety as well as to ensure limited access to 
information. Adriana’s persistence in getting information and her unique methods 
constantly seem to strain her relationship with the army officers who attempt 
repeatedly to rein her in. This self-reflexive moment about how the news and 
information is filtered before it reaches its mass audiences becomes key to the film’s 
plot. Archie Gates uses this to his advantage when he gets the media to film the 
passage of the Iraqis into Iran. He uses this footage as leverage to negotiate the 
unconditional release of himself and his little band even though initially, Gates does 
everything to hide the news about the gold bullion, and dodges being followed around 
by Adriana by sending her off on a wild goose chase. This manipulation of the media 






two Gulf Wars colored a nation’s perception of the ideology that propelled and 
instigated the wars as much as it sanitized the collateral damage in the aftermath of 
the war. In recent historic terms this is not unlike the tele-reporting of the Gulf Wars 
in the western media. The “shock and awe” campaign helped instill a sense of 
invincibility in the viewers, who saw the power of technology, infra-red vision, smart 
bombs and accepted it to be a clean war with minimum collateral damage. The 
simultaneous introduction of  familiarity with the action of a war unfolding halfway 
across the world and the obvious antiseptic distance provided by the camera, and the 
remote satellite access ensures the feeling of powerfulness backed by righteousness 
even as it  precludes the blood and gore. The rhetoric of America as the savior echoed 
in the Gulf wars and in this film, helps drum up the jingoism essential to keep the 
patriotic fervor, and as Adriana points out, takes away the ghosts of the Vietnam War. 
Shohat and Stam argue that the during the Gulf wars an “already powerful 
media apparatus became wedded to another apparatus of the gaze – that of military 
simulation and surveillance.  As a consequence, telespectators were encouraged to 
enjoy a quantum leap in prosthetic audio-visual power”(125). They use Donna 
Haraway’s concept of “the conquering gaze from nowhere,” a gaze that is, “the power 
to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation” (125). The media 
therefore, introduces its own biased perspective even while escaping representation 
through their insistence of claimed objectivity. In this film, the media succumbs to the 






within the filmic world. In a very interesting twist, the film’s audience also succumbs 
to the same perspective, and identifies with the same gaze14, and accepts the army’s 
point of view albeit through identification with the renegade protagonists. So the 
film’s audience in envisioning the national imaginary not only buys into the 
machismo and militarism but also the subtle references to righteous wars. In 
identifying with the gaze of the bad boys, the audience gets a vicarious thrill of 
having defied authority only to be rewarded for it. Not unlike the Bollywood films 
discussed in the previous chapter, the protagonists are redeemed by their final actions 
and any anti-national motive is promptly undercut by their ultimate sacrifice for their 
nation. 
Despite the suspect hero-protagonists the film starts out with, there is little 
doubt left at the end of the film. In the film, the main Iraqi resistance group, fuelled 
by nationalistic ambition, and weakened by the years of oppression is seen leaving 
their country, abandoning their nation. In absolute contrast, the little band of brothers 
and renegade US soldiers finally live up to their American ideals and show ‘true 
nationalistic spirit’ by virtue of their actions. They clearly exhibit a strong sense of 
loyalty, put duty towards women and children above all, obviously keep their word 
and their end of the bargain. Their desire to help the oppressed gets the better of their 
personal greed and ambition at the altar of true heroism. The film thus neatly wraps 
up the plot with the emergence of a true American hero even as it redefines the 






and the American spirit that drives it.  
Moving beyond this fictional representation, to the analysis of two 
documentaries requires a big shift in approach. These fiction films and these 
documentaries however provide the final link that ties fiction and fact in this global 
context of terrorism. Produced for PBS, by two independent filmmakers, these 
documentaries Jihad! in America and Hunting Bin Laden use different forms of 
conventional representation – interviews, media coverage, straightforward narration 
and archival footage. Unlike the fictional films discussed earlier in the chapter, these 
documentary films made for the consumption of the audiences of the Public 
Broadcasting Services assumes a very different and rather limited spectatorship. They 
are filmed in Expository mode with omniscient narration. Both the filmmakers make 
no attempt to hide their directorial interventions in terms of camera placement or 
decisions of editing.  It is also important to clarify these are small budget films with 
no unlimited access to state of the art technology.  
Jihad! in America provides us with a look at terrorism from the other side, 
defining Jihad, its supporters and the elaborate network they have established in the 
US. Through the reporting of Steven Emerson, the film explores how this propaganda 
is disseminated across the country and across the globe. The film includes footage of 
the first Islamic conference on Jihad held in Brooklyn, New York in 1989 and then 
later all over the US with a predominant concentration in cities in the Midwest – 






Amongst several people interviewed, Emerson also interviews Charles Cogan, 
a former CIA agent, who was part of the largest covert CIA operation that financed, 
armed and trained the mujahideen in Afghanistan through the help of Pakistan. 
Cogan, talking about this operation says, “we do not need to be apologetic about 
this”. We see a slightly different refrain echoed by the fictional CIA agent Elise Kraft 
in The Siege. 
The film documents various propagandist literature and films produced in the 
US for the purpose of recruiting more Muslims for jihad. The film further investigates 
the complex network across several continents and the intersections and conjunctions 
of several militant groups across the world. The message is simple and unequivocal: a 
declaration of jihad against America.  
Dr. Sami Al-Arian, President of the Islam Committee for Palestine, based in 
Florida, drums up support for the movement with provocative rhetoric. He says, 
We assemble here today to pay respects to the march of the martyrs…to the 
river of blood that gushes forth…and does not extinguish, from butchery to 
butchery, and from martyrdom to martyrdom, from jihad to jihad. 
The rhetoric is inflammatory, anti-American. It also uses powerful imagery and 
loftiness of language that seems to give it the legitimacy of the divine word.  
Osama bin Laden, uses similar rhetoric and again images of violence to 
reinforce the message of jihad. Martin Smith’s Hunting Bin Laden, investigates the 






debate, the Islamic perspective and the position of the US Government. The 
interviews reaffirm the Islamic fundamentalist perspective that argues against the US 
presence in the Middle East, specifically in Saudi Arabia, home to the two holiest 
shrines for the Islamic community in Mecca and Medina.  
These two documentaries have another facet that I have discussed earlier, the 
use of the media for promoting the cause of a violent ideology. Although the Islamic 
extremist perspective rejects all that is Western, it does not hesitate to use Western 
technology, weapons, communication systems, etc. in the war against the West.  
Beau Grosscup, in The Explosion of Terrorism, encapsulates the seven 
assumptions of the “ideology of terrorism”, what he calls conventional wisdom. They 
are: 
1. Terrorism is primarily a strategy of revolutionary groups or individuals 
directed against a state. 
2. Discussion of state terrorism should be focused on totalitarian, fascist, or 
Communist states and cannot include the liberal democratic states. 
3. Terrorism is primarily a strategy of the political Left in theory and 
practice. 
4. Terrorism is indiscriminate violence. 
5. Terrorism is ineffective as a strategy of social or political change. 
6. Terrorism is criminal not political activity. 






This definition is by no means unproblematic. It does not account for right wing 
extremism nor does it fully accommodate state-sponsored terrorism and moreover, it 
rests on the basic premise that any democratically elected government cannot practice 
coercion since they are by definition representative governments elected by popular 
vote. Grosscup himself goes on to deconstruct each of these premises and to make an 
argument as to how this is a politically partisan definition.  
My interest in this definition focuses on points 4 and 7. My argument here is 
that terrorism as we see it represented in these films is indiscriminate violence and the 
victims are random targets chosen with only one objective in mind – maximum 
mileage in terms of publicity. Secondly, and more importantly, terrorism is theatre; it 
is orchestrated as a spectacle – undoubtedly a horrific and graphic one, but enacted in 
a fashion that demands attention, demands spectators. It is also my contention that 
media coverage becomes crucial to the terrorist intention as the reenactment of this 
horrific act again, on a million television sets, brings the fear into millions of homes. 
Hence in The Siege, we see the terrorists wait for the news helicopters before they 
blow the bus up, and by extension of the same logic we see Osama Bin Laden’s 
willingness to talk to the media, grant interviews, release recorded video tapes, etc. 
This symbiotic relationship between the state and the media becomes even more 
tenuous in situations like these. And just as nation-states use media and technology to 
promote a national imaginary, terrorists now employ the same strategies to promote 






 Positioning viewers of fiction films and documentaries helps create a new 
narrative of nationalism and fosters a new national imaginary. In a postcolonial 
reading, it is this positioning, that helps us enter into a derivative discourse whether it 
is embracing the colonizer’s perspective or questioning the representation of the 
manifestation of the fissured subjectivity of the colonized peoples. It reveals the 
fundamental asymmetries in these imaginings within the existing hegemonic power 
structures. Just as technology makes available the experience of television and film 
viewing for millions, it also helps obliterate the experience for countless others. It 
gives voice and representation to the multitudes just as it takes away that power of 
representation from some.  Hollywood film uses several spectatorial positions to 
interpellate and mobilize spectatorial desire15 to participate in and support the 
neocolonial mission of the protagonists. It also projects any unwarranted injustices 
and oppressive tactics onto a faceless bureaucracy, the mammoth like institutional 
machinery of the military, a megalomaniac general even as it gives face to individual 
heroes who work within or outside the system as they transition into morally superior 
figures through the trajectory of the film. My analysis of these several films provides 
a close and detailed look at how viewers construct a national imaginary, and how it is 
thrust upon them.  
My category of (anti)nationalisms as seen in these films, is constructed and 
deconstructed, only to be made over again in a different avatar and this echoes in the 






Congress, and he declared, “Any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”. Elaborating on this 
definition further, on Oct 30, he said, “If you feed a terrorist, if you provide sanctuary 
to a terrorist, if you fund a terrorist, you are just as guilty as the terrorist that inflicted 
harm on the American people” (The Washington Post, Nov 27, 2001). The war in 
Afghanistan is over, although Osama Bin Laden is still at large. President Bush has 
further expanded on the parameters of the definition of terrorism to include “countries 
that develop weapons of mass destruction could be a target in the US war on 
terrorism…”  
  Jihad on America was declared officially in the summer of 1996, and the 
fatwa still stands. The US retaliated by declaring war on the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan that was harboring Osama Bin Laden, on October 7th, 2001. The US also 
declared war on Iraq on March 19th, 2003. Current events indicate the possibility of a 
breakout of a Shia-Sunni ethnic conflict that might result in an all-out civil war. New 
nations are being formed and the (anti)nationalisms that help define them. The rest is 











1 Benedict Anderson, in his seminal text, Imagined Communities argues that nations 
are imagined communities conceived out of a deep horizontal comradeship.  
They are inherently limited because even the largest nation has finite albeit elastic 
boundaries outside of which lie other nations. They are also sovereign because they 
have their genesis in a time when divinely ordained dynastical rule was being 
challenged. 
 
2 I refer to Bordwell, Thompson and Staiger’s essay “Space in the Classical Film” in 
their text, The Classical Hollywood Cinema. 
 
3 I refer to the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon in Washington DC and the twin 
towers at the World Trade Center towers in New York City on September 11, 2001. 
Al-Qaeda members flew three hijacked commercial airliners into these targets in what 
has now become the largest ever terrorist act on US soil. 
 
4 A Fatwa is a legal pronouncement in Islam, issued by a religious law specialist on a 
specific issue. Usually a fatwa is issued at the request of an individual or a judge to 
settle a question where Islamic jurisprudence, is unclear. 
 
5 Ummah Islam is an Arabic word also spelled umma, meaning community or nation. 
In the context of Islam, the word ummah is used to mean the community of the 
believers (ummat al-muminin), and thus the whole Islamic world. The phrase ummah 
wahida in the Quran refers to the Islamic world unified. Some modern Islamists use 
the term "Islamic Ummah" or "Muslim Ummah" to refer to the people in the nation-
states and nations that are predominantly Muslim and that were once under the 
control of the Islamic Caliphate. 
 
6 Sharia means Islamic Law. In an Islamic state, Sharia governs both public and 
private lives of those living within the state encompassing many aspects of day-to-day 
life - politics, economics, banking, business law, contract law, and social issues. Seyla 













with respect to the public but not the private sphere of society in the face of 
globalization in her essay, “Unholy Politics”. 
 
7 The Western uses the face-off as the final moment of climax in the confrontation of 
the protagonist (in this case the cowboy) with the antagonist usually in the form of a 
face to face duel like encounter. The audience is aware that any such face-off will 
obviously result in victory for the protagonist so the pleasure derived is not from the 
suspense of the final outcome but simply from the action and the speed of the draw in 
the western film.   
 
8 The Dhahran bombing took place when a large truck bomb hit the Khobar Towers 
apartment complex in Khobar, near Dhahran on June 25, 1996 in which 19American 
soldiers were killed and 372 wounded in the blast.  
 
9 Several Hollywood films have been made on the idea of terrorism in the US. Some 
notable films include - Passenger 57 (1992), Under Seige (1992), Executive Decision 
(1996, The Seige (1998) The Devil’s Own (1997) Arlington Road (1999). 
 
10 A lot of scholarly work exists on the use of rape as a strategy of war, and as its 
depiction as a necessary tool for release of pent up anger and frustration in a war 
zone. As a tool of war, the impregnation of the women of another race or class or 
nation also allows for the supposed perpetuation of the so called superior 
race/class/nation. The nudity of a black or brown female body also feeds the male 
gaze and nourishes spectatorial desire for the white male audience.  
 
11 Mani Ratnam’s choice of a South Indian hero protagonist in a national cinema 
dominated by people of North Indian origins and catering to a largely Hindi speaking 
audience is rather unusual. Bollywood cinema has always used the north Indian male 
as the archetypal macho hero and true patriot. Arvind, the nerdy South Indian hero-
protagonist whose overarching patriotism is cheered by the audiences in the end, 












English speaking, middle class male, whose patriotism also makes him an ideal 
citizen though not akin to the rural, Hindi speaking, macho hero-protagonists battles 
class hierarchies and overturns dominant and hegemonic social structures in the 
cinema of the early 1950s in India that helped in the myth of nation building.     
 
12 I seek to differentiate here between the kinds of violence the cinema audience is 
used to and thrives on – on cinema and television screen as well as in video games 
and the depiction of violence that Russell indulges in. While violence – almost 
choreographed violence, is commonplace in films starting with the thrillers to the war 
films, I argue it is the positioning of the spectatorial perspective that makes this 
violence palatable.  So films like Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction and Kill Bill Vol I 
and Vol 2 manipulate their audience and their popular expectations of violence by 
building on the spectator’s identification with the protagonist followed by a sudden 
let down and grotesque violence that subverts all their previous cinematic 
experiences.  
 
13 I refer here to the Classical Hollywood style of continuity. 
 
14 I use “gaze” in Laura Mulvey’s definition of the term. 
 










Chapter 6: Conclusion 
In Riot, the Hindu crowds chants slogans to incite and provoke the violence against 
Muslims and the cries of “Jis Hindu ka khoon na khaula, Khoon nahin woh pani hai” 
(The Hindu whose blood does not boil has water in his veins) and “Jo Janmabhoomi 
ke kaam na aaye, who bekaar jawanee hai” (he who does not work for the 
Janmabhoomi is a useless youth) rent the air (128). In what seems to be a startling 
coincidence that spoke to me in more ways than one, the beginning of a recently 
released Hindi film, Rang de Basanti (2006) directed by Rakeysh Omprakash Mehra1 
echoes a variation of the same words: “Ab bhi jiska khoon na khaula, khoon nahin 
woh paani hai, Jo desh ke kaam na aaye, woh bekaar jawanee hai” (Whoever’s blood 
is not yet boiling, has water running in his veins, and whoever does not work for the 
nation, wastes his youth). 
(Anti)nationalisms analyzed in the context of the Indian subcontinent in 
Chapter 2 continue to reverberate with similar rhetoric in today’s cinema bringing us 
a full circle from where we started.  But there is a big difference in the context of the 
enunciation of the versions of two little ditties, I mention here. That difference serves 
as another example in my overarching argument of the need for my category of 
(anti)nationalisms.  
The use of the slogan shouting in Riot is specific to the inflammatory rhetoric 






against the Muslim ‘other’, demanding they reclaim the land that is righteously theirs. 
It taunts their inability to harness their male energy towards this nationalistic 
enterprise and by displacing religion and ethnic identity into the public forum ensures 
that religion informs political manipulation and maneuverings. In Rang de Basanti, 
the (anti)nationalisms are not based in religious fundamentalisms at all but instead 
draw on the conflict between nation and nation-state. The call to respond is not 
directed at the Hindu youth alone, but to all Indian youth irrespective of caste, 
religion or class to rise up and meet the need of the hour. The need being articulated 
here is to fight their own apathy in order to take on the corrupt nation-state, its 
branches of government and to demand accountability from the politicians. The 
failure of the nation-state to provide for its citizens in the film manifests itself in 
multi-dimensional ways.  
Rang de Basanti, connects all the dots in my dissertation. Its thematic content 
blends seamlessly with several of the texts I have chosen for my dissertation even as 
its temporality spans the entire duration I deal with in my dissertation, from 1930s 
colonial India to contemporary India. The parallels are endless and I touch upon only 
a select few here. From the Indian freedom movement we see in Tamas that is re-
imagined and re-enacted in this film, to the shades of Richard we see in James 
McKinley as a British administrator, uncomfortable with the duties he is required to 
carry out, to the passion and zeal of Priscilla Hart that we see echoed in Sue’s 






the earlier texts in several ways. Sue like Priscilla revisits India to balance the books, 
her desire to celebrate the life of these Indian freedom fighters as unsung heroes is 
similar to Priscilla’s desire to give back to India what she perceives her father used 
only for his exploitative ends. Like the terrorist-protagonists of most of the 
Bollywood films I analyze, Rang de Basanti is also about disavowed, disgruntled 
unemployed urban educated youth, whose vulnerability and passion is easily 
manipulated and channelized into violence. The camaraderie of the morally bankrupt 
renegade soldiers in Three Kings, the very attributes that make them unlikely heroes 
translates into similar unlikely heroes in the fun-loving, beer-spilling, reckless but 
loveable characters of Rang de Basanti. But, despite all these similarities, Rang de 
Basanti is important for my conclusion because it invests each of these parallels with 
a difference in representation crucial to my larger argument.  
The film tells the story of an Englishwoman, Sue McKinley and her desire to 
make a film about several famous Indian revolutionaries from colonial times whose 
passion and nationalism features prominently in her grandfather’s diary. Moved by 
the eloquent prose of her grandfather, James McKinley, a jailer in British India, as he 
wrote about the grace of these men and women who embraced death to provide 
freedom to their nation, Sue arrives in India armed with only a dream, her night-
school Hindi and her movie camera.  Through Sonia her contact in India she is 
introduced to five disgruntled youth enrolled at the University of Delhi and as one of 






studying there. They are older than the average student and seem to thrive on their 
unlimited free time, scared to go out into the real world and tackle real problems they 
live their lives in a time warp. They obviously subscribe to different religious faiths 
so we have the Hindus (Karan, Sukhi) and the Muslim (Ashfaq) and the Sikh2 (DJ or 
Daljeet). The two outsiders are Lakshman, who is also Hindu, albeit of the 
fundamentalist variety and Flight Lieutenant Ajay Rathod (Sonia’s fiance).who is 
gainfully employed and stands apart from the rest in this and in many more ways. 
Unlike the others who dismiss nationalism as irrelevant to their daily lives, Lakshman 
and Ajay embrace their own versions of nationalist pride. Lakshman as a party 
worker of a Right-wing Hindu political party believes in ‘Hindutva’ as the only pure 
form of nationalism, rejecting the westernized ways of his peers and asserting the 
exclusionary nature of his male Hindu chauvinism by directing his anger towards the 
Muslim, Ashfaq. Ajay, as a fighter pilot in the Indian Air force, is invested in the 
nation and its borders, putting his life on the line to protect the nation-state he pledges 
allegiance to. Sue persuades these youth to act in her film, The Young Guns, about the 
Indian revolutionaries Bhagat Singh, Chandrashekhar Azad, Ramprasad Bismil, Lala 
Lajpat Rai, Aslam and Durga Bibi. The film within a film unfolds in sepia, and the 
protagonists get drawn into the spirit of nationalism that pervades their consciousness 
despite their resistance to it. Their innocence is shattered by the tragic death of Ajay 
in a flying accident, caused by the malfunctioning of the MIG-21 plane of the Indian 






evolves into a political drama when the threat to expose the corruption at the highest 
levels of government turns the silent memorial protest march into a spectacle of 
violence and police brutality. Lakshman, too eventually succumbs to the spirit of the 
secularized nationalism that engulfs them all with the unfolding of these tragic events. 
The disillusioned and disgruntled protagonists decide to take the law into their own 
hands and inspired by the revolutionaries who brought about change through their 
actions, they decide to assassinate the Defence Minister mimicking their roles in 
Sue’s film. The plotlines of the two films merge at this point and the dialogue and 
actions overlap and the constant intercutting between the two films establishes the 
parallel in the plot narrative. They cleverly use the media, the FM radio channels, 
choosing their target audience of Indian youth, to broadcast their message of anger 
against the corrupt state.  It appears they succeed in revitalizing the youth across the 
nation, winning their sympathy and the heavy handedness of the state in killing them 
all in the end despite their being unarmed only serves to reinforce their message to 
take back the nation from its current guardians. The five men protagonists die as 
heroes in the imagination of a new generation.  
The film, like all Bollywood films, uses spectacle and excess with its 
interruptions in the MTV style montage of the choreographed song and dance 
sequences, the constant flirtatious efforts of DJ to woo Sue, and the vivid color of the 
film’s title that spills onto the screen in the festivities associated with the Basant 






problems. The role of Sonia and Sue as cheerleaders on the sidelines is problematic to 
say the least. The transition of the characters from carefree youth to passionate 
citizens maybe read as a little hasty and not well developed. But that will have to wait 
for another time, another paper. 
Having pointed out the parallels that were staring me in the face, now, let me 
take a step back and analyze the difference in treatment of the subject matter that I 
said validates my argument further. In Tamas, as we discussed in Chapter 2, the 
fledgling Indian nationalism and the struggle of the local leaders to translate the 
larger vision of the nation into the daily lives of a largely rural population permeates 
the entire novel. The fissures of society surface competing with the nationalism of the 
freedom movement. And like in Riot, this privileging of other forms of identity above 
nation, results in collective violence or riots, manifestation of the (anti)nationalisms I 
discuss earlier. In Rang de Basanti, we see the opposite play out, with a celebration of 
the unsung heroes of the Indian freedom movement that inspires a new generation of 
Indians with their simple unbridled passion in their cause. Again, there is a 
manifestation in the form of violence, it is anti-national in its focus but the 
(anti)nationalisms that drive it are not religious fundamentalisms. It is a different kind 
of (anti)nationalism, completely political in its focus, directed exclusively towards the 
nation-state and the violence it inspires does not cause the deaths of fellow citizens.  
In what is an ironic twist, the malfunctioning of the fighter-jet is not about terrorism 






Like the trangressive terrorist-protagonists of Maachis, (Kirpal) Mission Kashmir 
(Altaaf) and Fiza (Amaan), the young men in this film are unemployed and 
disillusioned. When confronted by personal tragedy, DJ, Ashfaq, Sukhi, Karan and 
Lakshman don’t join forces with terror organizations like Kirpal, Altaaf and Amaan. 
They take the law in their own hands but direct their anger towards one single target, 
a corrupt politician, and mirroring the actions of Indian revolutionaries refrain from 
unmitigated violence. Their’s is a measured response, they do not fire back at the 
policemen who surround them in the end and die as unarmed targets in an 
unprecedented bloodbath. I wish to remind the reader at this point of my argument 
about the differences in the (anti)nationalisms and their motivations for terrorism in 
the case of  Kirpal, Altaaf and Amaan whose actions mark them as terrorists and 
ensure that they cannot be easily taken back into the folds of society. The family as 
nation trope with absent fathers continues with Daljeet who is fatherless and the 
moving force of the group, whose loving mother functions as the moral center for the 
entire group, anchoring them in the social structure, reining in their joie-de-vivre 
occasionally.  The comparisons are endless as are the disjunctures. 
Let me conclude by drawing on a clear example of how my category of 
(anti)nationalisms helps in bridging the discursive gap between nationalism and 
terrorism as we know it today. Rang de Basanti offers us a clear example of the 
distinction I draw in my dissertation between the nationalism as part of a freedom 






milieu.  In Sue’s film The Young Guns, Bhagat Singh, a young Sikh attempts to kill 
the British Police Chief Scott to avenge the brutal death of Lala Lajpat Rai killed 
while peacefully demonstrating against the Simon Commission of 19283. This 
historical lesson reinvents itself in the (anti)nationalism that consumes this young 
group when faced with the rampant corruption in today’s government. Far from 
acknowledging and celebrating Ajay Rathod’s heroic act of saving civilian lives, 
these morally bankrupt politicians twist the truth to paint Ajay Rathod as a reckless 
brash young man, whose antics cost the nation. Their effort to demonstrate peacefully 
and protest this unfair portrayal of a patriotic young man is met with police brutality 
that lands his mother in a coma. Like Bhagat Singh, another Punjabi youth is inspired 
and DJ steps up to kill Shastriji. In the postcolonial context, the (anti)nationalism that 
inspires this group has different roots, it has a different enemy and a different 
constituency. It does not promote a privileging enterprise for a top-down approach 
like the normative homogenized male middle-class Hindu national imaginings we see 
in the Bollywood films, not does it present the anti-modern nationalism of the Hindu 
Right, instead it offers us an alternative kind of inclusive national imaginary that rises 
from below within a younger generation already modernized.  
And yet, despite the violence associated with this (anti)nationalism with its 
anti-national sentiments, it is clearly not terrorism as the protagonists themselves 
assert repeatedly. This crucial difference between nationalism, (anti)nationalisms and 






nation are being re-written, it is now to be seen who write that history and who is 
written into it.   





1 Rang De Basanti: A Generation Awakens (Paint it Yellow) directed by Rakeysh 
Omprakash Mehra in January 2006 has already been hailed as a cult film. 
 
2 Many Sikhs in the wake of terrorism in Punjab cut their hair and stopped wearing 
the customary turban that marked them as Sikhs. Some even saw it as a need to 
modernize themselves, stripped of ascriptive markers, blending with the majority 
population of secularized citizenry. Daljeet (the name suggests he is Sikh) is one such 
example. His grandfather and mother are obviously Sikh in their manner, dress code 
and their visit to the Golden Temple in Amritsar validates this. 
  
3 The British government created a commission under Sir John Simon to report on the 
current political situation in India in 1928. The Indian political parties boycotted the 
commission because it did not include a single Indian as its member. When the 
commission visited Lahore on October 30, 1928, Lal Lajpat Rai led the protest 
against the commission in a silent march. He was killed and Bhagat Singh vowed to 
avenge his meaningless death. He conspired to kill Scott but in a case of mistaken 
identity, Bhagat Singh accidentally killed J.P. Saunders, a Deputy Superintendent of 
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